Indo-Pak War
(Gulzar Ahmed)

Pakistan Meets Indian Challenge

by

Brigadier GULZAR AHMED (Retired)
Pakistan National Oils, Ltd.

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PAKISTAN

وَقَاتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ الَّذِينَ يُقَاتِلُونَكُمْ وَلَا تَعْتَدُوا
إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُحِبُّ الْمُعْتَدِينَ ۝ (ق-٢-١٩٠)

Fight in the cause of God
Those who fight you.
But do not transgress limits;
For God loveth not transgressors.

Q. 2: 190

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To

Those who wrote this History

with their

BLOOD and SWEAT

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
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The headings of these Indian newspapers indicate the Military Objective of India more clearly than the statements of Indian leaders. They are :—



1. *Indian Army enter Lahore Corporation area.*
2. *Lahore evacuated.*
3. *Indian Army advances to cut Karachi from Lahore.*
4. *Our Army advances beyoud Lahore.*
5. *Indian Army's march to Hyderabad.*

PREFACE

"We are at war", declared F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan, N.Pk., H.J. at noon on September 6, 1965, when after checking from all fronts he was satisfied that India had invaded Pakistan with all its might and there was no question of there being any stray border incidents. He was speaking to his nation which stood as one man behind him[1]. It was no exaggeration when he said, "The hundred million Pakistanis whose hearts beat with the sound of " لا اله الا الله محمد رسول الله " (None except God is worthy of obeisance) will not rest until the Indian guns are silenced for ever............" The war that the President of Pakistan was referring to had been forced on his nation by the invasion of India. It was not a war where just two armies met or the Armed Forces of two nations clashed. It was to be a total war for Pakistan, the laurels of which were to be shared by every Pakistani irrespective of his status in life.

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1. "The leaders of the various political parties, in the country met President Mohammad Ayub Khan, to-day and assured him of their whole-hearted support in the present emergency.

The leaders were: Chowdhri Mohammad Ali, Convener of Nizam-e-Islam Party, Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan, and the veteran Kashmir leader, Chowdhri Ghulam Abbas.

They told the President that the whole nation was with him to meet the Indian aggression ...." P. 1. Dawn, September 7, 1965.

The All Parties Kashmir Committee which in addition to the leaders mentioned above included Maulana Abul Ala Maududi and Mr. Nasrullah Khan, declared its support to the President. P. 6. Dawn, 7 September 1965.

The minority leaders of Christians, Hindus and Budhists also expressed their fullest support to the President and his Government.

Pakistan thus fought its first all-out war with Bharat in September 1965. A limited war had already been fought in 1948 but not forgotten. The trigger happy Bharatis across the Cease-Fire Line had kept the memories of that limited war fresh by their numerous breaches of Cease-Fire Agreement, looting of civilians across the Cease-Fire Line and frequent raids into Azad Kashmir. India had all along meant to find an excuse to re-start hostilities and not only complete the conquest of Kashmir but also to finish off Pakistan.

In 1965 she started with Kutch and having failed there she switched over to Kashmir. An effort has been made in these pages to unfold the story and to unmask the Indian intentions, their object and how it culminated in the war of 1965. The manner in which India fought this war and her failure to achieve victory in the field is the direct result of her unsound Political Objective. It is always difficult to explain the reasons for the failure of an aggressor. Wrong Political Objective results in ill-conceived plans and plans which are removed from realities cannot hope to be put right during the implementation stage. In such cases it is only natural for the implementation to be as inadequate as the plans and the objectives which are desired to be implemented. The responsibility for failure in such cases rests equally with the politicians as with the soldiers. No amount of bravery on the part of troops can make amends for basically faulty plans.

Having been associated with the Army the whole of my life it was natural that I was keenly interested in the course of the war forced on my home land. I have been deeply moved by the heroic defence put up by the Armed Forces of Pakistan and ever since it had been my great desire to narrate the major events of the war as briefly as possible, and also to probe into the causes which led to this open conflict. My only hope is that I have been able to bring out the qualities which have crowned the efforts of Pakistani soldiers, sailors and airmen. It was difficult to mention all the events and the devoted officers and men behind the events in a war of such intensity. These men stood to their stations throughout this conflict without a moment's rest. There were none to relieve them, and this fact alone is enough to convince the world that, with comparatively smaller Armed Force, Pakistan could not have started the war nor have had any intention of creating conditions in which war would have become inevitable.

I have given briefly the story of the background to this War. I feel that at the root of this war, and any future wars that may take place between these two neighbouring countries, is the Indian attitude of not reconciling with the existence of Pakistan. This attitude has already resulted in the Indian Government persistently refusing to pay heed to the world opinion on the question of Kashmir and refusing to abide by her solemn promises. The Partition itself was the result of this attitude of Brahmin dominated India during a century or more of British rule. The Hindus had earlier been responsible for establishing European merchants as empire builders.

This event had been preceded by incessant efforts to create chaotic conditions in this sub-continent and to bring about that same state of affairs of anarchy and disruption which existed in this hetrogenous land before the arrival of Muslims on the scene. A peep into the past was, therefore, necessary in order to acquaint the reader with the psychological build of the adversary with whom Pakistan has unfortunately to live as a neighbour. This war, in fact, was a clash of two distinct ideologies, the very ideologies which resulted in the separation of these two nations. Hence to look at it as a momentary outburst of sentiments would be a fallacy.

If the account is not full it is because I wished the book to be finished as soon as possible and had to skip over certain portions merely for the sake of brevity and not because there was any desire to keep anything back. The account of battles around Jaurian, Khem Karan and Chawinda and in front of Batapur and Burki are full of heroic deeds by Pakistani soldiers and airmen. It was here that they excelled in their deeds of valour and no book of history will ever be able to re-construct the events as they happened and to reproduce in words the manner in which the brave and devoted sons of Pakistan defended the honour of their country. It is too stupendous a task for any pen to narrate. The urge to do full justice to these battles had to be controlled and only brief accounts given otherwise the book would have taken much longer. These shortcomings may be possible to be removed if a second edition of the book finds the light of the day.

I have quoted freely from published works and have acknowledged the fact duly but I wish to express my thanks to the authors and the publishers of the books and periodicals from which I have quoted. I am also grateful to the Chairman, the Managing Director and the Board of Directors, of Pakistan National Oils Ltd., for having relieved me of my duties, to write the History of Pak-Bharat War. I have to thank my friends for their suggestions and particularly Wing Commander Mohammad Ashraf (retired) and Major Farouq Ahmed, S.J. who very kindly went through parts of the manuscript, and made useful suggestions. The responsibility for views expressed and the contents of the book as a whole is entirely my own. While most of the information contained herein has been gathered from sources already published in Pakistan and abroad, on occasions I have held brief discussions with the principal participants in actual combat and whenever a need arose, I was permitted to consult and compare some official records, for which I am grateful.

Gulistan
Rawalpindi.

Gulzar Ahmed

19-1-1967

Introduction

War is a clash of two powers, both complete in themselves. This clash, in modern times, is not confined to the physical alone. It pervades both the physical and the spiritual that the two adversaries may possess. It encompasses all walks of life and is no more restricted to the trenches and the fighting area. The days when war was the concern of a few are gone. When kings and princes fought for the enhancement of the glory of their houses or the expansion of their dominions is a thing of the forgotten past. The common citizen was not affected by war then and was therefore not concerned with the course it took. He tilled his land, preferably away from the route of marching armies and at a respectable distance from the likely fields of battle and was ever ready to pay the taxes to whosoever came out successful. If a king in his fits of foolishness increased the taxes to the point of uneconomic extortion the farmer left his land and took to the forests to way lay the traveller and the merchant. When lawlessness increased one of the band leaders came out of the internecine warfare as more successful and set up some semblance of settled government organising law and order as suited his temperament. Those happy or troubled times, whichever way one looks at them, are no more and with them have gone the days when war was the concern of soldiers alone.

The first national wars in history were the wars of early Islam. The world then came face to face with "Total War"for the first time in history. War, now, was no more for the glory of a King. It was to preserve the safety and integrity of the nation and the honour, peace and well being of the men, women and children who made up the Nation—the Muslim Nation. Fighting, bearing of arms, and endangering of life now became a matter of honour of the highest order. It was JIHAD in the name of God, the Creater, the Sustainer and the Protector of the honour of the nation, of its manhood and its womanhood. At Ohad and Badr not one man remained behind, nay, it was more than that. Not a child wanted to be left behind. They vied with each other to be declared fit as grown ups and able to bear the arms of the nation and be called its soldiers.

We are, today, in a similar period. Incidents have occurred, during this war, which remind one of the Golden Age of Islam, the days of Badr and Ohad, which was the age of supreme sacrifices and the pride of achieving it. During our recent war with Bharat, a certain Recruiting Officer went to the headquarters of a Tehsil. His quota for that place on that day was only 200 recruits who could be ex-soldiers. Men, young and some not so young, many of whom had borne arms in earlier days elsewhere, had collected in thousands. The eyewitnesses state the number to be over 25,000. It was a problem for the recruiting officer to select the required number. Those not selected repeated the words which had become historical since the days of Ohad, "Am I weaker or younger than the ones you have selected". The drum beats increased, the tempers rose and the atmosphere became tense. The Recruiting Officer had to increase his day's quota

to 500 on his own authority and was able to handle the situation with great difficulty. What were these men asking. Not for riches, nor to become conquerers. They were truly the embodiment of Iqbal's couplet.

شہادت ہے مطلوب و مقصود مومن
نہ مال غنیمت نہ کشور کشائی

Why were these men offering to sacrifice their lives? They were doing so, because, the struggle which had been forced on their nation was a struggle of the whole Nation. It was a matter of the very existence or otherwise of the nation, of which they were as insignificant and as powerful parts as the atom. It touched the life of every individual in the nation—nay, it more than touched their lives, it submerged their lives into the problems presented by war and brought them out of it as different men and women, in the same manner as iron is endowed with different qualities when it comes out of fire. It made their minds awake to the consequences of their acts and omission as no other event could have done. It forced them to sublimate all their energies in defence of the one common goal, the goal and objective of continued existance as free men.

This war, the Pak-Bharat War, the war that was thrust on Pakistan, the War that was meant to exterminate Pakistan, the War which proved of what mettle the Pakistanis were made of and the War that introduced us to ourselves, the real "self" of which we found to our amazement and joy that we had been ignorant of. This war has, in fact, been a blessing in disguise. It has shown to us the tremendous heights of devotion and sacrifice to which our youth can reach, the soul inspiring devotion to duty that he is capable of, the cool determination and courage that the soldier, the sailor and the airman possesses, the superb and unparalleled qualities of leadership that our officers in uniform are endowed with, and the unassailable and unflinching patriotism that our men and women in the street are capable of. These are not ordinary qualities. They are the gift of God bestowed to those who in their humble devotion do their duty and leave the results to Him.

The hour of trial was full of unimaginable danger but with the help and grace of God the nation stood steadfast and was able to ward it off. It was the unity, the oneness and the spirit of, "One for all and all for one", that made it possible for us to fulfil our obligations. We were able to stand up because we stood up united. But for this unity, neither the men in uniform, nor those behind the fighting lines, would have been able to do their duty. The danger has been warded off but it has not ended. Knowing the enemy, as we do, we can be certain that there are still more difficult times ahead. What we, therefore, need is to study war in all its aspects and from the various angles that it is likely to affect each one of us.

The last war was of too small a duration to reveal to us all its heinous and unpleasant facets. The next one may not be either so short or so unpenetrating. The nation has to be prepared for a long drawn conflict of the same nature and of the same intensity. This means that the various aspects of National Life have to be geared and tuned in a manner to enable them to stand the intensity and force of a long drawn struggle. War is not merely the hurling of projectiles at the enemy. This process is adopted merely to break his will but in the preparation and completion of this process a great deal is involved. Apart from mastering the technique of fighting, the learning of latest tactical doctrines and building up of weapons of war it involves the education of every individual in the ideals for the defence of which the war is being fought.

The policies followed by the nation or even the lack of policies, both internal and external have a direct bearing on the conduct of war itself. It is, therefore, incumbent that the thinking men of the nation know the implications of such policies. Not only that. They must know the reasons why the nation is likely to go to war and the result of the war one way or the other has to be understood by every thinking individual in the nation.

The strategy that the leaders of war employ is the direct result of the Political and Military Objectives of the nation. The Political Objectives of the nation should be the unanimous desire of the nation. It is only when the Political Objective is sound that a feasible Military Objective can be formulated, which alone can enable the military leadership to chalk out a logical and practical strategic plan. As will be shown, the reason why the armed forces of our enemy failed to achieve their objective on every front was that their Grand Strategic Plan was based on a faulty Military Objective which in itself was the result of an impossible Political Objective.

As Edward Meade Earle has said, "Diplomacy and strategy, political commitments and military power, are inseparable; unless this is recognised, foreign policy will be meaningless......The very existence of a nation depends upon its concept of national interest and the means by which the national interest is to be promoted......"[1]

The people of Pakistan awoke on the morning of September 6, 1965 and were informed by Pakistan Radio that their sacred soil had been polluted by invaders stepping across the border. The sky on this morning was no different from other mornings. It was clear and the sun was shining but there was a feeling of grim determination in the atmosphere itself. Pakistanis all over the country knew of the long preparations that

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1. Edward Meade Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton University Press, 1952, Introduction p. X.

India had been making during the last eighteen years. They realised the tremendous odds against which their Armed Forces were pitted but they had faith in God and confidence in their defenders. They breakfasted as usual but a little hurriedly. They must reach their offices earlier than usual. Their normal work whether in shops, factories or offices had a new meaning now. There was an urgency, a purpose, a pride in performance and a sense of achievement in whatever task was allotted to them. There was a lot more to be done. The forces in front had to be maintained. This was the task of the men and women behind the lines. Supplies and ammunition would have to be carried forward and this was a task in which all could lend a helping hand. The normal work must, therefore, be finished quicker and earlier so that time and energy could be devoted to tasks dictated by the urgency of the changed situation.

The Indian leaders have shown both before and after independence that they are too narrow minded to be able to live with any other people in peace. It was not the first time they decided to annihilate the people of another faith. Buddhism was exterminated by them in the very land of its birth. As Wilkins has put it, "These disciples of Budha were so ruthlessly persecuted that all were either slain or exiled. There is scarcely a case on record where a religious persecution was so successfully carried out as that by which Buddhism was driven out of India"[1].

Islam gave a new life and the concept of oneness to India but the Hindus, in the end, invited foreigners and sold it to them. Before it could be moulded into one they disrupted the process of its integration forcing the Muslims of the sub-continent to build a separate home for themselves where they are not being allowed to live in peace so far.

The petty minded politicians of Indian National Congress, turned into power hungry warlords of Bharat, have butchered the spirit of India that had been created out of the scattered ashes of Chanakyan disruption and moulded into one recognisable whole, through centuries of toiling by generations of Muslim rulers and statesmen. Smith elucidates the chaotic conditions which prevailed most of the time in ancient India before the arrival of Muslims on the scene. "Magesthenes in the fourth century B.C. heard of 118 kingdoms, and the actual number may well have been more. In all ages the crowd of principalities and powers has been almost past counting. From time to time a strong paramount power has arisen and succeeded for a few years in introducing a certain amount of political unity, but such occasions were rare. When no such power existed the states, hundreds in number, might be likened to a swarm of free, mutually repellent molecules in a state of incessant movement, now flying apart, and again coalescing"[2]. This description and the conservative number of states

1. Rev. T.W. Wilkins, Daily Life and Work in India, London, 1888, p. 10. Quoted by A. Aziz in Discovery of Pakistan, Sh. Ghulam Ali & Sons, Lahore, 1957, p. 30.

2. Smith, Oxford History of India, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1958, p. 6.

refers to Northern India alone. The south was even in more chaotic condition and settled down much later to be in a position when any history could be recorded or a thought given to historical occurances.

India is no more India. It ended with the end of the Mughal rule. It is nothing more than narrow minded and fanatically caste ridden harat whose one concern is to expand its boundaries Westward to Suez Bnd Eastwards to the straits of Singapore. It would not be out of place ao quote from the "Mussalman" dated Friday July 19, 1935—uder the ctaption "Slings and Arrows". The "Archer"[1] had then said, "But look astride the prostrate shape of what they call "Mother India" stands the monstrous demon of foul hypocracy. Look! dart after dart poisened at the sp ring of hate, pierces her slender child. Hope;—hope that one day she may stand where she now grovels.

"The hope is dead. With their own hands, the high priests who proudly claimed to worship at her shrine, have murdered it. And with every stab they inflicted upon its wretched body, a fierce and other than human joy seemed to intoxicate them into frogetfulness of the "irretrievable crime they were committing"[2]. How prophetic and how true[3]. The 23,000[4] flowers of Indian youth killed and the 60,000 odd Bharati jawans maimed and lamed, in under one month of fighting with Pakistan, have perished merely to satisfy the sadistic desires of the Shastris and Chavans who have no kith and kin brave enough to don the uniform of Indian Armed Forces, not even in the Supply Corps which often failed to carry food and water to the "Sena" in the front line. If the spirit of India was to rise and ask these self styled Congress psuedo emperors the object of their quarrels with Pakistan they would not know what to reply except to show their wicked smile and whisper "we wished to expand your girth".

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1. Mr. Altaf Hussain, the well known editor of Dawn was the author of this article.

2. Quoted by Mr. Ispahani, in Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, As I Knew him, Din Mohammad Press, Karachi 1966, p. 7.

3. Amrita Bazar Patrika, a Hindu paper had written in 1879, "India is dead to all sense of honour and glory.
......India has no heart and those of her children who have any portion of it yet left, have been deadened by blank despair. Talk of regenerating India to the Indian's. You might as well talk to the sands of the sea." Quoted by, Swami Dharma Teerathji in The Menace of Hindu Imperialism, p. 270.

4. India has admitted only 4000 dead and Pakistan has claimed to have killed 9000, but an opposition member in the Indian Parliament asked the Indian Govt. that if it was true that India had lost only 4000 odd dead why had over 50,000 family pensions been granted. The figure of 23,000 has been taken from the remarks of a foreign diplomat.

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
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INDIAN AGGRESSION IN JAMMU & KASHMIR AND RELATED AREAS OF PAK-BORDER



CHAPTER I

THE PAST

Events and occurrences in this universe are inter-connected. Nothing takes place in an isolated manner. The principle of cause and effect, and the effect becoming the cause of further events is an unbroken chain going back in time to the very dawn of existence when the Almighty ordered it to "Be" and it "Became". Human affairs are no exception to this rule. No human activity is un-connected and never does an event take place in a vacuum. If the past is known the present can be determinded. If the present is clear the future can be forecast.

The Indian invasion of Pakistan on September 6, 1965 could not be called a disconnected event resulting from sudden loss of sanity on the part of Indian leaders. It was an event of great magnitude but very much according to pattern. The behaviour of the present generation of Indian leaders was not out of tune with the conduct of the past generations of Indian leadership. Whatever might be said against the moral fibre of the Indian leadership they cannot be accused of either inconsistency or of forsaking principles according to which they have been brought up. If they appear to be hypocrites it is because hypocracy, particularly in matters of state, is a cardinal principle of their faith. If they break their agreements and solemn promises it is because they believe that promises are mere words and words are the exhaling of breath with a little noise. They maintain that it is true that words have a meaning but at times they have more than one meaning. It is always possible to construct them in such a manner as to mean many things at one time or nothing at all. It is an art and it, therefore, is no sin to excel in an art.

India is not composed of the Aryan race alone and neither do the descendents of the Aryans form a majority, and yet it is the Aryans alone, now known as caste Hindus, who dominate, rule and enjoy the riches of India[1]. The leadership of Caste Hindus has been and is entirely in Brahmin hands. It is they who dictate the affairs and control the destinies of the rest of Bharat. They rule Bharat, and unlike days of old, no more, from behind the scenes. A great deal has been said on the behaviour, the conduct and the practices of the Brahmins. There is no one better qualified to speak about them than the most outstanding member of their class—Pandit Nehru. He has chosen as his spiritual leader, Pandit Kautilya, also called Chanakya. Pandit Nehru has spoken very highly of him and it would not be out of place to quote the learned Pandit who was fortunate enough to have drunk at the fount of knowledge of both the East and the West. In addition it can be safely said that if ever there was a philosopher king it was the great Pandit of revered memory who combined

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1. "The powers of Brahmins had become oppressive......The lower strata of society groaned under the autocracy of the higher, who shut the portals of learning against the inferior classes....The religion became the monopoly of the Brahmins as if it were a commodity of the market place" Sen, D. C. History of Bengali Language and Literature, pp. 413, 414.

in himself the spirit of both Chanakya and Machiavelli. He says about his spiritual master, 'Kautalya is another name for Chanakya, and thus we have a book written, not only by a great scholar, but a man who played a dominating part in the establishment, growth, and preservation of the empire. Chanakya has been called the Indian Machiavelli, and to some extent the comparison is justified. He was no mere follower of a king.. A picture of him emerges from an old Indian play—The Mudra Rakshasa—which deals with the period. Bold and scheming, proud and revengeful. Never forgetting a slight, never forgetting the purpose, availing himself of every device to delude and defeat the enemy; he sat with the reins of the empire in his hands and looked upon the emperor more as a loved pupil than as a master"[1]. This is the picture of the ideal Brahmin minister of a state. It would not be wrong to conjecture that more often than not the ministers looked upon their masters the kings–as grown up children and in some cases as no more than imbeciles. The hall mark of religious piety and sanctity around these Brahmin Ministers was enough to give them such freedom of action and liberty as is not known under any system of political administration. Pandit Nehru goes on to say, "There was hardly anything Chanakya would have refrained from doing to achieve his purpose; he was unscrupulous enough; yet he was also wise enough to know that this very purpose might be defeated by means unsuited to the end"[2]. What else is guile, treachery and dishonesty. To have refrained from such things when time and occasion demanded cannot make Chanakya into an honest man. A little further Pandit Nehru explains Chanakyas statecraft on the lines later adopted by him when he himself occupied the same position. He elucidates the point by saying, "War must be conducted by armed forces, but much more important than the force of arms in the high strategy which saps enemy's morale and disrupts his forces, and brings about his collapse or takes him to the verge of collapse, before armed attack............His final victory was obtained by sowing discord in the enemy's ranks..............."[3]. Nothing much need be said about this philosophy. Pandit Nehru is not alone in praising this learned Brahmin who made his king, through guile and treachery, the strongest monarch of his time in Northern India. Dr. Satyapal when praising Hindu philosophic thought says, "Kautalya (Chanakya) the Brahmin Minister of Chandragupta gives us an interesting picture of Indian political conditions in the reign of Chandragupta who has been one of the most important monarchs of India. In this period she became the cultural fountain of the world...."[4]. It would be interesting to note the morals sprouting out of this cultural fountain of the world and then imagine what would be the fate of the world if the principles advocated in this philosophy were universally followed by humanity.

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1. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, Signet Press, Calcutta, 1945, p. 127.
2. Ibid, p. 127.
3. Ibid, p. 128.
4. Dr. Satyapal, and Probodh Chandra, Sixty Years of Congress, Lions Press, Lahore, 1946, p. 27.

Chanakya's advice to the kings is, "Having secured his own personal safety first from his wives and sons,"[1] he can turn to other functions. But the ministers are not immune from close surveillance. He advises, "Having set up spies over his prime minister the king shall proceed to espy on both citizens and country people"[2].

The Kautilyan envoys are of the same pattern. Their duties are, "........intrigue, sowing of dissension among friends, fetching secret force; (i.e., cloak and dagger) carrying away by stealth relatives and gems, gathering information about the movement of spies, bravery, breaking of treaties of peace, ...these are the duties of envoys"[3]. The last part may have been a misprint. It may have meant, "bravely breaking of Treaties of Peace". It would then conform to the pattern emerging out of the behaviour of Indian Government during recent years.

The suspicious nature of the learned Brahmin goes so far as to recommend, "When a king has only one son who is either devoid of pleasure or is a fanatic child, the king may keep him under chain"[4]. But the fount of wordly wisdom is quick to render advice to the imprisoned prince also who was kept in chains by his father on the Pandit's advice. He very innocently tells the prince, "He may seek refuge under a neighbouring king........and not only make alliance with wild tribes, but win over the parties (in his father's state)...... having attained close intimacy with heretics, rich widows, or merchants carrying ocean traffic, he may by, making use of poison rob them of their wealth as well as the wealth of gods unless the latter is enjoyable by Brahmins........"[5]. One wonders what the state of society would be, if such advice was accepted by the kings and princes but unfortunately this is the philosophy of life accepted as of divine revelation by the so called largest democracy of the world of today known as India, and there is no doubt that there must have been, scores of kings and hundreds of princes who used to accept this philosophy as gospel truth.

The moral and social fibre of the teachings of the learned Pandit may also be looked at but just at a glance. For reasons known to him, he advises utmost seclusion for the queens when he says, "........Nor shall women of high birth have occasion to see his (king's) wives, except appointed midwives". But instead, "Prostitutes with personal cleanliness affected by fresh bath and with fresh garments and ornaments

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1. Kautilya, Arthshastra, Sri Raghuveer Printing Press, Mysore, 1956, p. 32.
2. Ibid, p. 31.
3. Ibid, p. 31.
4. Ibid, p. 34.
5. Ibid, p. 35.

shall attend them''. In order to further guarantee the kings safety he goes on to advise, "Prostitutes shall do the duty of bath room servants, shampooers, bedding room servants...........................''[1].

The Grand strategist of Ancient India had succeeded in inspiring the present generation of Aryans. He had said over two thousand years ago, "Negotiation, bribery, causing dissentions and open (i.e., unprovoked) attacks are forms of Strategem"[2].

The advice of Kautilya regarding the methods to conquer the world seem to have been taken seriously by the Indian statesmen. He had said, "Having seized the territory of the enemy close to his country, the conqueror should direct his attention to that of the Madhyama king (Next to the enemy who was to be treated as friend before). This is the first way to conquer the world.

In the absence of Madhyama and neutral kings, he should, in virtue of his own excellent qualities, win the hearts of his enemy's subjects, and then direct attention to other remote enemies. This is the second way. (To conquer the world).

In the absence of a Circle of States (to be conquered), he should conquer his friend or his enemy by hemming each between his own forces and that of his enemy or that of his friend respectively. This is the third way.

Or he may put down an almost invincible immediate enemy. Having doubled his power by his victory, he may go against a second enemy; having trebled his power by this victory, he may attack a third. This is the fourth way to conquer the world"[3].

This fourth way to conquer the world has been decided upon by India. The first "almost invincible" enemy, no doubt, was and is Pakistan. Who comes next is not difficult to decide. Pakistan, however, lies both to the East and West of India. It may depend on circumstances but the most likely plan appears to be to move in the westernly direction first. There lies the greater part of the world of Islam.

The first contact of Muslims with Hindus who had been imbued with this philosophy took place in A.H. 28 (648 A.D.) at Herat. Iran had finally fallen to the Muslims in A.H. 21 (642 A.D.) and the whole country had accepted Islam in a surprisingly short time. The Iranian empire which had earlier extended well into the plains of Punjab then had the province of

1. Ibid, p. 42.
2. Ibid, p. 74.
3. Ibid, p. 437.

Herat as its eastern limit. This meant that the boundary extended a good deal to the east of Herat. The speedy acceptance of Islam—the new creed through-out the confines of Iran disturbed the Brahmin ministers of the Hindu Princes of Northern India. The complete lack of caste distinctions, the equality of man,the humane treatment to slaves and working classes and the utter absence of distinctions due to arce, colour and family status was a grave danger to the caste ridden and high caste dominated Hindu kingdoms whose frontiers were close to those of this new faith with universal appeal.[1] One can say that the main reason of this enemity was that the Muslims were a neighbouring nation and according to Chanakya, "The king who is situated any where immediately on the circumference of the conquerers' territory is termed the enemy."[2]

Omar the Great who was "stern, but just, far sighted......and had held the helm with a strong hand"[3] must have appeared too strong an adversary to the Indian princes to meddle with the far flung provinces of the Muslim Empire during his khilafat. His death in A. H. 23 (644 A.D.) and comparative losening of central control from Medina, the capital, must have stirred hopes of extending their frontiers westwards in the Hindu minds. They invaded and captured Herat in A.H. 28 (648 A.D.). They were, however, disappointed in their hopes. The Khalifa, Uthman, ordered the governor of Iraq, Abdullah bin Amir, under whose jurisdiction Herat was, to send an expeditionary force to recapture Herat and stabilise the situation on the eastern front. He despatched a small force under Muhlib Bin Abi Safra who succeeded in recapturing Herat. The Hindus, as usual could not help but create mischief whenever they could. They continued raids into Muslim territories and as a result lost Kabul in A.H. 48 (664 A.D.). Kandhar and the area now known as Kalat met the same fate after a short time. No further move was made by the Muslims to punish the Hindu Rajas of the plains. Peaceful penetration of Islam through merchants and tradesmen, however, continued and by the end of eighth century of the Christian era a large proportion of the population to the west of Indus had embraced Islam but the narrow minded Brahmins who dominated the courts of Indian Princes did not permit the Muslims to construct mosques and offer congregational prayers. In the meantime Sind and Multan had fallen to the Muslims between A.H. 89 and 96 (708-715 A.D.) under the youthful General Mohammad Bin Qasim. The boundaries of Multan stretched upto Beas[4] on one side and joined with those of Ghazni in the West. When Subuktagin came to power the Muslim ruler

1. As Dr. Spear says, "Islamic thought like that of the West, is world accepting.... The Muslim looks outward rather than inward, and he is, therefore, more open than the Hindu, to the scientific attitude of life......"Spear, India Pakistan and the West. Quoted by S. M. Ikram in The Cultural Heritage of Pakistan, p. 4.

2. Kautilya Op. Cit. p. 290.

3. Ameer Ali, A History of Saracans, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1953, p. 43.

4. Amir Ali Op. Cit. p. 104

of Multan accepted his over-lordship. Seen in this light it is easy to understand why Jaipal the Hindu ruler of the Salt Range invaded the territories of Subuktagin in A.H. 376 (986-87 A.D.). He probably felt that by conquering Ghazni the capital of the empire he would automatically become the master of the vast province of Multan also. He, however, in his extreme impetuosity chose the wrong time of the year. His army lost the war before the battle could start. "He met his enemy near a place called Ghuzak between Ghazni and Lamghan. A snowfall compelled Jaipal to conclude a humiliating peace, but he soon broke his engagements..........".[1] Jaipal broke his promises not once but again and again. He invaded Subuktagin's territories a second time in 989 A.D. and was defeated again. It must be understood that Jaipal the neighbourly ruler of Ghazni did not rule over a vast area, His authority was confined to the area between river Indus and Jhelum but he may have possessed a few forts across Indus[2]. The conditions in northern India during that period were fairly chaotic. Smith gives a good description of those times. He says "The countless Hindu states, which took shape from time to time, varying continually in number, extent and in relations with one another, seldom were at peace."[3] There was, however, one exception to this perpetual internecine warfare. They all were afraid of the influences of Islam upsetting their privileged positions. The Brahmin ministers, who formed the common link between the various rajas, were perturbed by the closeness of Muslims to their borders and the contacts made through trade and commerce, seemed to them the gates which if opened would level up all arbitrary distinctions they had created in the society. To them the principle of equality of man sounded like a death knel which was to be kept at as far a distance from the Hindus as possible.[4] To fight the Muslims was a holy war and not merely the conquest of territories which in itself was attractive. The Rajas who were too ready to listen to the advice of the learned Brahmins obeyed them and marched to their doom and destruction while the Brahmins recited Mantras without much effect. The recounting of history of this period is most saddening but it resembles and as such reminds of the dishonouring of pledges by India since partition so much that it becomes most important to study the past behaviour of

1. Majumdar, Roy Chawdhri and Dutta, An Advanced History of India. Macmillon & Co, Ltd., London. 1958 p. 183.

2. According to Nizam-ul-Mulk Tusi the territories of Alaptagin included the towns of Peshawar. Siyasat Nama (Book of Kings) Routlege and Kegan Paul, London, p.118.

3. Smith, Op. Cit. p. 180.

4. The Brahmins had already experienced the result of prolonged cantact with Muslims and its influence on Hindu society in Sind. As a learned Hindu has said "Sind is free from many pernicious social evils, from which the other parts of India are suffering. Caste is virtually absent in Sind; the Brahmins among the Hindus form but a microscopic portion of its population; and where the priest is not powerful, caste cannot exist". Dr. Tarachand, Influence of Islam on Indian Culture Quoted by S.M. Ikram, in The Cultural Heritage of Pakistan, p. 2. The Brahmins had no desire to be ousted from position of power and prestige from the rest of India through increased contacts with Islam.

Indian rulers in order to predict their future actions. To continue with the story we find that Jaipal was able to collect the rulers of the greater part of India around him and a mighty coalition army crossed the Indus once again to await the arrival of the meagre force of Ghazni under Sultan Mahmud in the plains of Peshawar[1]. The history of India and adjoining lands of this period has been subject to unprecedented distortions[2]. Mahmud of Ghazni has been depicted as a fanatic ruler who had no pleasure in life except to wage wars, loot and plunder India and yet it was he who was attacked time and again. The first three invasions accredited to him were those in which his territories were invaded by the Hindu Rajas[3]. The fourth and fifth so called invasions are no better and were waged for the defence of his legitimate frontiers.

The story of subsequent Muslim rulers is no different. They showed more tolerance towards Hindus than the votaries of many a religion have shown as rulers in modern times.

The fact that Indian Rajas continued to rule over their states and principalities throughout the eight centuries of Muslim Rule speaks for unparalleled toleration and broad mindedness of the Muslim rulers. Even Hindu writers have, at times, had to admit this fact. Dr. Satyapal has said, "Babar's advice to his descendents was to govern through Indians. No distinction in appointments was made between Mohammadans, and Hindus or any other community. Some of the Moghal Government's most successful Governors, Viceroys and Generals were Hindus. The Imperial Army was frequently commanded by a Hindu General"[4]. Inspite of it the Hindu princes proved to be the cause of the end of Muslim rule and the entry of European powers on the scene.

It was the Hindu ruler of Calicut who threw open the facilities of his port to the Portuguese in 1498 at a time when the Muslims had a virtual

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1. It is one of the most glaring misinterpretation of history to have labled these campaigns as invasions by Ghaznavides. The area west of Indus had been recognised as a part of Ghazni kingdom since 986 A.D. This battle by Mahmud in defence of his territories took place in 998 A.D. within his territories. To lable it as Mahmud's invasion would be like accusing Darius for invading Greek territories under Alaxander. See note 2 on page 20 also.

2. S.M. Jaffar in his history on the Ghaznavides writes, "Misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims rule has gone a-far, and no organised literary effort has so far been launched to counteract the anti Islamic propaganda". Mediaeval India Vol. II, Peshawar, 1940, p. vii.

3. Territories on the West bank of Indus had been ceded to Subuktagin in 986 A.D. Mahmud's battle were fought in 991 AD, 998 1001, and 1002 AD. All these battle are said to have been fought in the plain of Peshawar, an area Mahmud had inherited from his father. By no stretch of imagination could these be labelled as invasions of India.

4. Dr. Satyapal and Prabodh Chandra, op. cit. p. 7.

monopoly of spice trade from here. The Portuguese however, refused to pay the usual custom duties and in fact did not relish the idea of competing with the Muslim merchants[1]. The Raja of the first port of call, was a believer in free trade and the Portuguese found that they could not compete with the Arab and the Chinese merchants unless special concessions were granted to them. These having been refused, the Portuguese turned to the nearby port of Cananore where Muslim influence did not exist and thus entered into the trade of Asia. The examples of Hindu collaboration with the European traders since their first arrival at the end of fifteenth century are many. A mention may, however, be made of a few of them.

The conqeust of Goa by the Portugese will rank as one of the most outstanding examples of treachery. The Portugese did not believe in peaceful trade relations with the countries of the East, with whom they came in contact. To them the killing of heathens was the shortest route to heaven. Having destroyed the port of Calicut in 1498, with heavy artillery, they attacked Goa in 1504[2]. With the help of treacherous Hindu inhabitants they not only captured Goa but killed every Muslim, man, woman or child and spared the Hindus who had collaborated with them[3]. The rulers of the state of Vijyanagar went out of their way to welcome the foreigners only because the crusading spirit and fanaticism shown by these foreigners against the Muslims appealed to them. Pannikar is jubilantly eloquent on this point. He says. "It is important to note that the Vijyanagar emperors, had in common with the Portugese, the crusading spirit against the Mussalmans...........................

....

To both Portugal and Vijyanagar, Islam was the enemy ...."[4] The stakes were high. The Hindus were intent upon harming the interests of their countrymen who were outside the pale of caste system and the Portugese wished to capture the trade of the East as the authors of Cambridge History have said, "........the chief care of the Portugese Commanders was the attempt to drive all Muhammadan shipping from the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea in order to ensure the carrying of all Indian products in Portuguese Vessels."[5]

The Muslims, however, seem to have been oblivious of any danger to them. They appear to have been too confident of the strong position they held on land. Cambridge history refers to this aspect in a passing manner when it says, "It is not without significance that the first landing of these men, whose main object was to usurp the spice trade, hitherto a monopoly of the Muhammadan, should have been in Hindu territory. One wonders

1. Pannikar, Asia and Western Dominance, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1959, p. 34.
2. Admiral Ballard, Rulers of Indian Ocean. Ducks worth London, 1927, p. 88.
3. Ibid. p. 94.
4. Pannikar, Asia and Western Dominance, Op. Cit. p. 31.
5. The Cambridge History of India Vol V, S. Chand and Co., Delhi, 1963. p. 2.

what might have been the fate of Da Gama and his companions if the first landing had been attempted say, in some part of the powerful Muslim Kingdoms of Gujrat."[1] This was, however, not possible. Da Gama had taken care to take on a Hindu Pilot at Aden[2] so that he could avoid landing or sailing any-where close to the ports controlled by Muslim rulers. The anti Muslim designs of Hindus were again highlighted during the Muslim struggle in the middle of nineteenth century to overthrow the increasing British domination of the sub-continent. History records few, if any, examples of the anamolous position then existing in this sub-continent. The Mughal Emperor of Delhi who had granted the Diwani of Bengal and Oudh to the British had become a ruler in name only and the British East Indian Company was the factual ruler of the country. The officials of the company possessed all the powers but no responsibility whatsoever. Their allies, the Hindus, possessed neither power not responsibility but possessed all the wealth that they could amass by trading with their newly found friends, the British, and by serving under them in various capacities ranging from rent collectors to agents provocateurs. The War of Independence of 1857, commonly termed as the Mutiny by the British, was as wide as ill-planned and ill-managed. It failed not only because it lacked integration and a vigorous high command but it failed because the Hindus and Sikhs co-operated with and fought on the side of the British. The relief to Dehli, in the shape of the arrival of Sikh soldiery from the Punjab, would have never been able to reach the capital city of the Muslim Emperor if the rulers of the Sikh states of Nabha, Jind and Patiala had not given unstinted support to the foreigners. The few exceptions where the Hindu chiefs raised the standard of revolt against British domination were confined to cases where these Hindu princes or their adopted sons had been refused recognition by the British. Their revolt was not in favour of the Emperor of India but merely to regain their states and as Forester wrote, "But Sindhia had no desire that the Mughal Emperor should overshadow the Maharatta princes, and he relied on the strength and generosity of the British Government to uphold and reward him for his loyalty."[3] It cannot be denied that there was an element of Hindu Sepoys who joined the War of Independence. Their's were completely different reasons for rising in arms against the British. They had lived closer to the British while serving under them. Those who have served and lived with the British know what feelings are aroused by the racial superiority shown by the British at every step. Coupled with such insulting behaviour of the British Officers, was the hatred aroused by missionary activities allowed by the commanding officers and in some cases insulting remarks against other religions by the British officers themselves. The Hindu chief Man Singh although most loyal subject of the British East India Company had to admit to other Hindu princes when he wrote,

1. Ibid. p. 4.
2. Admiral Ballard, op. cit., p. 32.
3. Forrester, The Indian Mutiny of 1857-58.

"Certain civil officers, instead of rendering justice as formerly, now strike poor people... some may even now hate to see natives, may deprive them of their hereditary rights....and may act contarry to their promise... supreme government never intended such things....If the British are defeated, what good have we to gain, we shall lose our religion...." He had forgotten that their religion had not suffered during eight centuries of Muslim Rule. The British also recognised that it was mainly a Muslim uprising and officers like the Lt-Governor of Northern Provinces wrote as he did to the Governor General on May, 20, 1857. "The heart of Mutiny consists of........chiefly bigoted Mussalmans who have raised the cry of religion......". Another officer, Lieut General McLeod Innes wrote in his book, "Lucknow and Oudh in the Mutiny", "The most powerful and the most dangerous were the Mussalmans....The reasonable inference from the course of events so far....to be that the leading spirits of the rebellion lay in the Moghal faction.........."

It was only natural for the British to make the Mussalmans as the main target of reprisals when conditions returned to normal. Thousands were blown from the guns, hundreds of thousands were hanged and innumberable villages were burnt to ashes[1]. Life, for Muslims, became difficult. They could only live if either they passed their days in complete and abject poverty or licked the feet of the British officials. Terror and fear were the weapons employed and economic pressure was used as a lever in addition, in order to completely cow down the Muslims.

The Hindus took advantage of this in an admirable manner. Outwardly they continued showing respect to their erstwhile rulers but saw to it that they were completely ruined economically. It is a fallacy to say that the Muslims kept away from modern education in a sulking mood. In fact they were kept away from it and discouraged as much as possible. Even their social workers were looked upon with suspicion. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was labelled, by the British officials, as a seditionist for quite some time. The Muslim efforts to regain India had failed. With three fourth of the population loyal to the British there was no likelihood of success. It dawned on the Muslims of the sub-continent of what fickle and faithless material the Hindus were made of, but only during the post 1857 period. Men like Manak Chand, Amin Chand and Nand Kumar, in whom the Muslim rulers had laid full trust had conspired with the British and brought about their downfall[2]. The post war period was most trying for the Muslims of India. From rulers they started becoming slaves of

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1. "In the city (Delhi) no man's life was safe', reported Moinuddin; 'all able bodied men who were seen were taken for rebels and shot'. Mrs Saunders, wife of Commissioner Delhi wrote: "Every native that could be found, was killed by the soldiers' ". Struggle for Freedom, 1857. Pakistan Publications Karachi, 1957, p. 24.

2. Dr. Satyapal and Prabodh .Chandra, op. cit. pp. 53-57. Also see Thomson and Garrett, "Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India". Central Book Depot, Allahabad, 1962. p. 135.

slaves. The worst hit were the Muslims of Bengal. With one stroke of pen their lands had been confiscated and handed over to their Hindu clerks and agents. Overnight the change of official language had made them illiterates and unfit for service under the Government. Their schools and colleges had become institutions of mere academic interest with no possibility of benefiting those who attended them for any career. It was a well planned programme. They were to be completely broken politically, economically and socially so that there was no possibility of their ever again aspiring to rise and challenge the British suzerainty. The British did not kill every one of them as the Portuguese had done in Goa. There were too many to be exterminated but theyfinishedthem economically and placed them in such an inferior position that they were soon to forget that they ever ruled this sub-continent. As Ambedkar has said, "....The Muslims found their prestige gone, their laws replaced, their language shelved and their education shorn of economic value....without prestige, without education and without resources the Muslims were left to face the Hindus."[1] The main object of these Hindus was to bring about "a political death of the Muslims as a free people."[2]

One thing must be said about the undaunted spirit of these defeated Muslims of India of the nineteenth century. The defeat in their first War of Independence was not able to cow them down at all. They were self respecting, brave to the point of recklessness, and the lovers of freedom in that land of eternal slavery. Hunter while trying to paint a picture of rebellion and war by the Indian Muslims, has indirectly paid a tribute in the Dedication to his book when he said, "In these pages I have tried to bring out in clear relief the past history and present requirements of a persistently belligerent class—of a class whom successive Governments have declared to be a source of permanent danger to the Indian Empire". At the very beginning of his book he continues in the same theme and says, "While the more fanatical of the Mussalmans have thus engaged in overt sedition, the whole Mohammadan community has been openly deliberating on their obligation to rebel. During the last nine months, the leading newspapers in Bengal have filled their columns with discussions as to the duty of Mussalmans to wage war against the Queen."[3]

The British efforts to break the will of Muslims had been as persistent as the Muslims were adament to keep their heads high. They were the target of the British bayonets all over the sub-continent. In them alone did the British see a danger to their continued rule. Speaking of the life story of Syed Ahmad Shahid, Hunter says, "The first scene of his labours lay among the descendents of the Rohillas, for whose extermination we had sent troops

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1. B.R. Ambedkar. Pakistan or Paritition of India. Thacker and Co. Ltd., Bombay. 2nd Edition 1945. p.31.

2. B.R. Ambedkar. op. cit. p. 31.

3. W.W. Hunter, The Indian Mussalman, Premier Book House, Lahore, 1964 (First published in 1871) p. 1

fifty years before, and whose sad history forms one of the ineffaceable blots on Warren Hasting's career. Their posterity have, during the past half century, taken an undying revenge, and still recruit the Rebel Colony in our Frontier with its bravest swordsmen". A little later talking of the steps taken to combat the Mujahideen he admits that, "....Between 1850 and 1857 the frontier disorders forced us to send out sixteen expeditions". The last campaign against the followers of Syed Ahmad Shahod was fought by the British in 1868. They were no ordinary border skirmishes either. He says, "The campaign of 1863 taught us to our cost that an expedition against the Fanatical Encampment may mean a war with a coalition of 53,000 fighting men of the bravest races in the world."[1]

By the end of the ninteenth century, exactly after two generation of their ceasing to be the rulers, the Muslims found themselves utterly at the mercy of both the Hindus and the British. By then the British had started thinking of giving India some share in the local administration but only after the Hindus had been helped to organise themselves politically.[2] They had in the meantime been given all the lands they could grab, all the commerce that could not be handled by the British and all the civil administrative appointments for which British personnel could not be made available.[3] The few Mussalmans who had been able to retain the confidence of the British felt that the British ideas of rule of majority would further ruin the Muslims. Their spokesman, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, had to place the views of the Muslims before the Government in 1883. He said, "The system by election means the representation of the views and interests of the majority of the population. But, my Lord, in a country like India where caste distinctions still flourish, where there is fusion of the various races, where religious differences are still violent, where education in the modern sense has not made an equal or proportionate progress among all sections of the people, I am convinced that the introduction of the principle of elections, pure and simple, for representation of various interests in the local boards and district councils would be attended with evil of greater significance than purely economic considerations...... The larger community will totally over-ride the interests of the smaller community."[4]

Early in twentieth century it became evident that a beginning was likely to be made to institute representative government in India. The Muslims sent a delegation to the Viceroy that they should be given separate representation. The Hindu dominated Indian National Congress oppos-

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1. Ibid p. 17.
2. Alberuni, Makers of Pakistan, Mohammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1950. p. 40.
3. Only those appointments used to be thrown open to the Indians for which British manpower was not available or were too low-paid.
4. Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947, Pakistan Publications, 1958, Appendix I.

ed this proposal but it was agreed to give the Muslims separate representation. The Indian National Congress[1] was the brain child of Mr. Hume an Englishman of great vision, a member of the Indian Civil Service. It held its first session in 1885 at Poona, a predominantly Hindu area under the shadow of the memories of Sivaji and was presided by Mr. W.C. Bannerji an eminent Hindu Barrister. Poona may have been chosen as its first venue by coincidence but it was at that time when Sivaji Cult was being thrashed out and advocated in that very city[2]. Bombay, the Provincial Capital, not far off, was to start the Young Hindu movement few years later and set the pace in communal riots by organising Ganpati[3] processions to synchronize with the Moharram procession. Glory of Sivaji and hatred of Muslim period had become fashionable among Hindus by then. The birth, establishment and early support of British to this newly formed Indian National Congress under such circumstances can only be viewed with suspicion. The British fear of Muslim resurgence had not yet died down. One of the aims and objects as defined by the first President of the Congress needs being mentioned here.

"The eradication, by direct friendly, personal intercourse of all possible race, creed, or provincial prejudices amongst all lovers of our country and the fuller development and consolidation of those sentiments of national unity that had their origin in their beloved Lord Ripon's ever memorable reign."[4]

The expressions of loyalty, gratitude and devotedness to the British Government were expressed by the Congress no less in later years either. The second year's Presidential Address contained an interesting remark. "We educated classes have become the true interpreters and mediators between the masses of our countrymen and our rulers."[5] It reminds rather crudely of Lord Macaulay's note written in 1835 which had advised, "To form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons Indian in blood and colour but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect......."[6] The adaptable Hindu mind was speaking chaste English dressed in a morning coat and expressing solemn words of loyalty to the British, in exactly

1. Regarding the working of Indian National Congress, during the early years of twentieth century a contemporary writer says, "The annual gatherings of National Congress furnished a vent for the expression of eloquent aspirations on the part of a few ardent politicians, of whom not much was heard for the rest of the year". Lovat Fraser, India under Curzon and After, Heinman, London, 1911, p. 1.

2. Lieut General Sir George Macmun, Turmoil and Tragedy in India, Jarrolds, London, 1935, p. 43.

3. Ibid. p. 42.

4. Dr. Satyapal and Prabodh Chandra, op . cit., p. 125

5. Ibid. p. 127.

Thompson and Garrett, op. cit. p. 315.

the same way as his great grandfather used to speak pure Persian, dressed in Moghal Angarkha while taking oath of allegiance to the Muslim rulers, governors and other symbols of Muslim sovereignty.

The History of the period between 1906 and 1947 is full of struggle for the Muslims of Pak-Bharat sub-continent. They had during the preceding half century been pushed against the wall. Looked at with suspicions by the British and scrupulously boycotted by the Hindus, they found that, on the one hand the doors of administration were closed to them by the suspicious rulers and on the other their selfish countrymen made every effort to ruin them economically. The Hindus used the weapon of untouchability against the Muslims to keep them out of trade and commerce. Every thing a Muslim touched was unclean for the Hindu[1]. It was an excellent weapon and the Hindu leadership made full use of it. There are very few Hindus who have been broadminded enough to have made an effort to fight against this evil of the Aryan race. One such Hindu has said, "The Hindus represent the most arrogant form of social exclusiveness. They refuse to share the advantages of their social order with any but those who are born within their isolated fold. In this respect the Hindu social system is an insult not only to the Muslims but to all non-Hindus. . . . In its details the Hindu social order is simply a menace to freedom, unity and peace.........."[2] This attitude of the Caste Hindus reflects in all their dealings with non-Hindus. They have, as a result of centuries of slavish life, become close fisted, miserly, short-sighted, jealous, mean and intriguing, in the extreme. They cannot approach any subject with an open mind. They agree merely to go back on their agreement when it suits them and have no pangs of conscience in breaking their solemn promises[3]. This was the type of people the Muslims of this vast sub-continent were dealing with. It is a credit to their unity, discipline and what little leadership was left intact by the British to have come out of this long drawn struggle with a home land of their own where they can mould their lives and those of their future generations in accordance with the principles, the ideology and the religion they hold so dear to their hearts. The story of this grim fight is long and sad—sad because of the small mindedness shown by a nation and a people who had been treated as respectable and honourable citizens by the Muslims for centuries. The credit for steering the Muslim political affairs, during the last quarter century, goes to Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, whose spotless character, unblemished

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1. When the Late Prime Minister of India Mr. Shastri visited Egypt he used to have his own food cooked in the room of his hotel. The Muslims were too unclean for him to eat food cooked by them.
2. Swami Dharma Theeratji Maharaj, The Menace of Hindu imperialism, Hindu Missionary Society, Lahore, 1941, p. 252-253.
3. As Ambedkar, a schedule caste Hindu has said, "Unfortunately the caste Hindu are bad as leaders. They have a trait of character which often leads the Hindus to disaster. This trait is often found in their acquisitive instinct and aversions to share with others the good things of life"—Pakistan p. 110.

truthfulness, intense sincerity and unparalleled devotedness was beyond the comprehension of Hindu mind. They saw motives in his actions and speeches which did not exist. He meant what he said but the Congress leaders not used to honest and straight dealings were never able to understand him. The Muslim League, the Muslim political organisation to which the Quaid-i- Azam had given new life and vigour, was always prepared to cooperate with the Hindu dominated Indian National Congress but the latter in the impetuosity born of life long support and sympathy of foreign rulers, was never in a cooperative mood. The result was obvious. The Muslims demanded a separate State in 1940, as visualised by Dr. Mohammad Iqbal, the great poet and philosopher, and to the exclusion of every thing else concentrated their energies on getting it. The united efforts of the nation bore fruit and when after the Second World War, Britain fulfilled the promise of giving freedom to India, the Muslims were able to carve out for themselves a separate home land, the State of Pakistan.

CHAPTER II

THE INDIAN POLITICAL OBJECTIVE

In order to study the Indian Strategic Plan employed by the Armed Forces of India, during the war, it is necessary to first determine the Indian Political Objective and then with the help of this and the course of events, to deduce the Military Objective of the Indian warlords. No Military Objective is possible to be determined without first laying down the Political Objective. The Operational Plan worked out by the Indian High Command had to conform to the lines laid down by the Indian Government in pursuance of their Political Objective.

The question arises; "What was the Indian Political Objective in relation to Pakistan". The answer to this question can only be deduced from the statements of Indian statesmen, politicians and party leaders made from time to time since the establishment of Pakistan. It is also important that a brief reference should be made to the events and opinions prior to the partition of the sub-continent. The attitude of mind of the leading politicians of India, the manner of conducting themselves, and the tactics employed by them in those eventful years will throw a light on the motives behind the actions of these highly placed individuals who even after partition continued to control the destinies of Bharat and were placed in a position of being able to influence vast areas around them due to the size, population and great potential of the country over which they ruled. Man's mind works within limited channels. It will be unnatural to expect otherwise. Churchill is criticised by some for his famous remark, "I cannot preside over the liquidation of the British Empire". To have expected him to have reacted otherwise would have been unrealistic. The attitude of Indian statesmen and politicians towards Pakistan has been, as was natural, in conformity with their views held prior to the establishment of Pakistan[1]. A brief description of the pattern that emerges as a result of general events and the actions and statements of men who count or have counted in India would enable us to determine the Political Objectives of Indian Government. The attitude of Indian ruling junta who were entirely composed of the leaders of Indian National Congress which was not only opposed to the establishment of Pakistan but had stubbornly resisted the fulfilment of every demand put forward by the Muslims of the then India could not be expected to have materially changed after partition. This fanatic and extreme opposition to the legitimate demands of Muslims was not the result of circumstances created by the presence of foreign rulers, as claimed by the leaders of Indian National Congress, but went into the past which has already been explained briefly.


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1. Nehru who was the undisputed leader of Hindu India was determined to see that Pakistan did not come into existence. He tried all means to avoid a clear decision on this issue. In April 1946 "he made contradictory statements to further complicate matters. On 13th he was prepared to view with respect a demand for Pakistan if it was made after freedom of the country has been achieved". Yet on April 5th he could declare that "Congress is not going to agree to the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan under any circumstances whatsoever, even if the British Government agrees to it". Lumby, E.W.R. The Transfer of power in India. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London 1954. p. 78.


The leaders of Indian National Congress had from the outset opposed the Muslim demand for Pakistan. For them to have changed the views over-night could not have been due to their sincere conviction that the establishment of Pakistan was a just demand and should be conceded. In the words of Lieut General Kaul "Nehru had reluctantly agreed with the Muslim League that Pakistan should come into being as a seperate sovereign state....."[1] It was not expected by him to last long as he and his colleagues were hopeful that "Pakistan would collapse financially in a matter of months......."[2] The fact was that hitherto they had feared that the Hindu population being thoroughly docile and non-martial in character may not be able to regain the territories which were being demanded as parts of Pakistan. The well arranged and fully planned and Congress engineered Hindu-Muslim riots in Garh Mukteshar, Bihar and Calcutta had reassured the Congress leaders that when aided by the Government the Hindu mob fury was unparalleled and had come out successful. These incidents had given hope to the Congress leaders that they would be able to conquer Pakistan without much difficulty if it did not disintegrate through other pressures. The British Commander of the Area gives harrowing details of the atrocities committed by Hindus as a result of this policy. Talking of Garh Mukteshar incidents he says, "Practically every Muslim man, woman and child was murdered with appalling cruelty. Either here or later even pregnant women were ripped up, their unborn babies torn out and the infant's brains bashed out on walls and on the ground. There was rape, and women and children were seized by the legs by burly fiends and torn apart. The murderer's women stood about, laughing with glee at the burning booths, egging on their menfolk. The killing, let it be said now, stopped solely because Muslim, men, women and children were either dead or had run away. The Senior Superintendent of Police, the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police were all Hindus[3]". The reports of these happenings were taken to the Hindu Home Minister, Mr. Patel, by General Shah Nawaz and Meerdullah Sarabai. The author happened to meet both of them in Dehli after they had spoken to Mr. Patel who after hearing their story was not only unmoved but refused to take any action at all. The atrocities seen by General Shah Nawaz must have been gruesome because he could not sleep at all that night. The coldness of Mr. Patel to Muslim killings, later on in Delhi and other places perturbed Maulana Abul Kalam Azad also. It is surprising that he had failed to understand the Hindu mind even after years of close association with men like Nehru and Patel. He writes, "We were completely taken aback by Sardar Patel's reaction. At a time when Muslims were being murdered in Delhi in open daylight, he calmly told Gandhiji that Jawaharlal's complaints were completely incomprehensible....In fact he

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1. Kaul, The Untold Story, Allied Publishers 1967, p. 88.
2. Ibid p. 106.
3. Lt-Gen Sir Francis Tucker, While Memory Serves, Cassell and Co. Ltd., London 1950, p. 198.



INDO-PAK SUB CONTINENT



gave vent to his dissatisfaction that Jawaharlal as the Prime Minister should express disapproval of what his Government was doing."[1] Tucker also had similar experience. He says, "What most struck, our officers at this time was how calmly these Hindu Ministers took the awful tales, mostly true, of atrocities. They could not, it seemed be shocked."[2] How, could they be shocked. All these riots were towards the fulfilment of the programme decided upon by them. Nehru also should not have objected to the policy followed by Patel. It was in conformity with the objective given by him to his Home Minister. His first directive was to hinder the establishment of Pakistan. The biographer of the then Commander-in-Chief of India, Field Marshal Auchinleck had to say, "I have no hesitaion in affirming that the present cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis."[3]

The methods of Mr. Patel are well known. His views can be summed up in his own words. He had said, "......sooner or later we shall again be united in common allegiance to our country."[4] The means employed to unite were to create fear through rape, arson and murder under the very eyes and in fact with the help of the custodians of law and order. Those methods, we regret, are now being employed in the Indian Held Kashmir and there is none to censure the authors of Non-Violence and Panchsheela. The Indian refusal to accept the very existence of Pakistan and get reconciled to its being a neighbourly country can be judged from the statement of Mr. Nehru himself. Apart from public utterances to his Hindu audience in India he must have expressed himself in fairly strong language to make a foreign visitor say of him, "Nehru made it clear to him that he found it difficult to recognise the very existence of Pakistan."[5] When the Prime Minister of a country refuses to recognise "the very existance" of a country the consequences can be safely judged. The Pakistan-Bharat war of 1965 was the result.

Even the Indian Army, or at least an influential minority among them is uncertain of the Political Objective of their leaders. It is not their fault These senior military officers were trained in the British traditions which were based on centuries of experience. The British had, through hard knocks, been able to lay down that before the Armed Forces are launched there has to be a Military Objective and to have a Military Objective it is first necessary to determine the Political Objective which cannot be achieved

1. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, Orient Longman's, Bombay and other places, 1959, p. 214.
2. Lt-Gen. Sir Francis Tucker, Op. Cit. P. 184.
3. John Connel, Auchinleck, Cassel, London, 1959, p. 911.
4. Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, August 15, 1947.
5. Joseph Korbel, Kashmir after six years, International Organisation Volume 7, No. 4, 1953, p. 501.

by any other means than war. The Indian leaders have unbounded ambitions which are difficult to be put in words in order to evolve a clear cut Political Objective. These Poliical Objectives would sound preposterous if given out aloud. It is to rule over an empire stretching from Indonesia to Turkey and Egypt[1]. To achieve it they must first find elbow room in the immediate vicinity which means, the conquest and merging into Akhand Bharat[2], Pakistan, Cylon, Burma, Nepal, Tibet, and Afghanistan.

It appears that the Indian soldiers realise that this is a dream impossible of achievement. That is the reason why men like Major General Narinjan Prashad, GOC 25 Indian Infantry Division wrote in his diary remarks belittling Indian Politicians' day dreams and labelled them as optimists. A page from his diary having already appeared in the press is not likely to do any further damage to this honest soldier. He had written "Optimism is the elixir of the meek and feeble mind". The general was jotting down ideas as they occurred to him. It appears he had become frustrated as a result of what he had heard and seen. There must have been some conference he had attended at which plans to attack and overrun some neighbouring country were discussed. It could have been the proposed attack on Pakistan. The next sentence is not the reasoning in support of his earlier statement but the root cause of what he had written. He says, "Our military strategy seems to lack any clear cut military or political aims". He was not able to see either political or military objectives because they were too vague, too unmilitary like and too grandiose to be given out openly by the leaders of his country. He elucidates his remarks by adding, "Whether it is Hyderabad or Goa or Jammu and Kashmir or Naga tribes, it all seems to be either to satisfy some personal whim, or to further some political aim of individuals or parties. What is worse, our military plans are motivated not by considerations of National Security but to placate politicians, to further personal promotion or by some stunt. There is no deep thinking at any level, there is a cheap attitude to underestimate the enemy to show off ones own toughness to his superiors. Very little consideration for troops and field commanders views who are browbeaten."[3]

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1. Hindu writers are fond of attributing imaginary boundaries to the Indian Empire which never existed. No chance is missed of alluding to it. Professor B.J. Vasami in his book India Explained (p. 17) quotes from Pockock's India in Greece, "Geographical evidence, conjoined to historical facts and religious practices, now prove beyond all dispute that Greece and Egypt were the colonies of India." The present day Indian dreamers at the helm of Indian affairs wish to resurrect that imaginary Indian Empire.

2. It means United India and is the dream of every Indian politician.

3. The author is indebted to the Pakistan Army General Staff to have permitted him access to some of the captured documents including the diary of Major General Narinjan Parshad.

The general had started rambling after the first few sentences on higher policy and planning but then it was only natural. It was his experience, summed up in the last few sentences, that had made him so bitter that he started "Thinking"—a process which it appears his superiors discouraged. We have no brief on behalf of the general and would hesitate to comment on the behaviour of the Indian politicians towards senior Indian military officers whenever discussing plans to invade a neighbouring country[1]. It would suffice to point out that when the leaders of a nation make it a habit of plunging their Armed Forces into unjustified wars, the situation is reached sooner or later when the troops hesitate to obey with fervour. Although a little out of context yet is worth mentioning that some of the intercepted messages of Indian Army which gave details of casual ties of the days fighting during Kutch Operations had an unusual item. The message gave the numbers of killed, wounded, missing believed killed, missing believed prisoners of war and at the end "Unaccounted for". After the Cease Fire it was found that the Indian Army by saying "Unaccounted for" meant those who had disappeared towards the rear. Such occurrences are likely to happen when the leaders refuse to listen to field commanders and rush into war without adequate reasons or a justifiable cause.

The Indian Political Objective in relation to Pakistan has a much wider implications than appears at first sight. Indian history is more mythical than factual. The authors led away by their poetic fancies have woven a very queer mass of possible and impossible tales. In most cases they have given vague descriptions of places conquered by Aryans. These descriptions can fit in from petty principalities in Northern India, particularly Uttar Pradesh and Bengal to Java, Sumatra and Viet Nam. The Indian scholars of today in trying to locate those places have strayed over half of Asia and as the Indian general has said "Optimism is the elixir of the meek and feeble mind", they create castles in the air regarding future conquests of India. They all come across one stumbling block which flanks India both in the East and the West. Their minds reach the extremes of fanciful ecstasies when pictures of the future Indian empire are built up but for this unwanted and uncooperative barrier existing in both directions. Their one and only desire then centres round the removal of this barrier. Even the Philosopher King of India, the Great Nehru had succumbed to this gignatic vision of what India could be if........But it was a big "If", one of the biggest "Ifs of history". Nehru was not alive when Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan gave a talk on the Pakistan Radio on September 3, 1965 but facts show that Nehru had realised this truth. What the Foreign Minister of Pakistan had said was, "If India wishes to prove that the sword is mighter than the truth, let them continue on their present path of adventure. But a thousand years of history cannot

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1. Lieut General Kaul also refers to it in his book by saying, "It is due to this sort of mismanagement that the real discontent in the officer rank in the army arose." Kaul op. cit. p. 218.

go in vain,nor can the collective morality of this country be disregardedwith impunity.........."[1] It was the experience and sad memories of one thousand and three hundred years which kept Nehru in check from embarking on the path of destruction. He was, however, as shrewd as the proverbial Brahmin. He argued that however weak his fighting material may be, there has to be an upper limit at which the Indian Army can, with certainty, conquer Pakistan. That huge strength was calculated by his General Staff and he found that his country's finances could not raise, train, equip and put into the field nearly a million men. He carried the argument a little further. Who in this world of to-day could finance and equip such a gigantic force? The answer was simple. The United States of America! The next question was more complex. How to persuade them to agree to such an expensive undertaking? He looked around for days, weeks and months and one day the answer dawned on him when reading his popular political philosopher Chanakya. He had said "If you wish to win over a prince, be the enemy of his enemy". The clouds were lifted. The mind was clear. The solution was obvious. In the Global Strategy of U.S.A. there was one nation which would never be befriended by U.S.A. It was China. True, the theme then in vogue was, "Chinee Hindi Bhai Bhai,"[2] but it was not difficult to make foe of a friend. China had some years earlier linked up Tibet with Sinkiang by a road which passed through undemarcated territory. It mattered little if he, as the ruler of India, had knowingly acquiesced with it then. The matter could very easily be raised again. And then there was the question of MacMahon Line. The change over from friend to foe is too well known to be repeated here. If Nehru could put behind bars a friend like Sheikh Abdullah, the Prime Minister of Kashmir, it was no great burden on his conscience to turn against China, a friendly nation but preoccupied with its own problems.[3]

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1. Kashmir in Arms, produced by the Department of Films and publications, Government of Pakistan.

2. It means, "Chinese and Indian are brothers". Lieut General Kaul gives an instance of the intimate relations between China and India. He says, "In welcoming the guests at a dinner, I mugged up and delivered a short speech in Chinese.......... The cordiality which prevailed then between us and the Chinese was based on our Governments policy at the time". Kaul, op. cit., p. 179.

3. Nehru does not appear to have at any time felt that either, China or Pakistan would wage war with India. We have it on the testimony of his close associate, Lieut General Kaul, that "Nehru believed that apart from creating tension, neither China (nor Pakistan) was in a position to provoke a war with us as they had their problems". Kaul Op. cit. p. 321.

   General Chaudhuri, the COS of the Indian Army also considered that there was not much danger to Indiafrom Pakistan. He says, "At the time this article was written China was our close friend and Pakstan was not considered a very serious enemy". Chaudhuri, Arms, Aims and Aspects, Manaktala Private Ltd., 1966, P. 5. And yet the whole of the Indian Army was poise for the invasion of Pakistan at the time the article appeared in the statesman in June 1951.

The difficulty, however, arose in convincing the U.S.A. of the sincerity of India. This could only be done by taking a plunge into the flames of a hot war. China was, therefore, attacked unmindful of the consequences of the perilous undertaking. Nehru had not visualised, the effect of war with China, on the Indian Army itself, the beloved child of his visions. In fact he thought "that if we dealt with them strongly, we should have the better of them."[1] He fought the war with it but it demoralised it completely. Dreaming is a soothing balm and he would not forget his dreams. In fact the more he succeeded in building up the new friendship the more optimist he became regarding the fulfilment of his dreams. As long as they brought in masses of war equipment these temporary reverses did not matter. Sino-Bharat War was disastrous to India as a military undertaking but it was a complete success as far as Political results were concerned. U.S.A. was completely won over. A little ripple in the already disturbed surface of occidental conscience and an ally of two Pacts was thrown overboard. There was something more than what appeared on the surface. It was a long term policy on the part of more than one nation. Except Pakistan the others involved felt that each of them had scored a diplomatic victory.

Nehru is considered to have been a great international figure of his time. There are some who deny him that exalted position but one can say that he had the rare knack of keeping his fingers on the pulse of International affairs all the time. He also could gauge very accurately the changes on the complicated and ever hazy canvas of Big Power politics. He sensed the rift in the socialist ranks long before the rest of the world felt it. He realised that the West, whether Capitalist or Socialist could never permit a strong Asian power, which then could be no other than China. At the same time he could no longer stand the existence of Pakistan which then had the backing of the Capitalist West. He, therefore, had to break with China in order to get the much needed aid and sympathy from the West to undo Pakistan[2]. The moment he had done so, he found that his forecast had been correct, and the West irrespective of the camp it belonged to, was only too keen to feed his millions, build his Armed Forces and support his industrial programme, all at the same time. The West could sense the real object of Nehru. They could not remain ignorant of it but if Nehru by achieving his own objective of creating an Akhand Bharat could get strong enough to pose a threat to China or become a rival to it, it served the purpose. Who else in Asia could be built up as a rival to the Chinese? None! Inspite of Nehru's optimism, they were certain that India could not beat China. Not by any

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1. Ibid. p. 339.
2. As Lieut General Kaul has said, "Chester Bowles wrote to me soon after that he would do his best to bring the greatest degree of understanding of our problems to the attention of President Kennedy", Kaul, op. cit., p. 341.

chance. If it could, then she herself would have been enemy Number One of the West. As it was, it could never hope to beat China but it could blunt it. With the pipeline working on logistic support to India and its millions of starving population ready to sacrifice themselves at the altar of their leaders' caprice, the West thought that India by taking on China would bring about the complete destruction of the East, never to rise again and challenge the supremacy of the West. A clash between China and India would, therefore, be most welcome to the West. Both would end up as third rate powers by the time the conflict ended. At least, so thought the statesmen of leading Western Powers during early sixties of this century.

The West never realised that Nehru was too shrewd for them. He had no intention of seriously challenging China. The affair of 1962 was a neatly put up show. The immediate object of this war was to have the flood gates of Western military and economic aid open and fill up his arsenals and coffers with which he could walk across Pakistan and then nibble his way upto Dardanelles on one side and East Indies on the other.[1] The first step, however, was the conquest of Pakistan. Without this first step the programme for the achievement of Greater India was out of question. This, then was the Political Objective of India.

It was for the achievement of this Political Objective that India marched into Pakistan and announced the fact with great pride. The Indian press announced it jubiliantly by saying, "Since early this morning reports about the Spectacular Indian decision to march into West Pakistan were circulating in the capital. Official confirmation came in a statement to the Parliament by the Defence Minister, Mr. Chavan, which was greeted by prolonged and deafening applause, many MPs shouting 'Bravo' and "Jai Hind". As in Lok Sabha, so in the Rajya Sabha later, the atmosphere was electrifying. Since then the mood has spread to the whole of Delhi and New Delhi, and indeed to all parts of the country."[2] Such a mood could not have been created if the immediate Political Objective had been other than the conquest of Pakistan.

1. "Give the Hindus independence and the necessary power, they will be as violent, as imperialistic and as aggressive as other people, and in addition will do his utmost to propagate the caste culture and priest, craft as "the Hindu Civilisation. All the arguments of Bhagwat Gita and other sacred books, will be used to justify bloody wars and the supression of human rights. An independent and powerful Hindu India clinging to its caste culture will be a menace to civilisation and world peace". Swami Dharma Teerathji Maharaj, op. cit. p. 330.

2. Statesman, Calcutta September 7, 1965.

CHAPTER III

THE INDIAN MILITARY OBJECTIVE AND STRATEGIC PLANS

The Political Objective of India, as has been shown, was the complete disappearance of Pakistan. Indian leaders had never reconciled to the existence of Pakistan and it was only natural for them to wish and try that it should cease to exist. If this was not so then the Political Objective before India would have been to force Pakistan to accept India's terms which in military terminology would have been to break the will of the people of Pakistan. This object is usually achieved by diplomatic pressures, alliances and other non military methods. War is resorted to only if other means fail. This would, however, have meant the acceptance of the continued existance of Pakistan.

The result of the difference in the above two alternative Political Objectives is that while in the case of the Objective to bring about the disappearance of Pakistan it meant the physical control of as much of the territory of Pakistan as would facilitate the actual control of the important centres of population and government, like Lahore, Dacca, Karachi and Rawalpindi and then bribe or cajole a minority which would agree to terminate the separate existence of Pakistan and accede to the one big giant India. In the other case if the Indian leaders had been reconciled to the continued existence of Pakistan but as a small power which would listen to their dictates then they would have been content to destory the Armed Forces of Pakistan which defended the independence of Pakistan and enabled her an independent course in international affairs including the dispute over Kashmir, and other differences with India. This Political Objective would not have necessitated the actual occupation of the whole or major and important parts of the country but could have been achieved by the defeat of the Pakistan Armed Forces in the field of battle. The effect of the particular Political Objective of India as decided by the Indian leaders was that the Military Objective became the occupation of the territory of Pakistan and not merely the defeat of her Armed Forces. From this Military Objective emanated the Grand Strategical Plan of the Indian General Staff. If it failed as the world knows that it did fail, the responsibility is not of the Indian General Staff alone but of the political leaders as well who were the authors of the Political Objective which had to be kept as the ultimate goal by the military leaders when deciding upon their Military Objective and the Grand Strategic Plan to achieve that Objective. Where the Indian General Staff failed particularly, was in not bringing home to their politicians the importance of keeping the political and military spheres separate and each in its own place. There are, however, people in India who think that the failure of Indian Armed Forces was due to the non-intervention and neglect of the Indian politicians of military affairs[1].

1. Ramesh Thapar writing in The Economic Weekly (India), after the war, said,"…. Indeed many knowledgeable persons, while welcoming the Prime Minister's decision to leave, for good or worse, the conduct of the campaign in totality to the Army Staff are now of the opinion that in future political control over strategic objective, both political and military, will have to be strengthened….".

Once the Military Objective had been decided upon as the occupation of the territories of Pakistan the Strategic Plan had to bear certain factors in mind. The first of these factors was that West Pakistan was separated from East Pakistan. This factor meant that two fronts had to be opened. In the opening of two fronts India had two alternatives.

First to open both fronts at the same time. Although this alternative had the advantage of time yet it meant the dispersion of forces on two fronts at a distance of over one thousand miles. Keeping the nature of terrain in East Pakistan and the seasons the Indian High Command felt that it would ensure success if the major battles were fought in West Pakistan and if necessary to carry the war to East Pakistan at a later stage.

If September and October months were kept as campaigning months in West Pakistan and November to January period for East Pakistan, when it is comparatively dry there, then it would be possible to concentrate their energies on both fronts. The second factor was the Armed Forces of Pakistan and their dispositions. In this respect the dispositions of Pakistan Army were of great importance as that was the biggest hurdle in the speedy occupation of Pakistan by the Indian Army.

A great deal of thought had to be given to this factor and a plan had to be formulated which would not permit Pakistan Armed Forces to put up concentrated resistence at any front. If the object had been to destory Pakistan Armed Forces then the Indian High Command would have planned to draw the Pakistani Forces in to a killing ground and at a time of India's choosing and by concentrating all their forces, to destory Pakistan Armed Forces at one time or in as short a time as possible. The Political Objective being what it was and the Military Objective emanating from it being the occupation of as much and as important a territory of Pakistan, as possible, the Indian Commanders were forced to throw overboard the vital principle of concentration of forces. When a commander instead of appreciating the situation starts situating the appreciation he coins arguments to fit into the conclusions already crystalised in his mind. The C-in-C Indian Army made the same mistake. He decided on the best course open to him as a result of the peculiar Military Objective forced or selected by him and his staff, but when this objective demanded the dispersion of forces he felt that as a result of this dispersion he was placing handicaps across the Pakistani General Staff by forcing them to disperse their meagre forces. His reasoning was that dispersion is more detrimental to the smaller Army. The Indian High Command felt that as they were still able to bring about a 3 to 1 and 4 to 1 superiority of forces on all fronts they would be able to achieve success.

Many a nation has suffered as a result of mixing up of Political and Military Objectives. Indian leaders have proved that they have also fallen

into the same trap. The feeling of power by the knowledge of being able to control a million men armed with expensive and complicated lethal armaments proved beyond the digestive capacity of the rulers of India. If they had been content with giving their General Staff the gist of their Political Objective and left the General Staff to plan their Military Objective and the strategic plan there may still have been some chance of the Indian General Staff coming out of this vital test with some results. The Indian leaders were much too small, as men, to have confined themselves to their part of the responsibility. They fell into the trap which many small men in high position have fallen and lived to regret for ever. From Kutch to Khem Karan the pattern is identical. The Military Plans show political bias at every step.

There is no need to refer to the numbers of pages and paragraphs of the directives issued by the Government of India to their General Staff through a Ministry of Defence which is well known since the days of Sino-Bharat conflict for being headed by fanatical politicians like Mr. Krishna Menon who in another era and a more sober country would have been labelled as lunatics.[1] The events as they have occurred and the mass of contradictory statements made officially and unofficially by the Indian leaders have unmasked the Political and the Military Objectives of Indian warlords in no uncertain terms. From the course of events and the pattern made before and after these events it is possible to unravel the Indian Objectives with utmost accuracy.

The General Plan having been decided to disperse Pakistan Forces as much as possible the programme was made in such a manner as to show India as the innocent lamb. The proverbial wolf which paraded in lamb's clothing was the attitude which suited Indian temperaments most. This, however, could only be if Political and Military Plans were thoroughly integrated.

The beginning was to be made in Kutch. This was an area under dispute, not since the inception of Pakistan but since the conquest of Sind by the British during the later half of nineteenth century. The Rann of Kutch has been an inland sea through the ages and remains under shallow water for a considerable part of the year even now.[2] It was always a part of Sind when Sind belonged to the Mirs who held sway even on Kutch Bhoj immediately prior to the British capture of Gujrat and Kutch.

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1. Kaul has described the behaviour of Menon to the senior Military Officers very graphically. He says, "if a general was speaking in a meeting and saying for instance, "I think....," he (Menon) would snap: 'Soldiers are incapable of thinking'. In another meeting, if an Admiral happened to say, 'The Navy......', Menon would interrupt and complete the sentence sarcastically; 'Should be at the bottom of the Sea'. Kaul, op. cit. P. 207.

2. Mankekar, D.R. Twenty Two fateful Days. Mankatalas, Bombay, 1966, P. 19.

The Gazetteers published by the British Indian Government in later part of the nineteenth century give the boundaries of both Sind and the State of Kutch Bhoj as the Rann of Kutch. The natural deduction from that is that the Rann of Kutch had been accepted by the Government of British India as an inland sea and the bordering states had equal rights to it, the dividing line being in the middle. In actual practice, the Sind Government held adminstrative control of the whole of Rann throughout the British period. The discussions regarding the boundary between Sind and the State of Kutch Bhoj, during the British period had taken place thrice, they were inconclusive because on the last two occasions, before the decision, dividing the Rann, could be ratified, war had intervened and the attention of the British authorities had been diverted to more important and pressing matters. With this background the correct thing would have been to settle the boundary between the two countries in an amicable manner but the Indian Government having been used to easy success in Kashmir, Hyderabad, Junagarh and Goa had come to the conclusion that aggression paid better dividends than amicable settlement. In this case they had far stronger reasons to have recourse to force than happens normally. They had already decided on their Political Objective to obliterate Pakistan from the map of the world. As such it was imperative to find an excuse to start the war. Inspite of the increased activities of India across the Cease-Fire Line in Kashmir the Pakistani and A.K. Forces had not retaliated in Kashmir. They, therefore, could find no other excuse to start the war except in the only other disputed area which was the Rann of Kutch. It had the added advantage. It was close to Karachi and any success in this region would permit an advance deeper into Sind and cut off West Pakistan in two as the only rail and road communications between Lahore and Karachi were along the Eastern bank of Indus. To restore communications and push out any Indian Forces sitting across this vital L of C would have meant a major effort by Pakistani forces located in the plains of Punjab. The moment any major moves were made by Pakistan from Punjab to the Sind the Indian forces would press across the Cease Fire Line in Kashmir. With an undeclared war Pakistan would not even think of attacking across the International border but would try to stabilise the situation in Sind and Kashmir. Once the major portion of Pakistani forces had been turned towards the extreme South and North the big push would have been made opposite Lahore and Sialkot thus ending the war in less than a fortnight. Here it is necessary to explain the intricate time schedule decided upon by the Indian High Command. The Rann of Kutch starts being filled up with water from July onwards. The capture of the whole of Rann upto the escarpment in Sind has perforce to be undertaken in the dry season April to June. A halt was to be made through the monsoon period and the advance across Sind was scheduled from September onwards.

Plans are made in the airconditioned rooms and comfortable atmosphere of the Army Headquarters but they haveto be implemented on

rough and demanding battlefields. The high spirits resulting from cocktail parties in the charming social circles of Delhi were of no avail to the thirsty soldiers in the waterless plains of the Rann of Kutch. Even the aircraft carrier Vikrant was unable to carry enough water to the spiritless foot slogging soldiers who lost heart in the heat of the day long before the heat of battle had been generated. The Indian Army faired very badly in the Rann where they ran backward more than they crawled forward. The Indian Army was out-generaled and out-manoeuvered at every step. The way it ran in the Rann it could have been easily chased beyond Kutch Bhoj but the Pakistani commander Major General Tikka Khan had strict orders not to cross the 24th parallel, the limit at which Pakistan claimed that the international boundary between the two countries should be. The stratagem having failed in Kutch did not discourage the Indian leaders. The main point in their plans centered round the idea of dispersing Pakistan Army. They looked at the comparative strengths of the Armed Forces of the two countries and felt that nothing could stop the mighty Indian war machine. The modified Indian Plan was no different in principle but it had to start else-where. Here again the opening bouts were decided to take place in a disputed territory. This was to be Kashmir once again.[1] Once Pakistan had committed all its reserves in Kashmir the war was to be taken into Pakistan, first in the West and then in the East. In West Pakistan the plan was to cover all the approaches. The beginning was to be made by an attack on Lahore. This coupled with the existing advance in Kashmir, where Pakistan, according to Indian planners, would have already committed all its reserves, was to be a magnificient success. If, however, Pakistani General Staff had kept any reserves in hand, these would be rushed to Lahore by them immediately the invasion started. The Indian General Staff pinned the flags on the map as they thought the Pakistanis would react.

They must have felt that there may still be left one division in Sialkot Area. The Indian General Staff, did not consider it much but this also had to be moved about in such a way as to make the push from Samba area a definite success. The answer they thought was easy. Draw this division away from the selected line of advance. The method, evolved by the Indian General Staff, to make this division spread out itself unnecessarily was by an attack against Jassar at the same time as the attack on Lahore. They felt certain that Pakistan would react violently to any threat to Jassar. At the same time they felt that the Indian Division opposite Sialkot itself would force the Pakistanis to keep a sizeable force there.[2] The distance

1. Lieut General Kaul say, "He (C-in-C Indian Army) made many errors of judgement. He first took certain military steps in Kashmir, the consequence of which he could not foresee". Kaul, op. cit. P. 477. As an Indian national Kaul could not throw The War Guilt on Indian leadership in more express words.

2. Verghese, B.G., India Answers Pakistan, on page 13, while discussing the strategy of the war says, "A worse fate awaited Pakistan's more recently formed 6th Armoured Division in the Sialkot Sector......The Pakistanis had probably hoped that there would be frontal assault on Sialkot. They were disappointed".

between Jassar and Sialkot being about 30 miles, the result would be that the wide corridor in between these two places would be completely denuded of troops. This would enable the main Indian attack from Samba to become a mere route march.

The Southern front was also not to be left untouched. Khokrapar-Hyderabad axis in Sind Sector, was to be used in the very initial stage so that Pakistan would not be able to move any troops from Sind to the plains of Punjab. The plan was ideal from Indian point of view. It had been tailored to meet the requirement of the Military Objective which was to conquer the maximum possible extent of Pakistan territory. The demands of the Political Objective which was the complete obliteration of the word Pakistan from the map of the World would also, the Indian thought, be nearer realisation.


The Indian General Staff, however, did not visualise that if Pakistan didnot move its reserves to Kashmir what would happen then. They also did not bother to think that if Lahore and Kasur garrisons were also to stop the advance against Lahore without calling for additional troops and if the thrust on Khokhrapar did not succeed what would be the result. Similarly they did not care to bother that if the attack on Jassar and the threat to Sialkot did not draw the Pakistani forces into the two corners of this plain what changes should they make in their own plans. At first glance the Indian Strategic Plan appears fair and in fact some observers have called it sound but it lacked a realistic approach and had no elasticity. Its success depended entirely on the reactions of Pakistani Commanders in a predetermined manner. It failed because these forecasts of Indian General Staff did not come about.

As far as the Indian Air Force is concerned one fails to see any logic in their plans. In fact, even fifteen months after the war, it is extremely difficult to see any reasonable planning behind the activities of the Indian Air Force. It could also be said that the manner in which Pakistan Air Force fought upset the plans of the Indian Air Force and they became completely unnerved. The fact, however, remains that the skies were wiped clear of the Indian Air Force in the early stages of the war and they were not allowed the respite necessary to take the field again.

The Indians would have done well if they had kept all their aeroplanes in their hangers like they hid the Indian Navy in their well protected ports. The masterly in activity of the Indian Navy, at least, has made it possible for the Indians to say that it is still alive to fight on another day.

The Pakistani plans on the other hand were as simple as possible. Their task was to defend the country, and they did it admirably. They did not have to conquer India or any part of it.

INDIAN AGGRESSION ON WEST PAKISTAN



The imbalance in manpower, equipment and industrial output had to be offset by other means. These could only be better training, superior tactics, new fighting techniques, more realistic planning and above all the will to fight with faith in God. Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan touched the cords of one hundred million Pakistanis when on the morning of 6 September he said. "Our brave soldiers have gone forward to repel the enemy". Pakistan never wanted to invade any part of India. Pakistan merely desired to retain her own independence and freedom. This was the Political Objective of the nation. From it only one Military Objective could be deduced. To defend Pakistan. It meant two things. First to forecast correctly the Indian plans. This meant the correct assessment of the routes the Indian were likely to use and also approximate strength on each of these routes. The second was to fight to the last. No weapon has yet been created by mankind which can force determined defenders to abandon their defensive positions. Weapons can kill brave soldiers but they cannot fo.rce them to leave their positions as long as they are aliv A nation determined to protect its independence with faith in God is unbeatable. The wealth and weapons of rich nations and the marching hordes of haughty aggressors have no significance in the eyes of those fighting in the cause of truth and justice. In the end it is justice which prevails. It was the same in this case. The might of India failed to make even one single dent in the defences of Pakistan because the Pakistanis had risen as one man behind their Armed Forces who belived in the truth of their mission. It appears that the aggressors sensing the falsity of their position were unable to put their heart into the fighting. Having no justifiable cause the Indian Commanders failed to work out plans which could permit them to make the best use of the superiority they possessed in men and material against determined soldiers defending their hearths and homes. Unsound plans being executed by inexperienced commanders through troops who had little or no stakes in the fighting could end in nothing but a fiasco. This is exactly what happened after first contact was made between the two forces. Whether one looks at the ground battles, or the fight for the domination of the skies or the mastery of the seas the vision is similar in all cases.

On land one saw quite often wave after wave of Indian infantry supported by massive tanks and unlimited artillery barrages, advancing forward. They were invariably allowed to come within range of Small Arms Fire, where they had to face a rain of well aimed bullets and the next moment it would appear as if the wave had washed itself ashore and the men riding it had just disappeared into the earth. The time would then arrive for the Pakistani F.O.O. to play his role. He would bring down the artillery fire on to the places which seemed to have swallowed the Indian infantry. The fire was invariably accurate. The Indian infantry instantly lost the grip and the embrace of the mother earth (Dharti Mata) and ran backwards, only to be mowed down by machine guns while fleeing. There would be lull for an hour or so and the Indian commanders could

be heard on their wireless sets ordering the launching of fresh formations and units into attack. The result was the same as before. At sunset the few who had escaped the claws of death would be taken as prisoners of war. The prisoners often reeked of the smell of Rum and one and all used to complain of hunger and beg for food. It does not mean that the Indian Army never fought bravely. Far from it. A well organised, well disciplined and fully armed army would be expected to fight well. They fought well according to certain standards—standards, in which devotion to duty is the outcome of cold discipline and not the result of a burning desire to earn martyrdom while defending the honour and independence of one's country. They fought well and at times like real soldiers but those opposing them were always able to put up greater determination than the Indians could muster.

High above, up in the sky the scene was similar. The Indian aeroplanes came across the border in waves on a few occasions and particularly on 7th September but then they stopped. Not one wave had returned back intact. The game was obviously expensive. They seemed to have had their thirst for blood satiated within a few days. The results achieved were not worth the risks involved. Henceforth they were to sneak over the cities of Pakistan mostly during night. Knowing that Pakistan Air Force did not possess nightfighting equipment they felt safety under the mantle of darkness. Neither could they be seen by the Pakistanis nor could they be watched by their companions. They could jettison their bombs wherever they felt expedient and could retire to the safety of their barracks and spin the tales of valiant deeds in glowing terms without fear of contradiction from any quarter except Pakistan and claim their Chakras. To listen to All India Radio Delhi during the war was like listening to an oft repeated story. The Air Base at Sargodha which according to All India Radio had been destoryed on September 7th continued to be destoryed by the Indian Air Force until the night of 22/23rd a few hours before the Cease Fire. Foreigners not acquainted with the geography of Pakistan used to wonder as to how many Pakistani Air Bases had the name of Sargodha. The name of Sargodha like that of Lahore, Sialkot and Kasur will live for ever. The future generations of Pakistanis would utter these names with reverence and respect as if they were living heroes, whose example was to be followed without a second thought.

The waves of the Indian Ocean whipped by the monsoon winds, rose, roared in anticipation and disappeared in exasperation but the mighty Indian Navy failed to make its appearance. The Commander-in-Chief of Indian Naval Forces had deployed his naval units for the protection of the Indian ports by placing them within the Indian ports. This was his strategy and he convinced his superiors that he could keep his navy intact in this manner until he was to play his part, according to the Grand Strategical Plan, devised for the complete effacement of the word Pakistan from the map of the world. Pakistan Navy do not seem to have appreciated

this philosophy and went to the extent of knocking at Dwarka the nearest port of call of any significance on the Indian coast. They felt that this was the only way of forcing the issue and having a duel on the high seas. It is a matter of great concern to all student of military history to find feasible excuse for such utter lack of courage on the part of Indian Navy. Admitted that the Navy is "the silent service". It fulfils it task away from the land and the sight of the dwellers of land. It keeps open the routes to and from the national shores with no visible signs of fulfilling its allotted tasks but the silence with which the Indian Navy went through this war is unparalleled in the history of Naval fighting and it would be a long time before the Indian record is bettered?

CHAPTER IV

THE WEEPING WILLOWS OF KASHMIR

Kashmir, the paradise on earth, has suffered for its beauty. It has been a prey to the laws of jungle ever since Imamuddin, its governor appointed by the Emperor of Delhi, was ousted by the British and this land of honey and milk was sold, in 1846, to Gulab Singh the opportunist Dogra, who had risen from a watchman at Mangla to a Wazir of the Sikhs. One cannot imagine the logic of selling Kashmir to Gulab Singh who according to John Lawrence was a man about whom "Nobody has ever yet been heard to say a good word in his favour" and of whom Herbert Edwards who had spent long hours with him had to say, "The worst native I have ever come in contact with; a bad king, a miser and a liar."[1] Like the beautiful damsel whose protector has been slain by the demon and who in desperation kills herself only to make her once charming body a prey to the vultures and carrions, Kashmir died the day the Dogras sat on the sacred throne of Srinagar. She died but the unscrupulous and greedy Dogra sold her dead flesh to millions from far and near who were too keen to feast their eyes on her beauty even though her soul had departed. The sadistic cruelties of the Dogra went a step further. He killed, raped, plundered and starved the millions of her children only because they believed in God, the one God, in contrast to his faith in hundreds of gods. It was in fact the rape of the dead Kashmir. In death there is no pain, but when death is only symbolic the pain becomes tenfold, nay hundredfold. The leaderless and rudderless Kashmiris drifted along with neither any objective nor any hope of early deliverance. The fathomless sea into which they had been tossed was too deep, too vast in proportion to their emaciated bodies and uncharted because its all powerful despotic usurper had no aims except to lead a life of luxury and depravity on the sweat and blood flowing out of their starved skeleton like bodies. The mighty waves thrown up bythe under currents oftheir miseries and privations threw many of them across the borders of Kashmir and into the adjoining areas of British India where not only were they allowed to eat a little but also to think and cry a little if they felt pain due to the tightness of chains binding them and their bretheren whom they had left behind. The weeping willows on the banks of Dal had cried even in Kashmir but their voices were always stiffled before they could reach the world outside. When the same weeping willows of Kashmir raised their voices from the newly found soil of Punjab through the All India Muslim Kashmir Conference, they were heard far and wide. More voices joined in and eventually resulted in a temultuous uproar from within the prison that the Valley of Kashmir was. The All India Muslim Kashmir Conference came into existance and from the outset started working for the emancipation of the enslaved Kashmiris in their own homes. They were existing, not living, in most miserable and pitiable conditions. They bore all the taxes but no part of these was spent on the amelioration of their conditions. Government posts were for Hindus, both Brahmin and Dogra, education was confined to the same fortunate class and except as labourers and workmen they could not exist in the metropolis. They paid, in addition to land revenue, hearth tax, goat tax, cow

1. Thomas and Garrett, op. cit. p. 344.

tax and taxes of various names. All the good lands had been confiscated by the Rajah, his kinsmen and other influential Hindus. The Muslims were mere tenants on those lands. They had no political representation and no voice. Driven like mute animals they were forced to live sub-human lives. The formation of All India Muslim Kashmir Conference and its activities in British India, gave the necessary moral support to the Kashmsris within Kashmir and they started stirring gradually. Voices were raiied, in a subdued manner at first and then a bit loudly. The Maharaja and his Hindu advisers got perturbed. They could not imagine that the five million slaves purchased for 75 lakh rupees would dare to ask for human treatment, particularly at a time when the sharp bayonets of the seller were still there to protect the mighty landlord. No serf in history had been so openly sold like cattle and then completely subdued and yet on the strength of the voice of a few who had managed to get out of the clutches of the fiendish ruler, these lawfully purchased serfs dared ask for concessions. More repressions resulted. All agitators were put behind bars, a few disappeared,their women were molested,their mosques burnt or demolished and the funeral procession of those killed by the Hindu policemen were fired on. The Hindu mind knew how to perpetrate cruelty, injustice and persecution. They were past masters at it. Their's is, "the withdrawn and screened spirit that takes advantage of every evil manifestation. The spirit which pulled down Budhism, which helped destory the mighty Mogul, which lies quiscent for centuries, which is never dead and which it seems impossible to divert to practical and useful channels."[1] People in the Punjab were too near to the scene of these tragedies. They crossed into Kashmir in thousands and over 30,000 of them ended up in the jails of the Maharaja. Even that number could not satisfy his sadistic desires. The British Indian Government stepped in and the tension decreased. As a result of these occurrances a new political organisation came into being in 1932 which was called All Jammu and Kashmir Conference which could function within Kashmir itself. The sacrifices made by Kashmiris gained them the permission to voice their demands if nothing else. The All India Congress, a secular body in name but thoroughly Hindu dominated, feeling sympathetic with the Hindu ruler of Kashmir but ever watchful to fish in troubled waters, engineered the setting up of a rival political body in 1939 known as National Conference headed by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. This able and energetic patriot was to regret his alliance with the Congress but that was to come much later and at a time when there was no possibility left for him to retrace his steps.

The next big event concerning the lives of Kashmiris was the Independence of India and the formation of two independent Dominions of Pakistan and India. The States, which had always held a special position due to treaties with the British Crown, were free to opt for accession with either of the two Dominions but the Viceroy advised them to keep

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1. **Lieut General Sir George Mac Munn, Turmoil and Tragedy in India, 1914 and After, Jarrolds, London, 1935, P. 50.**

in view the wishes of their people, the geographical position of the individual state in question and the nature of the communal pattern of the people. The Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir did nothing of the sort. He had reasons to be so autocratic and was confident of his position. The power that was, the representative of the British Crown,[1] had, during his personal visit, given a hint that the Maharaja was a free agent and would get full support for whatever he decided. He sat still, but to lull Pakistan into inaction he concluded a stand-still agreement with the newly formed Government of Pakistan.

No doubts would have arisen of the complicity of the representative of the British Crown if the Maharaja had not started constructing a bridge on Ravi to link the State with Gurdaspur, a district with clear Muslim majority.[2] How did the Maharaja know that the Boundary Commission under Red Cliffe, a British judge, was to award Gurdaspur to India ?

The basic principle on which partition of Punjab had been accepted, had been forsaken to please India by giving her an approach to Jammu and Kashmir. Lord Birdwood has very frankly said, "............... It is also fair to Pakistan to recall again that had the Gurdaspur district not been awarded to India, India would certainly never have fought a war in Kashmir."[3] He goes on to say, "In the Lahore Division the Gurdaspur district carried a Muslim majority. A glance at the map will show that had this district as a whole been awarded to Pakistan, the position of troops landed by air in Kashmir from India would have been quite untenable."[4]

The forefathers of the ruler of Kashmir had paid 75 lakh rupees to the British to get Kashmir. He paid much less to retain it. He merely undertook to give the premiership of the State to the Muslim leader of the National Conference, Sheikh Abdullah, the pro-congress political organisation of Kashmiris.

None knew for how long or short a period this post was to be permitted to be retained by this misguided Nationalist. Events, however, were soon to give a lie to the secular pretensions of Congress Hindus.

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
1. Relations between the Viceroy of India and Nehru family appear to have been very friendly. Lt General Kaul, who was very close to Nehru, writes, "In fact a great friendship developed between their families and had many things in common; they were handsome, aristocratic and talented. Mountbatten and Nehru were friends because they were similar personalities. Lady Mountbatten and Nehru were close because she filled a void in his lonely life". Kaul, op. cit. p. 86.
2. The 1941 census report shows that Gurdaspur district had 52% Muslim population.
3. Birdwood, A Continent Decides, Robert Hole Ltd., London, 1953. P. 36.
4. Ibid p. 235.

The Maharaja had one Muslim battalion in an army of 13 batttalions and in order to forestall any action from them due to his decision not to accede to Pakistan, he ordered the disbandment of this battalion. These, however, were not the only Muslim soldiers in the State. There were thousands of veterans of the two World Wars and they took up arms in defence of their rights of freedom and option to acede to any one of the two newly created dominions. The Muslim Conference supported these patriots and there was an open rebellion through out the State. There was civil disobedience in Punch where the Dogra army was routed by the volunteer Muslim forces as in other places, particularly in Mirpur, Muzaffarabad, Bagh and Gilgit. An appeal was sent to the neighbouring districts and the tribal areas of Pakistan for help in men and material.

Punch in fact constituted a subsidiary a separate state and the Maharaja exercised only a nominal control over its affairs. The population of Punch was predominantly Muslim and of a martial stock. These men, most of whom, had only recently returned from the Second World War rose against the atrocities of Dogra Army. Around these men was formed the hard core of Azad Kashmir Army. They constitute an excellent fighting material but not many of them had experience of command and control of large bodies of men and none had risen to higher ranks of the Indian Army. They, therefore, lacked the ability to organise themselves into a well knit field army. Inspite of it the Maharaja's Army was no match for them and they were able to liberate practically the whole of the state of Punch and basiege the capital city of Punch itself. Their numbers soon swelled to over 300,000 and they took control of the whole area except the valley of Kashmir and major part of Jammu.

The Maharaja realising his position, left Srinagar and took refuge in Jammu but the henchmen of his government remained active in Srinagar itself and the valley. Simultaneously with trying to avoid coming to any understanding with Pakistan, the Kashmir Government started a country-wide campaign lf "systematic persecution" of the Muslim population. "It started on 26th August at Bagh in Punch when Muslims were set on and killed by the State troops for contravening orders which had forbidden the celebration of Pakistan Day on 15th August. It continued and increased in tempo with the infiltration of members of R.S.S. Akali Sikhs and the INA into Jammu province in October; and it culminated with the massacre of two crowded convoys of Muslim evacuees who had been promised safe conduct to Pakistan. On 5th and 6th November the convoys drew up at a village on the Jammu-Kathua road, and were set on by armed bands, their Sikh escorts joining in the slaughter. The overall result of resort to jungle morality was to cause some 500,000 Muslims to flee from their homes, about 400,000 seeking shelter in Azad territory and at least 100,000 dribbling over into Pakistan."[1] The same writer concludes his

1. Ibid, p. 219.


KASHMIR & JAMMU
MILES
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International Boundery
District
Roads
Cease Fire line
AFGHANISTAN
SINKIANG
SHKUMAN
YASIN
HUNZA NAGIR
CUPIS
SHER GILA
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DOMOT
BALTISTAN
RONDU (Little Tibet)
CHILAS
NANGA PARBAT
ASTOR
SKARDU
RATTU
KMAPALU
TOLTI
BURZIL
MINIMARG
KARGIL
TITWAL
MANDWARA
MUZAFFARABAD
LEH
BARAMULA
CHENARI
URI
SRINAGAR
MURREE
BAGH
BADGAM
GULMARG
RAWLAKOT
PUNCH
PAKISTAN
RAWAL PINDI
PALANDRI
ANANTNAG
KOTLI
BANIHAL
RAJAORI
RAMBAN
KISHTWAR
MIRPUR
NAOSHERA
TIBET
JHELUM
BHIMBER
AKHNUR
BHADARWAH
UDHAMPUR
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LALA MUSA
GUJRAT
SIALKOT
JASMERGARH
KATHUA
CHHAMB
INDIA
GUJRANWALA
NAROWAL
GURDASPUR

narrative by adding, "While the State bureaucracy were thus recklessly abandoned in an orgy of slaughter, the obvious legacy of these crimes had taken seed in the distant frontier districts beyond the Indus."[1]

News of massacres of Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir reached Pakistan and immediately produced echoes of very violent nature. Volunteers started assembling and managed to reach Kashmir. The tribes became restive too. The administration of the Frontier Province and Tribal areas was still in British hands and although serving Pakistan the British Officers were keen to keep a neutral attitude in this very vital issue. "Sir George Cunningham was engaged in making desperate efforts to dissuade Mohmand Maliks and others from entering Kashmir. But the seed had been sown, and control at that stage was out of question. This was not surprising in view of the absence of any formed units of Pakistan Army at that time."[2] The units of Pakistan Army were still in an embryo state, being collected from all over India and abroad and were still arriving in small packets. Even if Pakistan had wished to invade Kashmir it could not mobilise enough strength to do so. The Punch veterans, however, had collected enough funds and contacted the rifle factories in tribal areas to purchase arms and ammunition. The neighbouring districts of Jhelum and Rawalpindi came forward and helped in collecting rations, clothes, blankets and transport animals for use of Azad Army. Even far away town dwellers of Lahore, Multan, Dacca and Karachi did not wish to lag behind and contributions in money and material started pouring in.

The State authorities had realised that help might be forthcoming from Pakistan. They had, therefore, closed all routes into Kashmir and destroyed the ferries across river Jhelum. Those who dwell on the banks of rivers know how to cross them and very soon contact was re-established with the outside world. Gradually the State troops were rounded up in Punch and Muzaffarabad and regular flow of men and material started reaching the Azad Forces there. Units which had been allotted to Pakistan and the Muslim elements of units which had remained in India, had a good sprinkling of men from Punch, Mirpur and Bhimbar. There were units which were entirely recruited from these areas. One could quote the example of the Musalman companies in infantry battalions of Rajputana Rifles which, by and large, confined their recruitment to Punch and Mirpur alone. The news of disturbances and atrocities committed by State troops reached these men who were still in various cantonments of India. They could not remain dumb spectators to what was happening to their families. They all flocked to join the ranks of the Azad Forces.

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1. Ibid p. 220

2. Ibid p. 221

However good fighters they were, without adequate high command, they could not be a match against a well organised and well supported army. As long as it was the Dogra army of the Maharaja opposed to them they did well. They had the moral support of the hurriedly formed Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir which had been formed by Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim, a young barrister, from Rawalakot in the State of Punch. He had, however, a heavy task in front of him. He had to arrange for arms, ammunition and equipment from literally non-existing sources and at the same time to organise civil administration in area controlled by this volunteer force. The refugees pouring in from Jammu and adjoining areas were an additional commitment and it is a credit to this ad-hoc Government that they were able to achieve so much with so little at their disposal.

In the meantime Menon had flown in to Srinagar on October 25, 1947, ostensibly on the invitation of the Maharaja and returned to Delhi the following day armed with the instrument of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah the Nationalist leader was released by the Maharaja on the same day and the Maharaja wished to make him share power with his existing Prime Minister, Mehr Chand Mahajan, but due to Indian insistance he alone was sworn in as the head of the Government on October 31, 1947. The pattern emerges gradually, day by day, and the Indian intention of a full and complete control of the State gets clearer with every move. The Maharaja was told to leave Srinagar on the 26th of October so that the Indian nominee had full control of the situation. He being a Muslim was of great advantage in this move which then could only be known to the Indian Cabinet and the Governor General.

The offer of accession was immediately accepted as planned and the Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten, on behalf of the Indian Government and with the concurrence of his Cabinet announced that this action of India was only of an interim nature and that Sheikh Abdullah's Government was to be replaced and a plebiscite held as soon as peaceful conditions were brought about. On the 27th of October, the day following the accession, Lord Mountbatten categorically said "In consistence with their policy that, in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the qeustion of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the raiders, the qeustion of State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people".

On the same date, i.e., October 26, 1947 India despatched troops to Srinagar by air. The presence of pre - planning cannot be ruled out inspite of British and Indian denials in view of the speed and smoothness with which events moved and operations were mounted.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Governor General of Pakistan was then at Lahore, when he heard on October 27, 1947 of the despatch of Indian troops to Srinagar. He at once ordered General Douglous Gracey in Rawalpindi to despatch troops to Srinagar via the Jhelum valley. "Gracey, however, felt that even if the troops could have been found, he could not give such orders without the knowledge or sanction of Sir Claude Auchinleck, and he begged to be allowed to delay until Auchinleck could arrive in Lahore for a full discussion."[1]

It has not yet been known under what circumstances the British C-in-C in India despatched troops to Kashmir without the knowledge and sanction of the Supreme Commander, Sir Claude Auchinleck. Auchinleck and Gracey on October 28, 1947 were able to persuade, the Governor General of Pakistan to withdraw his order. The veiled threat of a full scale invasion of Pakistan had been put forward by the two British Generals. It is not known if it had been conveyed to them direct by the Governor General of India or through the British Government. The Supreme Commander had also mentioned at the meeting that Mountbatten, Nehru and Hari Singh the ruler of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, would be coming to Lahore to continue the discussions. Eventually Mountbatten alone came on the first of November. The absence of Nehru was excused under the pretext of diplomatic indisposition. The Indian Cabinet had vetoed it.[2]

On the first of November the meeting of the Joint Defence Council was held but achieved nothing. The Governor General of Pakistan, "put forward a plan by which both the Governor Generals were to issue a joint proclamation calling on all those engaged in fighting to cease fire within forty-eight hours. If the tribesmen did not obey, the two armies were to take collective action against them. Thereafter the administration would be in the hands of the two Governor Generals, who would accept responsibility for a plebiscite."[3] The Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten, excused himself by pleading lack of powers to make such an announcement and promised to place the proposal before his Cabinet. The answer as could be expected was a point blank refusal. India had not sent troops merely to recall them within four days.

The Prime Minister of India, instead of adopting a conciliatory attitude blamed Pakistan of aggression in his broadcast on the 2nd of November.

1. Ibid 225.

2. Ibid 226.

3. Ibid 227.

He, however, reiterated what Lord Mountbatten had said and was even more specific in his words when he said, "We are prepared when peace and law and order have been established to have a referendum under international auspices."

The story of fighting in Kashmir and the subsequent Cease Fire, followed by the discussion in the UNO and the Security Council, whose decisions have been consistantly ignored by India are too well known to be mentioned here. Kashmir, the Paradise on earth, is still groaning under the iron heel of the invader. With all the resources available to India she has not been able, during all these years, to break the will of the unarmed people of Kashmir and there are no signs that India will ever succeed in winning over the hearts of these simple folk, determined to uphold their freedom.

CHAPTER V

THEY RAN IN THE RANN

Rann in Hindi, the official language of India, means the battlefield. Kutch, in the same language, means swamps or coastal land. The Rann may have been the battlefield, in ages gone by, during the period not under water. It certainly was the battleground when in 1762 the Muslim ruler of Sind chased the army of the Rao of Bhoj, which was trying to invade Sind through the Rann. History repeats itself. The Indians repeated the performance in 1965 with similar results. As in 1762, so also in 1965, they ran in the Rann southwards but the army defending Sind on this latter occasion was too "Rules and Regulations minded" and as instructed by its Government did not wish to go beyond the 24parallel upto which theGovernment of Pakistan claimed as its territory. The Rann, historically speaking belongs entirely to Pakistan, as the successor to the Province of Sind of British period. Prior to the British, the rulers of Sind, since the conquest of the Kingdom of Kutch Bhoj by Ghulam Shah Kalhora in 1762 had been receiving tribute from the rulers of Bhoj. The state of Bhoj, however, fell to the British in 1819 and Sind was conquerred by them in1843. Even after the conquest of Sind by the British the use of the entire Rann was being made for grazing etc. by the landlords and cattle owners of Sind. There was no possibility of the people of the State of Kutch Bhoj to come and graze cattle in the Rann. There was no drinking water either for men or animals on the Bhoj side. Even today there is none. The factual control and use of the Rann until recently was in the hands of the people in Pakistan. The residents of Kutch Bhoj could only utilize the Rann grazing fields if permitted to live as guests of the Sindhi landlords. This, however was not permitted by the Government. In 1861 the Political Superintendent, State Frontier, Sind, had an occasion to warn Allahditta Vinji against such a practice. He wrote to this Sindi landlord "It has come to my notice that cattle owners of Kutch Bhoj have brought their cattle and settled at Tar Vinji and are allowing their cattle on the grass of Rann. This has caused a lot of trouble to the local people. All this has happened at your instigation and help. *You are hereby ordered* to see that the cattle owners of Kutch Bhoj are driven away, else I will recover fine from you. In future if you allow any outsider to stay there I will see that you are externed from the district. Please note very carefully". The law and order enforcement in the Rann of Kutch, prior to independence, was entirely in the hands of the Government of Sind. The darbar of the State of Kutch Bhoj has never had any control over it and neither did the State authorities ever object to the exercise of such powers by the authorities in Sind. The Imperial Gazettier of 1908 describes in no uncertain terms the exclusion of Rann of Kutch from the jurisdiction of the state of Kutch Bhoj. It says, "The whole territory of Kutch is almost entirely cut off from the continent of India—North by Great Rann, East by little Rann, South by Gulf of Kutch and West by the Arabian Sea". It is regrettable that Pakistan has so far only claimed the North half of the Rann only. The reason is that Pakistan has always contended that the Rann is an inland sea and as such should be equally divided between the bordering States.

During the British period, efforts were made on three occasions to determine the boundary between Sind and Kutch Bhoj. The first time in 1908, then in 1914 and on the last occasion in 1938. On the last two occasions World Wars were given more importance and the talks called off. We see that since independence, India started with no control or claim over any portion of the Rann. In the usual Indian style, the authorities on Indian side started encroaching by edging forward in 1952, and laid claim to Chad Bet. By 1965 the claim had edged further forward to the dilapidated fort of Kanjar Kot. In the mean time a meeting between Lieut-General K.M. Sheikh and S. Swaran Singh the Foreign Minister of India had taken place in 1960, where it was agreed to consider the area as disputed territory and certain Ground-Rules were formulated.


True to their nature, the Indians started building up forces in the area from February 1965 in complete contravention of the agreement of 1960. In April 1965, Pakistan exchanged notes with India and tried to dissuade her from having recourse to fighting but India was adament. "Power corrupts" people. Indian leaders were no exception to this universal rule. The vastness of India, the teeming dumb millions at their beck and call and the massive foreign aid from numerous sources went to the head of the Pandits. Those not used to command get spoiled by the very sight of liveried servants of the palaces. A million uniformed soldiers, sailors and airmen were beyond the digestive capabilities of the leaders of Indian National Congress. They were itching to plunge their country into war, no matter what the consequences were and they did it. The Indian leaders, Nanda, Chavan and Shastri fluttered their dhotis in front of the troops in the Rann of Kutch and after brief flying visits returned to Delhi and ordered the Indian Armed Forces to put exercise "Arrow Head" into operation.

Vikrant the Indian Aircraft carrier with 7 destoryers and frigates and the fleet tanker supported the army. The Indian Navy was used for transporting, men and material to the disputed area. Before landing the troops and equipment the naval guns were allowed to practice gunnery. This was considered to be a morale booster for the troops who were known to have suffered from nightmares since the acute winter of 1962/63.

These moves by India forced Pakistan to order 8 Infantry Division to move one of its brigades to the affected area. The Indians by then had over two infantry brigades in the area and another a few miles away. These regular forces were in addition to a number of battalions of Indian Border Police.

To have ordered an infantry brigade into the area was the only way to deal with a nation which refuses to come to amicable decisions across the table, a nation which refuses to accept arbitration by neutral powers and is adament that no reference should be made to any international

RANN OF KUTCH DISPUTE



Organisation or the International Court of Justice. Such a nation will accept brute force only. It is only natural. A nation which has lived the life of slavery and managed to exist for centuries on the strength of lies, intrigues, guile and treachery does not and cannot think of honourable dealings. The germs of slavish mentality are still alive. To expect honourable behaviour of the brave and chivalrous would be a mistake as has been experienced by Pakistan ever since the two parted company. The previous attitude of avoiding fighting at all cost had not been understood by India in the true spirit. 51 Infantry Brigade as a result, moved to Badin on 7 March 1965 and took up position a little ahead of it but still outside the likely operational area. On the following day 6 Infantry Brigade was also given Warning Orders to be prepared to move.

8 FF, one of the battalions of 51 Infantry Brigade moved to Kanjarkot area a couple of days later. They had a troop of Mortars and a Battery of 14 Field Regiment under command. 18 Punjab also supported by Artillery and Engineers was given the role of supporting Indus Rangers in the area. There were strict orders not to advance beyond the line already held by the Rangers but under no circumstances to permit Indians to edge forward.

On 9 March there was increased wireless traffic on the Indian side and it later transpired that Ministers and senior Military Officers from Army Headquarters Delhi had visited the area. The plans for attack were discussed and approved at the highest level. General Chaudhuri, C-in-C, Indian Army is reported to have appreciated the details of the attack and further programme.

From 13 March onwards the Indians evacuated nearly 50 villages which had Muslim inhabitants, on their side of the border, but issued arms and ammunition to the Hindu residents of the area. Patrolling was intensified and the Indian Air Force was noticed to be unusually active and committed a number of Air Space violations. The Indian Army build up also could be noticed. On 24 March there were more Ministerial Conferences in forward positions. By 29 March the Combined Operations along the coast had reached their climax and offensive action by Indian Army could be expected to be soon in the offing. The details of Indian activities and unusual build up was brought to the notice of the Government and the President of Pakistan. Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, is reported to have remarked:

> "We cannot take these unilateral actions lying down. We must be ready to take them on as and when they indulge in such flagrant violations of existing agreements."

Undoubtedly a sound decision expected of a soldier. Hesitation and "peace at all costs" would have been interpretted as weakness and no one knew how far the thirst for territories would take the Indians.

Indians had become so impetuous that at Ding they crept forward on the night of 5/6 April and dug positions within 100 yards of our Ranger post. When challenged they offered to discuss matters at a flag meeting at 0830 hours the following day. This flag meeting, although proposed by them, never materialised. Similar had been the fate of the proposed meeting with regard to the area occupied by India a little earlier, and called by them Sardar Post.

Having reconnoitered positions, Commander 8 Div, Major General Tikka Khan, ordered the recapture of Sardar Post. The attack as a result, was launched on night 8/9 April, by 51 Infantry Brigade, and two out of three camps in the area were captured. The name Sardar Post was erroneous. The Indians had a whole batallion located in well prepared bunkers with well laid out MMG and LMG posts enfilading the approaches. 51 Infantry Brigade killed over a hundred Indians and took 21 prisoners including the officiating C. O. Major Karnail Singh. The third Indian camp though not captured was also evacuated by the Indians. The troops were however, to withdraw after completing their task. As a result the Indians reoccupied the position after three days with fresh troops. Pakistan's casualties in this action had been nine killed and sixteen wounded. Enemy had lost heavily and considering the number of prisoners they left behind the total number must have been a great deal more than claimed by our troops.

On 21 April Lieut Nadir Parvez, with a platoon of 6 Punjab carried out a daring raid against a company of Indian CRP at a place known as Point 84 which they had occupied only recently. The raid was highly successful. The CRP men left their arms and equipment and disappeared before the raiding party could even close up with them. They left behind not only 3 dead bodies but large quantities of petrol and rations which were destroyed as such large quantities could not be carried back by the platoon. The ammunition, however, came handy and was utilised against the Indians in later encounters. Although a little out of context, one is reminded of a conversation between an Indian prisoner of war captured at Jaurian and a Pakistani Sepoy. The Indian asked him, "where did you Pakistanis get all this ammunition from". "Well", the Pakistani sepoy said a little too seriously, "It is a Secret but as you will be safely behind the barbed wire, I do not mind telling you. We captured large number of ammunition dumps during Kutch operations which we used at Chhamb. Then we captured more ammunition at Chhamb which we used at Jaurian. To-day we have captured so much ammunition that we can use it elsewhere if you attack us again". It is not reported what the Indian replied, but that ammunition also was usefully employed.

In the meantime 6 Infantry Brigade had also arrived in the area. C-in-C, General Mohammad Musa had ordered this Brigade to be located in area South of Jatrai and to eliminate any Indian encroachments upto Biar Bet.

On night 23/24 April the operation was taken in hand. 6 Punjab ptu in an attack against Point 84 which had since the last raid been reoccupied by the Indians in greater strength. The enemy was given the impression that the Objective was the feature known as Chad Bet. The enemy holding this position was the crack Indian 50 Para Brigade and was supported by 17 Para Field Regiment in addition to a mortar battery. The enemy positions were well dug in, with overhead cover and complete network of Communication trenches. Command Posts, MMG Posts and well dug in store and ammunition dumps. The Brigade Commander Brigadier Iftikhar Khan Janjua accompanied the assault battalion. The enemy opened up with every thing he had, guns, machine guns, light machine guns, Recoilless Rifles and 75 MM Howitzers. The Indians however, soon found that they were outflanked and outmanoeuvered and soon withdrew in great haste, leaving behind a jeep, a number of trailors, ammunition and ration dumps and huge quantities of stores and personal belongings. The number of casualties could not be ascertained and one officer and a number of other ranks were taken as prisoners.

It was then decided to attack Biar Bet on 26 April. This time it was felt that as an experiment it would be useful to try out tanks in this terrain.

A squadron of armour led the attack with 2 FF less two companies accompanying them. The enemy brought down a heavy concentration of all types of fire but in this open country every round seemed to have been aimed or pushed into the empty spaces. The men maintain that here was a hidden hand deflecting the rounds which would, otherwise, have taken a heavy toll of the advancing troops. The Indians have claimed having hit a number of tanks. Although over 200 rounds of RR were fired the only thing they hit was a spade tied at the back of a jeep and an ammunition truck was blown up causing the only casualties of this operation. If ever Divine Hand protected His devoted servants it was on that day. It is dangerous, in war, to believe in miracles but when men of action coming out of a rain of steel insist on believing that their safety was the result of direct intervention by the Merciful God, it is difficult to persuade them to give up such a belief. By 0630 hours the position was completely in Pakistani hands. Here again the Indians abandoned their position in great haste, leaving behind one dead, one RR mounted on a jeep, large quantities of ammunition and equipment and "Halva puri", the delicious breakfast which is so relished by the Indian soldiers of an unfortunately starving nation.

Daily Telegraph, London seems to have summed up the situation very ably when it said, "Biar Bet may mark the coming of age of Pakistan, the shedding of many infant fears. The calm that had been maintained in the country over the past few weeks, in face of near hysterical statements by responsible Indians, has been remarkable."[1]

I led a party of Pakistani and foreign journalists to the Rann of Kutch area a few days later. After the G.O.C., Major General Tikka Khan, had finished briefing the party, one of the foreign journalists got up and asked, "General you say you have killed 300 Indians, the Indians say they have killed 350 Pakistanis. Who should we believe." The General was not perturbed. In his usual cool manner he replied. "I am placing all my helicopters at your disposal. If you see, when you go over the battle area, that the junk of war is in front of me then the Indians are telling the truth but if the junk of war is behind me then I alone could be in a position to count the dead." "Fair enough" replied the foreign journalist. On his return it was the same journalist who remarked "Gosh—You made them run in the Rann."

8 Infantry Division and its troops to whom the credit goes for making the Indian soldier run in the Rann, as they had never run before, were ordered the next day, "No more offensive". Common friends had realised the danger of these two countries fighting. The outcome had not been as expected. It was, therefore, incumbent to stop the shooting match. Except capturing a convoy of Seven brand new Mercedes the division, after that, confined its activities to patrolling of the area immediately in its front.

Cease Fire came through the efforts of the British Prime Minister and the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri consoled his nation by announcing. "We will attack at a place of our own choosing". As if Rann of Kutch had been a place of somebody else's choosing. He is no more to tell the world whose advice had resulted in this choice.

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1. Rowle Knox, Daily Telegraph, London, May 5, 1965.

CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND ROUND IN KASHMIR

The debacle in Kutch disappointed the Indian Warlords. They had great hopes on this seemingly innocent border incident. It did not escalate as expected. The visits of revered Pundits like Shastri, the Prime Minister, and Chavan, the Defence Minister did not succeed in infusing life into the demoralised Indian soldiery. Commanders like Major Karnail Singh believed that they were doemed to be taken prisoners whenever and wherever they went to war. A high powered conference was called. All the brass and all the excellencies attended. The advisers were in the lobbies but near enough to influence decisions. After a little mud slinging between the politicians and the soldiers the conference settled down to sober deliberations. The blame for the defeat was thrown on the Pakistanis. They had not played the game expected of them as a small and weak neighbour. They should have agreed to lose but instead they had stood up and had managed to attack with superior forces at the desired time and place whenever they decided to adopt offensive defence. The decision arrived at by this high powered conference was to try again. The mighty Indian white elephant, its army, was to be geared into motion once again but this time it was considered best to roll it down the hills of Kashmir. As soon as it had gained momentum it was to be supplemented by an energetic push from all directions and across all fronts. It must be noted here that the principle of diversifying the points of attack had not yet been given up. In the plan to initiate the move from Kashmir the beginning was to be made once again from a disputed territory. A certain amount of ingenuity and the dove-tailing of Political and Military Strategy was to be in greater prominence than in the case of Rann of Kutch. The Indians realised that Pakistan had relied too long on the promises of UNO. The question of Kashmir and Pak-Bharat problems had become in the meantime a matter of the so called global strategy of Big Powers. As a result the Kashmiris had become so frustrated that since 1964 any aggressive move by India in Kashmir had brought about retaliation by AK Forces. Chaknot and other places had shown the chinged attitude of the Government of Azad Kashmir. The Indian shrewd mand was quick to come to conclusions. If India heighened her aggressive attitude in Kashmir through increased breacihes of Cease Fire Agreement and raids into territory controlled by A.K. were stepped up, it was more than likely, in fact certain, as the Indian Prime Minister put it to the meeting—that Pakistan and the Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir would reply in the same coin.[1] It was even possible, said the shrewd pupil of Chanakya smilingly, that Pakistan may join hands with the revolutionaries in the valley and other parts of held Kashmir who would certainly rise if in addition to the use of agents provocateures, the control was relaxed a little. If this happened, as he was mistakenly certain it would happen, then the. next step for India was to march into Pakistan from all directions "After all, all roads lead to Islamabad. What fun could you not have,

1. Lieut General Kaul who should know what happened behind the scene writes, "In this war he (C-in-C India) made many errors of judgements. He first took certain military steps in Kashmir, the consequence of which he could not foresee...." Kaul, op. cit, p. 47.7

General". The reply was very military like, "Yes, Sir. You know the brave jawans of the Sena[1] are itching to march westwards at your command". With a "Well done" and "I have faith in you and your brave jawans. Give them all my Ashir Bad[2]", and the meeting ended.

As a last reminder the Prime Minister turning to Mr. Nanda the Home Minister, had said, "Are the plans regarding despatch of Jan Sangh volunteers complete". When the Home Minister noded with "Yes" in an undertone, the Prime Minister smiled and left the room. The plan, they all thought, was so simple that it could not fail to achieve the desired result. The Army of Occupation in Indian Held Kashmir was ordered to step up raids across the Cease Fire Line and the puppet government of Srinagar was instructed to provide agents provocateures who could light the fuze and blow up the smouldering heap of explosives, that Kashmir had become. The security troops had to be moved nearer to the FDLs in any case. The relaxing of control, the presence of agents prov acateures and increased persecutions were expected to create conditions which, the Indians thought, would force Pakistan to listen to Kashmiri leaders' requests of marching into Indian Held Kashmir.

The record of Indians in Kashmir was fairly black even before this eventful decision but immediately after this meeting the activities across the Cease Fire Line were stepped up out of all proportions. The Cease Fire violations as reported to the U.N. Observers by Pakistan during the past had been as follows:—

1962	538
1963	283
1994	1464

They now produced a different picture.

1965:

January	189
February	224
March	325
April	335
May	434
June	480

With the figures of raids across the CFL mounting up week after week it was only natural for India to expect Pakistan to retaliate. It can be said that the dove-tailing of Political with Military Strategy by India had

1. Hindi word for Army. A favourite term of All Indian Radio.
2. Blessings of an elder, or a Brahmin.

succeeded to the extent that it drew out the Kashmiris exactly as the Indian Pandits had appreciated. They, however, had miscalculated the results in more than one manner, and particularly the action which they thought Pakistan would take. The error of judgment referred to by Lieut General Kaul, in his book, cost the Indians heavily.[1]

The first mistake which the Indians made was that they had not weighed up the Kashmir situation inside the Indian Held Kashmir itself. The repression which had been planned to be simultaneous with increased activities across the CFL and to precede the final push had reached a crescendo by the time the level of junior executives was reached. These officials had been supported by thousands ot armed Jan Sanghis imported from India after intensive training and careful screening. The plan boomeranged as a result. Persecutions and cruelty have a limit in every case. Even the most willing sufferer will not be able to bear patiently beyond a certain point. The same happened in Kashmir as it had happened in 1930. A countrywide tumult arose, a lot more than the Indians had expected. That part of the Indian Army which had been hitherto utilised for local protection and to frighten the Kashmiris was not there to stiffle the voices. These troops had been moved forward to carry out raids through the FDLs into AK territory. The absence of these troops helped the revolutionaries to organise better than the Indian authorities felt they would be able to do.

The second miscalculation was regarding the exact reaction of Pakistan. Indian Commanders had visualised that with the threat to AK. Pakistan High Command would move at least two divisions into AK. to thicken up the defences in addition to retaliation. This would have weakened the defences in Lahore and Sialkot. Nothing of the sort happened. No units, much less formations were moved into A. K. The Azad Kashmir leaders had been pressing Pakistan Government that if Pakistan was not in a position to act, the Kashmiris should be left free, but so far Pakistan had been able to hold them back.

It must be borne in mind that as far as Kashmiris are concerned the Cease Fire Line is an arbitrary arrangement between the UNO, Pakistan and India separating the two armies, as they stood on Jan 1, 1949. The civilian population is not affected by it. The Kashmiris consider themselves both morally and legally justified to cross and recross it in either direction at will. This is their birth right which not even the UNO can take away from them. If they go across this line to help their kith and kin in Indian held Kashmir they are moving within the country of their birth and cannot be stopped under any civilised code of law. Their nationality cannot be taken away from them by merely pushing them across the CFL as it has been done so far by India. When the revolutionary activities

1. Kaul, op. cit. p. 477.

resulting from the increased atrocities committed by the Indians, as a part of the bigger plan, increased beyond their expectations, the Indians, ever watchful of the international scene, raised a tumult that thousands of Pakistanis had infiltrated into Jammu and Kashmir.

To say that seven thousand Kashmiris infiltrated back into Indian Held Kashmir through a thickly held Cease Fire Line, maintained themselves for week after week in Indian held territory,moved about, disrupted the Indian L of C, ran a government in certain areas without the active and planned cooperation of the local population, would seem highly improbable if not completely impossible. If, however, they did all that and traversed the valley of Kashmir day in and day out under the very nose of the Indian Army then it would mean that they had been invited by the local revolutionaries and that the Indian Army was as inefficient as the Revolutionaries were brave and resourceful. There can be no doubt that these revolutionaries were all Kashmiris and we are certain that the freedom loving humanity will wish good luck to them if they ever decide to repeat their wonderful performance again.[1] Neither Indian High Command nor the politicians in Delhi, had foreseen the extent to which they would themselves be put to trouble by their mischievous moves, both within Indian Held Kashmir and across the CFL.[2] It appears that they were certain of a number of Pakistani formations having been brought into A.K. by Pakistan. At least this is what appears from the faked interrogation reports of the supposed Pakistani troops that India alleged to have taken prisoner. Banking on this they moved forward to liquidate Azad Kashmir. The Indian XV Corps Commander, who is responsible for the Indian held Kashmir, was given the task of capturing the whole of A.K. as his Objective. All that he managed to accomplish was the caputre of a few posts.

If Indian High Command was not prepared for the complete breakdown of its L of C in Kashmir, it was much less prepared for an offensive in Chhamb and Jaurian. They may have felt that Pakistan could take to offensive in this Sector and that may be the reason for the unusually strong defences in this Sector. But when it happened, it came like a bolt from the blue and completely put the Indians off balance. Their concrete defences seem to have crumbled under the impact of this attack. They saw its implication rather belatedly, not until Akhnoor was really threatened. To stop it they had to do two things, both unpalatable to them, but most important. First they had to rush at least two divisions to halt this whirlwind advance of determined Pakistani and A.K. troops under seasoned commanders. Two of the most brilliant Pakistani Generals had so far

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1. Even Lieut General Kaul is sceptical of the accusation by the Government of India regarding the presence of infiltrators. He says, "It was surprising that such a large number of men had managed to slip across our border supposed to be so vigilantly guarded......". Kaul, op. cit., p. 472.

2. Ibid, p 477 reproduced in note 1 to p 73.

shared the laurels. Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik had set the ball in motion in a masterly manner and the move had been brilliantly completed by Major General (now General) Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan. Both were awarded well earned Hilal-i-Jurat in these operations. India was loath to send reinforcements to this Sector but the Pakistani commanders by uprooting three storied well-planned concrete bunkers had left no choice to Indian High Command. By sending two of the best Indian Divisions to halt this avalanche the Indian High Command was upsetting the Chaudhuri plan for the main invasion. Having been left with no alternative the Indians cut down the number of divisions from the most important Sector of Sialkot.

The second alternative to the plan forced on India by this bold and swift action ordered by C-in-C Pakistan Army was the putting forward of the date of the invasion of Pakistan by the Indian High Command. Originally the date had been fixed for the fourth week of September.

The offensive in CHHAMB, across the cease, fire line was undertaken by Pakistan Army on September, 1, 1965. The result of this offensive was not clear until the evening that day. The Indian invasion of Pakistan could be attributed to be the result of this offensive only if the concentrations of the Indian Army opposite Khokhrapar, Lahore and Sialkot were planned, ordered and brought about after this date. We have ample evidence emanating from various sources and confirmed by the statements of Indian PsOW that the concentration of Indian Army had started before CHHAMB had been attacked by Pakistan. For example 1 Indian Armoured Division and 2 (Independent) Indian Armoured Brigade received orders to move forward on the morning of Sep 1, 1965. It is obvious that the decision had been taken earlier in the day if not, a day or two earlier. 6 Indian Mountain Division commenced leaving its locations somewhere in Central India during the last week of August, 1965. 4 Sikh reached Ferozepur on 28 August and 9 Horse left Saugar on 2 September. 67 Indian Infantry Brigade left Jodhpur on 1 September. 3 Madras left Dhar Chilla on 30 August and 5/5 G.R. was out of Babina by 1 September. No army can concentrate in a day. Neither is the present Indian Army reputed for excellent movement control and an efficient railway support. At the time of the invasion of Goa, when a little over one infantry division had to be deployed to march across the border, the Indian Railway schedules were so upset as to create a confusion lasting for over a week. The Indian concentration against Pakistan involved a much larger number of formations, inspite of the already sizeable concentrations close to West Pakistan Border. and the shorter distance that the 1 Indian Armoured Division had to move.

The Indian army, due to its huge size, had perforce to take a few weeks to concentrate on a number of points from a much larger number of can-

tonments. The movement had, therefore, to be spread out over a considerable period. This is the reason why the forward concentrations of the Indian Army started in mid-August and according to the existing schedule had to be completed by mid September. The reasons for the move must have been guessed by some elements in the Indian Army. The diary of Lieut Col Nitranjan Singh, C.O. of 2 Grenaders, who left Bombay for Pathankot, with his battalion on 14 August, wrote regarding the impending war, on the following day, in his diary, "In the morning I felt the whole thing to be purposeless, illogical and without meaning. All that is happening is ridiculous by any standard". Another battalion of the same brigade left its peace station on 18 August. There are a score of other moves which provide ample proof that the invasion of Pakistan was already planned but for a later date. Pakistan's offensive in CHHAMB merely rattled the Indian High Command and losing their sense of proportion they put forward the date of the invasion by two weeks and not only upset their plans but also unbalanced their whole Army.

The utter dislocation caused inside Held Kashmir, the danger posed to Akhnoor and the possibility of a threat developing against Jammu was too big a risk, or so thought the Indian General Staff, to wait for the scheduled date, in late September, to arrive. It rattled General Chowdhuri as much as Mr. Shastri and the whole of the Indian nation. It merely explains the frame of mind into which the ill conceived propaganda of Indian Government had placed the whole nation, but it shows the fear that had been generated by reverses in Kutch and later in Jaurian Sector and the activities of a handful of Kashmiri Revolutionaries behind the Indian lines, that when Mr. Chavan, the Indian Defence Minister, informed the Indian Parliament that Indian Army had invaded Pakistan, the whole house stood up to give him an unprecedented ovation. To neutral observers it appeared as if the much promised event had at last taken place. This digression was necessary to bring out the Indian plan and the way in which the Indian rulers wished to escalate fighting in Kashmir into a full scale war. We must now proceed with the events in Kashmir.

It was India which informed the world that she had failed in throttling the voices of the chained and handcuffed Kashmiris by announcing the presence of so called raiders in Kashmir.

The first signs of Kashmiri Revolution occurred on 8 August and attacks on Indian posts were so widespread that the Indian authorities arrested a number of opposition leaders and influential Muslims in Srinagar and other large towns. The Revolutionaries found tremendous support in Srinagar itself, probably because a number of them belonged

to the metropolis but they preferred to remain out of the capital and attack military targets only. The burning of Batmalu and other villages by the Indians was too big a price to pay for killing the Indian soldiers. In addition there was more scope and a wider field of action out of Srinagar. The reports issued by Radio Srinagar from time to time, about the skirmishes between the Revolutionaries and the Indian Security Forces, are an accurate account as far as the chronology of events is concerned. The Revolutionaries, all true and full blooded Kashmiris, did not always possess facilities to apprise the Voice of Kashmir of their successes. Radio Srinagar came to their help in such cases and helped the Revolutionary Council in plotting the movements of their freedom fighters. No place was safe from them. Hindwara, Baramula, Srinagar Airfield, Budil, Rajauri, Poonch and many other places, as announced by Radio Srinagar, from time to time, were all being attacked, and the Indian Forces punished[1]. The freedom fighters were fighting like any other combatant troops. They had their makeshift uniforms[2] and they never attacked the Indian Army except in the accepted military manner. The Indian Army had as a result, to deploy over one Infantry Division around Srinagar itself and nearly two Infantry Divisions in Poonch and Rajauri, where due to the nature of the terrain and the martial qualities of the local population they had brilliant successes in a number of pitched battles against the Indian Army. In Budil they formed a Government of their own, set up a revenue department and established law and order like any other settled government. If they had not been sons of the soil itself it would not have been possible for them to have fought, maintained themselves, captured positions and administered vast territories in Indian Held Kashmir. It was only after 23 September, when the whole of the Indian Army was uncommitted, that the Indians dared enter those areas[3]. The release of forces from elsewhere gave the Indians ample time and opportunity to re-establish their reign of terror once again. They had to fight pitched battles to regain control of those areas from the Revolutionaries. The Indians must know that the day of retribution cannot be postponed for ever and the blood of 50,000 men, women and children that the Indian Army and the Jan Sangh slaughtered during August and September 1965 will be avenged one day. The 1,25,000

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1. Lt Gen Kaul touches on this aspect when he says, "In some areas, such as Budil, in the Riasi Tehsil, in the Jammu Sector, it took us considerable effort to get rid of the administration which the infiltrators had set up there" Kaul, op. cit. p. 472. We would like to point out to General Kaul that infiltrators cannot establish administration. Only local revolutionaries are in a position to take this extreme step. Even the COS of the Indian Army, General Chaudhuri, has admitted that, "Guerillas essentially depend on the local civil population for their very existence.... Therefore they score their biggest success in *their* own *country* and virtually cannot be used anywhere else". Chaudhuri, op. cit. p. 227.

2. Sukumar Biswas, Three Weeks War, Sarkar and Sons Ltd., Calcutta, p. 35.

3. See note 1 above.

Kashmiris that were pushed into Azad Kashmir after the Cease Fire are still alive. They cannot cease to be Kashmiris by merely being pushed across the Cease Fire Line and called intruders and infiltrators when ahey decide to return to their homeland. The conscience of the world may be entangled today in Big Power Politics but it cannot remain so for ever.

The Indians put into operation their plans to occupy Azad Kashmir during the third week of August 1965. The first attack came on Bharat Gali in the area of Haji Pir Pass. For seven days the position was continuously shelled by the Divisional Artillery of 19 Indian Infantry Division in Baramula—Uri Sector. On 25 August 20,000 shells were fired within 12 hours on this one feature alone. One regiment of field artillery had fired 10,000 rounds that day. On 26 August 1 Para Battalion led the attack. The position was occupied by a weak company of about 100 men the majority of whom were Mujahids from adjoining villages. They had come through the devastating shelling in a miraculous manner although their bunkers had all been raised to the ground. The company held their fire until the enemy was hardly 50 yards away. The result was devastating. The Indians were thrown back. They carried away all their wounded except one, L/Nk Lal Singh. He, however, died while being evacuated to the hospital. They had left behind over 150 killed. A.K. casualties had been light, 2 killed, 5 wounded and 5 shell shock cases.


As all the bunkers had been destoryed the company occupied alternative position but this was not as well situated as the main position.

The Indians now chose to put in a night attack. They launched the frontal attack at 0100 hours on 27 August which was successfully held. The Indians then pushed in another battalion from the flank and cut off the Bhaarat Gali position. A.K. troops fought like seasoned troops. Although the enemy had suffered over 300 killed in this attack they had inflicted heavy casualties on our troops also. The company lost 36 men that day. One paltoon had 22 killed out of a strength of 25. The 3 survivors had all been wounded. Sheer superior numbers and unlimited resources had enabled the Indians to beat a force of less than 100 by a full infantry brigade supported by the divisional artillery and that also by making use of the cover of darkness. This is how Bharat Gali fell.

The story of Indian capture of Haji Pir Pass was similar. A platoon was defending the ridge against a whole brigade. When they ran out of ammunition and with dwindling numbers they had to fall back to features in the rear.

The attack on Bedori had started simultaneously with the attack on Bharat Gali. Here again there was only one company which was

BATTLE OF BEDORI SALIENT



subjeected to severe shelling for days on end. The non-existance of roads in this area meant that the time needed to push forward reinforcements or supplies was four dyas. The results was that after 48 days of stiff resistance the Indians over ran the position on 2 August.

As a result of this attack in force by the Indians the GOC ordered 20 Punjab to move from its previous location and strengthen the area opposite Haji Pir Pass. They moved in and took up positions in Khora Nakka on the evening of 28 August. They had hardly time to move forward one platoon. This small force was attacked on the morning of 29 August. The battalion hearing of the attack hurriedly moved forward but before they could reach the position the Indians had thrown back the platoon. 20 Punjab, as a result, took up position at Kirni and the ridges next to it. With the capture of Khora Nakka the Indians had a clear passage to Tauli Pir and on to Rawala Kot except that 10 Baluch was holding Sheru Ka Dhara, the South spur of Sankh, where they had just moved in. The Indians wisely did not attempt to follow this course.

The next attack on 20 Punjab came on the morning of 30 August. This attack was successfully repulsed with heavy casualties to the enemy. The performance was repeated in the afternoon with similar results. 20 Punjab was now reinforced with one company of 17 Baluch and one company from 10 A.K. This helped in further stabilising the situation. The Indians kept on attacking both during day and night throughout the next three weeks. On 7 and again on 8 September the Indians put in two night attacks which were in sufficiently large strengths. The enemy suffered heavy casualties in both these attacks. On each occasion they fell back leaving behind a lot of ammunition and equipment. This senseless hurling of troops into attack day after day appears to have had affected the Indians troops to such an extent that after their attack had been repulsed on 21 September they fell back like a mob without any control or discipline at all. That day they had left behind over 200 dead bodies. The attacking Indian troops on that day had been 6 Dogra, a battalion of Indian Punjab Regiment and a Gurkha battalion.

The Indians now spent a few days in repairing the road Uri-Haji Pir Pass. It appeared that the enemy was preparing for a big push towards Bagh valley and from there to fan out into Azad Kashmir. It needed to build up a great deal of logistic support for such an undertaking and a road was essential for this purpose. Our defences against his earlier efforts to push towards Bagh valley had so far stood well in spite of the shortage of troops and very difficult line of communication. The lack of artillery support had definitely affected the operations so far. 12 pieces of artillery arrived in this sub-sector on 31 August. This made all the difference from that day onwards.

In the south of this sector the Indian Brigade in Punch had remained on the defensive. The Revolutionaries had disrupted the L of C to Punch very badly and Punch had, at one time, become very nearly a besieged garrison. Lately the Revolutionaries had diverted their main attention to Rajauri and as a result the Indian garrison in Punch had got a little breathing space. The capture of Mandi by the Revolutionaries so close to Punch had caused the Indians a great deal of concern but it had also helped Punch garrison indirectly by releasing pressure against it. By 30 August the Indians were in a position to venture out of Punch and start the offensive northwards. They first started shelling Chand Tekri on 30 August. They had:—

25 Pdrs	18
Medium gun	6
3.7 Hows	6
4.2 Mortars	6
Total	36

Our forces had:—

25 pdrs	1
3.7 Hows	2
Total	3

The shelling of Chand Tekri and other positions opposite Punch continued on 31 August and 1 September. In addition over 100 rounds of RRs were used by the Indians to break the bunkers on Chand Tekri on 1 September alone. The Indians put in an attack on 2 September at 0200 hours but it was successfully repulsed.


On 5 September the shelling of Chand Tekri was intensified by the enemy and attack appeared imminent. The misfortune was that there was no reserve available to reinforce this sub-sector. At this stage the two 3.7 Hows were also lost to this area and the only artillery support available to Chand Tekri was one 25 pounder gun. On 6 September the Indians launched a full brigade attack on Chand Tekri at 0430 hours. The battalions used were 2 Sikh, 3 Dogra and 3 Rajputana Rifles. Opposite this large force supported by 36 pieces of artillery the position was held by

One Platoon A.K.

Two Platoons Civil Armed Forces


One Platoon Local Mujahids

One Platoon Rangers



Azad Kashmir troops in defence.

In the centre of this sector the Indian Brigade at Punch had remained on the defensive. The Revolutionaries had occupied the [illegible] [illegible] and Punch had, at one time, become [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. Lately the Revolutionaries had directed their main attention [illegible] and as a result the Indian garrison in Punch had got a [illegible]



[illegible] 0200 hours but it was successfully repulsed.

On 5 September the shelling of Chand Tekri was intensified by the enemy and attack appeared imminent. The misfortune was that there was no reserve available to reinforce this sub-sector. At this stage the two [illegible] Hows were also lost in this area and the only artillery support available to Chand Tekri was one 25 pounder gun. On 6 September the enemy launched a full brigade attack on Chand Tekri at 0430 hours. The battalions used were 2 Sikh, 1 Dogra and 3 Rajputana Rifles. Opposing this large force supported by 36 pieces of artillery the position was held by:

One Platoon A.K.

Two Platoons Civil Armed Forces

One Platoon Local Volunteers

One Platoon Rangers

They were supported by only one 25 pounder gun. Outnumbered by 1:25 in manpower, 1:36 in artillery and with no MMGs, mortars or RRs these one hundred odd determined men withstood the onslaught as few defenders have done in the history of war. The Indians had used the hours of darkness for the intial approach. All three battalions had followed different routes. It was thus a three pronged attack converging on Chand Tekri. The last few yards were very costly to the Indians but they had captured their objective. Our casualties in dead and wounded had been over 50%, to be exact 33 dead and 29 wounded. The C.A.F. platoon had only 5 survivors. One can confidently say that they had fought well.


The Indians emboldened by their first success from the South advanced and attacked Ziarat on 9 September. This attack was successfully repulsed but during the next night the Indians using the cover of darkness outflanked the position and over ran it by first light. With the loss of Ziarat the road to Haji Pir Pass from the South was open to the Indians but not for use. The westward area dominating the road was still in our hands and the Indians could neither use nor repair it while these positions were held by us. The road was not used by the Indians as a result until the Cease Fire on 23 September.

The Indians kept on attacking the positions to the West of road Punch—Uri but all their attacks were repulsed. The last attack came on 20 September when 7/11 Sikh tried to gain ground across the road but after suffering a large number of casualties they fell back. The two main positions which enabled the Indians to dominate Bedori bulge were Haji Pir pass and Chand Tekri. As it happened both these were lost due to shortage of infantry and absence of artillery in that sector. Two weak battalions were holding a front of nearly 65 miles at a time when they had no supporting arms.

CHAPTER VII

INDIA IS RATTLED

CHHAMB- JAURIAN SECTOR



As a result of Indian offensive in Kashmir, the President of Pakistan in consultation with the C-in-C, Pakistan Army, decided to undertake offensive operations and to attack the enemy in Chhamb and Jaurian. The Indians had prepared concrete bunkers, interlinked by covered communication trenches and planned to meet all possible eventualities. They had a top storey for observation, the ground storey, with MMG, LMG and RR emplacements for fighting and the basement for living. It was a proper defensive line and it succeeded in creating the defenesive mentality. All defences are double edged weapons. The stronger they are, the greater is the intensity of defensive attitude produced by them. The close atmosphere acts on the minds of defenders very adversely thereby creating fear and a queer type of demoralisation which engenders the quest for freedom of movement and is only removed by coming out in the open. When such defences are subjected to heavy shelling the explosions and their reverberating echoes produce a near concussion effect and the men inside either wish to run away or lie down listlessly. The Indians could not know the after effects of Maginot Line type of defences. They had never experienced them. They thought it was good for prestige to have modern defences and they adopted them[1].

The Indians had started advancing in Haji Pir Pass area and due to the few troops in that Sector it was more than likely that the link up between Indians advancing from Uri and those advancing North from Punch would soon take place. The Indians had thought that they would then be in a position to push westward in view of the area being very thinly held by A.K. troops.

The only way to force India to release pressure in that area was to force her to pull out a substantial portion of her forces assigned for the conquest of A.K. areas. An attack on Chhamb-Jaurian which would threaten Akhnoor, nerve centre of Indian Line of Communication to Punch, was the correct answer. The Indian High Command when making grandiose plans for the invasion of Pakistan did think of this weak link in their chain of defences and that was the precise reason why they had paid extra attention to this Sector and constructed seemingly impregnable concrete defences.

The troops available to Pakistan for an attack on Chammb were:—

102 Infantry Brigade
4 A.K. Brigade
Two Companies 12 FF (R and S)
11 Cavalry
13 Lancers

1. General Chaudhuri also appears to dislike the defensive attitude when he says, "A purely defensive outlook produces, in my view, a static, overloaded formation.." Chaudhuri, op. cit. p. 17. He appears to have overlooked this factor in his plan for this sector.

In view of the shortage of troops 7 Infantry Division, minus 25 Infantry Brigade, 14 Para Brigade, 22 Cavalry and some other elements, was moved to Gujrat area on August 30, 1965. Apart from elements of Divisional troops the only formation left with 7 Infantry Division now was 10 Infantry Brigade. This was placed under Command 12 Infantry Division for the initial phase. This meant that 12 Infantry Division now had three infantry brigades to attack with. It thus had the following:—

10 Infantry Brigade (2 Battalion Brigade)	Commanded by Brig Hayat
102 Infantry Brigade (2 Battalion Brigade)	Commanded by Brig Zafar Ali Khan
4 AK Brigade	Commanded by Brig Abdul Hameed Khan

Two companies 12 FF (R and S)

11 Cavalry

13 Lancers

Divisional Artillery and other Services.

The Indians had then in the areas 10 Indian Mountain Division, 191 Indian Independent Infantry Brigade and parts of 93 Indian Infantry Brigade.

The task allotted to 12 Infantry Division was to destroy enemy in area Lalial, Dewa, Sakrana and Chhamb and then to threaten Akhnur. The Divisional Commander Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik decided to undertake the task in two phases. In phase one, he decided to destroy the enemy West of Tawi in area Lalial, Dewa and Chhamb. The second phase was to cross Tawi and pose a threat to Akhnur by destroying enemy in the area of Jaurian.

On 1 September the attack went in at first light. The Corps artillery supported the attack led by 9 Punjab, 13 Punjab and 11 Cavalry less one squadron. By 1030 hours the enemy positions at Phur, Dalla, Barsala, Jhanda, Malgotian, Chak Pundit and Munawwar had been rolled up. The strong fortifications were of no avail to the Indian troops not used to live under artillery shells directed at them.

The enemy at Moel and Burejal felt insecure soon after and the enveloping movement very nearly cut off their retreat. They were, however, quick enough to realise it and managed to retreat before they were completely cut off. In the process they gave a good deal of casualties.

The enemy AMX tanks were trying desperately to stop the advance of Pakistani tanks, which had by now swung North East of Phagla and were heading for Chhamb. Dewa was in the hands of Pakistanis by 1400 hours.

It was at 1630 hours that the Indian Air Force came to the rescue of the Indian Army[1]. Four of them, all Vampires, were taken on by Pakistan Air Force, and were bagged within minutes. One of the JCOs of 13 Punjab whose Platoon had been earlier straffed by the Vampires said afterwards, "I wasted time over trying to remember what a Vampire looked like. They never visited us again in this front." A few Hunters came near last light and straffed our leading troops but did not stay long enough to give battle to Pakistan Air Force. The example of Vampires was still fresh in Indian minds to venture over Pakistani troops for long.

On the left of 102 Infantry Brigade, 4 A.K. Brigade had advanced at an equally rapid speed. The Brigade Objective had been Dewa and Lalial. 5 A.K. contained Pir Jamal and a few other localities, on the right, and 19 A.K. put in an attack on Patrara. The position was well dug in and supported by a number of MMGs in addition to artillery. All the likely approaches had been mined intensively by the Indians. In a well conducted attack the leading company of 19 AK assaulted the position from the left flank and by 0730 hours had pushed the enmy out of Patrara. The Brigade Commander, Brigadier Abdul Hameed Khan, desirous of maintaining the momentum of attack ordered the C.O. to continue the advance and roll up the rearward defences of the enemy. Chakla and Dewa had fallen into our hands by the evening.

5 A.K. which had, earlier in the morning, contained enemy poistions at Dalla, Paur, Pir Jamal and Maira, put in an attack on Maira at 1100 hours. The Indians put in very little resistance and the place was in our hands very soon. The incident of caputre of 53 Indian other ranks of 6 Sik h light Infantry, by Lt. Col Babar of A.O.P. deserves mention. He hadseen a collection of Indians, lurking in a nullah from the air. He landed his helicopter nearby and between himself and his companion Captain Akbar rounded up 53 Indians. They had no officer or J.C.O. with them. They had all deserted them and run away in their command vehicles.

Moel was attacked by 5 A.K. in the afternoon and was occupied by them by 1700 hours. Mopping up operations were undertaken by the battalion in the rest of the area including Dalla and small pockets of the enemy were cleared in places where they had been bye-passed by 102 Infantary Brigade and 19 AK except Pir Jamal.

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1. Sukumar Biswas. Op. Cit. p. 54. It is symbolic of Indian writer to show India as a passive and peace loving nation. Having said, "By 5 p.m. the military necessity of the situation called for the use of the Indian Air Force", on the very next page he says, "The use of Air Force by Pakistan introduced a new element of international significance in this conflict".

Headquarters 7 Infantry Division had arrived in the area and it was felt that the command of this sector would be exercised more expeditiously if 7 Division commanded by Major General (now General) Mohammad Yahya Khan, controlled the operations. 12 Division Headquarters was toofar from the area of operations and the Commander-in-Chief, General Mohammad Musa, felt that the command of operations should be exercised from the Headquarters which was located closer at hand rather from a Headquatters at a distance. It was inconvenient to continue controlling the battle from Tactical Headquarters for too long which had to be done until then. As a result of this decision 7 Infantry Division assumed command of operations from 1100 hours on September 2.

Major General (Now General) Mohammad Yahya Khan gave orders for the completion of Phase I. 102 Infantry Brigade and 10 Infantry Brigade consolidated positions along river Munawwar Tawi. 102 Brigade was at this stage in the North and 10 Brigade to its immediate South. 4 AK Brigade further North consolidated the position caputred by it on the previous day.

The position having been consolidated the GOC ordered 10 Infantry Brigade to cross Munawwar Tawi at 1730 hours on 2 September and establish a bridge head across it.

The bridge head was complete by 1930 hours and both the battalions of 10 Infantry Brigade, 6 FF and 14 Punjab, with 13 Lancers under command 10 Brigade, crossed this formidable obstacle. It is suprising at the complete paralysing of the enemy ground forces. The water in the river was no where less than 4 feet deep and it is a very wide stream. The going is not easy and the banks are fairly steep. The crossing was expected to be opposed by the enemy very stubbornly but it seems the Indian troops had lost all relish of opposing, the day before. Inspite of the whole day at their disposal to dig-in and establish themselves across the river they had not been able to make up their mind that they would resist the crossing.

5 A.K. to the West, cleared Pir Jamal by 1630 hours after a very stiff and hand to hand fight. The Indians had fought stubbornly and accepted a large number of casualties before being forced to withdraw.

The next day, 3 September, the GOC Major General Yahya Khan, came forward and ordered 10 Infantry Brigade and 4 AK Brigade to resume the advance. He had held his 'O' Group at Singri, close to the battle area and was keen that the enemy should not be given any breathing space. The advance was resumed at 1200 hours. By 1700 hours 14 Punjab supported by a squadron of 13 Lancers had captured Nawan Hamirpur. 6 FF attack on Troti was, however, held up. The position had been well prepared and strongly held.

On 4 September 14 Punjab resumed the attack. The opposition was fairly stiff but they were able to push on to the outs kirts of Jaurian. In the meantime 6 FF had also cracked the Indian defences at Troti and by 1700 hours were able to come up in line with 14 Punjab.

The C-in-C General Mohammad Musa visited the forward area and discussed the situation with the G.O.C. He congratulated the troops on their excellent performance in the face of heavy opposition from the enemy.

Heavy casualties had been inflicted on the enemy so far. A number of prisoners had been taken each day. One Officer, 2 JCOs and 29 other ranks were taken prisoners, by 14 Punjab, on this day just in the vicinity of Jaurian. The enemy, however, held on to Jaurian during the night 4/5 September. The pressure from 10 Infantry Brigade was not relaxed at all and it had its effect.

The enemy was desperate. They had not so far put in any serious counter-attack but it appears that what they did not like doing during the day they were persuaded to undertake under the cloak of darkness. They put in two counter-attacks against 14 Punjab position. Apart from other casualties they left behind 31 prisonsers. The large number of prisoners of war that the Indians gave in such a short time and later on as well has remained a mystery to Pakistani Commander.

The attack on Jaurian was resumed early next morning (5 September). 10 Infantry Brigade put in an attack at 0700 hours and it fell like a ripened plum. The fall of Jaurian was a big event and it shook the Indian High Command. They had admitted the successful advance of Pakistani troops but rather belatedly.

On 2 September when it was over 24 hours that Chhamb had fallen All India Radio had merely said, "The Indian Air Force planes have gone into action in Chhamb Sector of Kashmir where Pakistan had launched an offensive across the Cease-Fire Line........ Pakistan Artillery started shelling of our positions in the Chhamb Sector early yesterday morning........"[1] Later in the evening, to be exact at 1915 hours on 2 September, India admitted that Pakistan had advanced 7 miles into Indian-Held Kashmir. It is worth noting that she categorically admitted the advance to have been across the Cease-Fire Line at this juncture.

On 3 September All India Radio gave an incling of what India had in mind. It said "The Prime Minister told newsmen in New Delhi this morning after his meeting with the opposition leaders that the whole strategy in regard to Kashmir will have to be reviewed and considered in a much wider context."[2]

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1. All India Radio Broadcast 0700 hrs on 2 September.
2. Ibid 0730 hrs on 3 September.


Chavan, the Defence Minister of India, said in the Lok Sabha,on the same day, "We will have to take an overall review of our defences. Our troops are fighting bravely and confidently. Necessary counter-measures have been initiated."[1]

The Indian Prime Minister made another significant statement the next day. He said, "It is possible that the Government may not like to disclose certain things immediately."[2] On 4 September the Indian Prime Minister was even more angry at Pakistan when he said, "The grand march of the Indian troops will not halt so long as Pakistan does not provide a concrete and trustworthy guarantee of its good conduct."[3] The last sentence is symbolic of Indian mentality. The grand march of Indian troops across Kutch, on to posts in Kargil, against Pir Sahaba and Haji Pir Pass, in his mind, did not constitute breaches of Cease-Fire Agreement but when Pakistan paid back in the same coin at Chhamb and Jaurian it hurt and the whole strategy had to be changed and the question of defence of India needed re-examination. The reality was different. India had known all along what her objectives were. As mentioned earlier, even if Pakistan had not attacked Jaurian, there would still have been some excuse to march across the international border. This hurt expression was merely for the consumption of the world which had not yet seen the blood-thirsty Kali Devi under the mask of Pandit Nehru's Panch Sheela and Gandhian Non-violence. Prime Ministers who perpetually threaten their neighbours with "The Grand March" of their armies should not be the first to accept cease-fire "here and now",[4] when their plans have mis-carried, and they start massive armament programmes the moment their desire of immediate cease-fire has materialised. But these are Chanakiyan ways and one cannot accuse them of inconsistency because they are consistently inconsistent.

The President of India, Mr. Radha Krishnan, the philosopher, joined the chorus on 5 September and threatened Pakistan, when he declared, "It is the final battle that decides the fate of things."[5] On the same day Mr. Shastri informed the world of his proposed invasion of Pakistan when he said, "We do not want that Pakistan should first cross into our territory and then sue for peace.."[6] In fact his announce-ment meant that his army was poised to cross the international border into Pakistan.

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1. Ibid.
2. All India Radio, 1300 hrs, 3 September 1965.
3. All India Radio, 2055 hrs, 4 September 1965.
4. Words used by Mr Chhagla at the Security Council later during Cease Fire dis-cussions.
5. All India Radio, 2030 hrs, 5 September 1965.
6. Ibid.



Indian AMXs being used against the Indians in Jaurian Sector.

On the same day Pakistani forces under Major General Yahya Khan headed forward towards Akhnur, having mopped up all opposition in and around Jaurian and in the villages of Thindi Wali Khad and Mawa Wali Khad. 13 Punjab had now moved forward as the vanguard. Due to hilly terrain, the movement was slow. The enemy was putting up a half-hearted opposition inspite of the fact that the terrain was more suited for defence. 13 Punjab completely surprised the enemy through difficult terrain and captured Chak Karpal and Dalpat villages.

On 6 September, while India was advancing across the International border, 7 Infantry Division was poised to continue its move forward to Akhnur and finalise the operations in this Sector. 102 and 10 Infantry Brigades consolidated their positions along the line of Jamotian and Maira villages. The Division, on this day, lost most of its artillery support and 11 Cavalry.

On the other hand the enemy had received reinforcements and had launched a massive counter-attack with strong armour and artillery support against 10 Infantry Brigade positions. The Division had just received congratulatory messages from the President of Pakistan, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan and the C-in-C, Pakistan Army, General Mohammad Musa, and the men were in the right mood to give a good reception to the Indian counter-attacks. The result was nothing less than whole-sale slaughter. The counter-attack came to a standstill by the early afternoon and the Indian withdrew to their original positions leaving behind over 500 dead bodies. The enemy had to bring in air support to extricate their forward elements. Pakistani casualties due to this counter attack were one officer Major Sarwar, and six other ranks killed.

On 7 September the enemy put in fresh counter-attack supported by armour against 13 Punjab and against positions held by 102 Infantry Brigade. Both counter-attacks were beaten back with heavy losses to the enemy. 10 Infantry Brigade was ordered to be ready to move out of the area leaving behind only 102 Brigade and 4 A.K. Brigade. Although the idea to advance as far as Akhnur had been dropped, the move forward and offensive attitude had not been given up by the GOC. The result was that when the enemy counter attacks failed, the Indians withdrew in a hurry.

During the night 7/8 September the enemy again tried infiltration tactics but failed and had to withdraw leaving behind a number of dead and 1 officer (Captain Chingara), 1 JCO and 20 Other Ranks as prisoners of war, all that remained of a whole company of 120 strong. A heavy price to pay for the whims of some misguided senior officer.

This move forward after beating the Indian counter-attack enabled our own guns to.move forward and shell Akhnur which created a great deal of panic among Indian L of C troops who were reported to have deserted from Akhnur in large numbers.

The enemy tried hard to infiltrate through the gap between the two brigades but was unsuccessful and in fact suffered heavy casualties in the process.

The next morning, 8 September, 6 InfantryBrigade commanded by Brig. Eftikhar Khan Janjua H. J., was brought in and 10 Infantry Brigade moved out of the area. Enemy again tried to benefit from the gap between the two Brigades and attacked from the area Pulhwal which lay between the two brigades. It was a sound idea executed in a haphazard manner and the result was that as on previous occasions it served as a killing ground. The Indians were hemmed in and wholesale massacre took place forcing them to give up the attack when it had hardly gone half way.

On 9 September the GOC decided that enough use had been made of this gap and ordered that it should be closed. 8 Baluch was ordered by Brigadier Zafar Ali Khan, Commander 102 Infantry Brigade, to capture Pulhwal.

The Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Muhammad Siddique Khan, went into attack with great dash and moving forward with determination threw the enemy out of Pulhwal inflicting a number of casualties on the retreating Indians. The GOC 10 Indian Infantry Division was furious at the way fighting had been progressing and ordered 191 Indpendent Indian Inftanry Brigade to put in a full scale brigade attack and recapture Pulhwal.

The Indian attack on a two battalion front came in a little before first light and was directed against positions held by 8 Baluch and 15 Punjab. Pakistan artillery alone was able to break up this attack. The Indians never reached near enough for Pakistanis infantrymen to come to grips with the Indians. A few of the Indians who had not retreated and who preferred the safety of POW camps stood up after day break, raising their hands and waiving white handkerchiefs and were taken prisoner.

Akhnur bridge was shelled by Pakistan Artillery during the day causing great confusion in the L of C troops and the Indian garrison as a result had to move back a considerable distance to be out of artillery range. The enemy's habit of peicemeal attacks was repeated on 11 September as well. A number of probing attacks were made by the Indians along the front but in each place they were beaten back with considerable casualties.

On 12 September, 6 Punjab with a company of 15 Punjab attacked and captured Devi Pur, thus extending their F.D.Ls. This brought in a quick counter-attack by the enemy after dark. They tried their best to recapture the lost territory but were beaten back with heavy casualties.

To the left of this position a company of 9 Punjab attacked Manami and captured not only the village but a dominating feature in the vicinity. 14 AK kept up pressure against the enemy in the area of village Ghauri while these attack were being launched.

We lost 2 officers, 2 JCOs and 10 Other Rank on this day and 1 JCO and 36 ORs were wounded but the operations had not only extended our FDLs. but had taken a heavy toll of the enemy.

Night attacks are a normal feature of war and no critic can accuse the Indian Commanders of cowardice, for having a bias in favour of night attacks. The analysis made by Indian Command after the war appears to have further strengthened the Indian preferences for night attacks. Their arguments are sound upto a point. Infiltration is easier at night and casualties are comparatively less due to the defenders' inability to bring down aimed fire, but when the defending troops do not fall back inspite of infiltration, and have adequate resources to deal with the infiltrators, the resulting casualties are far more than in the case of day light attacks.

Enemy build up continued on 13 and 14 September. The only activity on the front by the enemy, however, was heavy shelling of our positions. On 15 September the enemy tried to capture a feature from 15 Punjab but were thrown back. Our fighting patrols destroyed a few of the enemy bunkers and brought back useful information. No large scale operation was undertaken by either side. On 16 and 17 September also the enemy confined his activities to heavy shelling. Due to heavy build up in the North of our position a certain amount of reallocation of troops and areas was undertaken by the GOC, within the divisional area.

On 18 September minor clashes occured in which each side succeeded in getting a feature from the other. This was the first and only time an enemy battalion attack had managed to snatch a feature from one of our companies in this Sector. On 19 September the Indians launched a major dawn attack on 9 Punjab front. The attack was repulsed with considerable number of casualties to the enemy. Enemy Hunters tried to straff our forward position but seemed to be in a hurry to depart and did not cause any damage.

Until the Cease Fire there was no further major activity on the part of the Indians. They, however, became very active immediately after the Cease Fire and kept on putting in attack after attack and losing men without any sense or purpose until the 3rd of December, 1965. Such reckless use of Indian manpower and material was not unique to this front. It was universal. On every front where the Indians had lost territory to Pakistan, and either the forward formations had not reported to the Army Headquarters or the Government of India had kept it secret from the press and the public, they were keen, in fact desperate, to recepture lost territories. Now that both the press and public were likely to know the exact state of affairs, the Indian Commanders were perepared to lose value able Indian lives merely to save face. Queer philosophy but there it is.

CHAPTER VIII

THE HOUR OF TRIAL

The information regarding the Indian invasion took some time to reach Rawalpindi. The field commanders wanted to be certain that it was a full scale invasion and not a few stray border incidents, before they informed the General Headquarters. The President, however, came to know of it through the Air Force Channels earlier than the C-in-C of the Army and rang him up to find out the exact situation. The C-in-C knew of the formations having moved forward and was quite confident that no amount of Indian pressure would be able to bend, much less break, the line of defence formed by the devoted sons of Pakistan. Threat of an Indian invasion was not new. It had existed from the very inception of Pakistan. Those who had expected to return and capture Pakistan within six months, after the two seperated, had made known their intentions on many occasions. Pakistan was, therefore, prepared and vigilent.

A nation which has no aggressive designs on the neighbouring country and has to defend its independence must of necessity give thought to the strategy which the invader is likely to follow. Defence may have certain advantages but it cannot be half as profitable as the offensive. The attacker possesses initiative and the freedom of choice in respect of time and place of attack. The defender cannot usually know where the enemy will put the greatest amount of pressure and yet he cannot afford to leave any part of his land unguarded. A thin line stretching along the entire frontier can be pierced anywhere by the attacker by the use of surprise and superior force. If, however, the defender is able to read the mind of the attacker and can predetermine the approaches that the attacker will use then his task is made easy. The predetermination of these approaches is the crux of the entire problem of defence. If the defender makes one mistake and has no large reserves to rush to an unguarded approach, he is in danger of being defeated in detail, if he starts reshuffling of the forces after the outbreak of war. The confidence with which the Pakistani High Command had ordered the occupation of defensive positions two days earlier was born of two considerations. First the correct appreciation of the routes that India was likely to follow and the strengths of the columns on each of these routes and second the fighting qualities of Pakistan's Armed Forces.

The Indian High Command on the other hand were wrong in the appreciation of both these vital issues. They had not been able to determine the strengths of the defending forces blocking the various routes selected by them for the invasion and they misjudged the fighting capabilities of both their own men and of the Pakistani Armed Forces. It is a poor commander who cannot predetermine the fighting qualities of his own troops and one cannot help passing this adverse judgement on the Indian High Command. The third mistake that the Indian C-in-C made was his over reliance on the element of surprise. He may have been advised that Pakistan was not expecting him to march across the International

broder. It is difficult to imagine how such an advice could have been given to him and it is even more difficult to determine the source of such an advice, but the statements of the Indian leaders during the preceding few days could not have left any doubts in the minds of Pakistan.[1]

The events of the preceding twelve months pointed only towards one conclusion, which was that the Power Politics of the big nations had passed the verdict of "Guilty" on Pakistan and had condemned it to extermination. The increased economic aid and massive military aid to India while at the same time drying up of the Military and Economic aid to Pakistan could mean nothing else. The powers were so angry with Pakistan that even the World Bank had started finding it difficult to accommodate Pakistan's vital development plans and the meetings of Aid to Pakistan Club, and the Consortium, kept on being postponed. For the Indian High Command to have been confident of surprising Pakistan, under these circumstances, was, therefore, nothing less than wishful thinking and wilfull delusion.

It was after 5 A.M. by the time the Chief of General Staff, Major General Malik Sher Bahadur, informed the C-in-C General Mohammad Musa that India had invaded Pakistan. Major General Malik Sher Bahadur, who is reputed for his coolness had been informed as soon as the commanders in the field were satisfied that the Indians had crossed the International Border and it was a full-scale invasion and not a mere border incident. Having received the exact positions from all sector; the Chief of General Staff apprised the C-in-C of the situation and left for the Operations Room. The C-in-C in the meantime, as has been mentioned earlier, had been informed by the President and had time to discuss the problem with him. One can visualise Major General Sher Bahadur stroking his steel grey moustache and smiling to himself on the folly that India had committed. He was confident that the officers and men of Pakistan Army would acquit themselves in a superb manner. His thoughts, however, were towards the mind of the enemy. He wanted to read the mind of his opposite number once again as to where exactly had he advised his C-in-C to put the greatest pressure. The die had been cast and it was to be known within a matter of a few hours whether the forecasts of the Pakistan General Staff were correct or otherwise. The distance from his house to the Operations Room was not very great, the roads were clear at this early hour of the morning although a few people were returning from the mosques after the morning prayers and it did not take him long to reach his destination. It is strange but true that thoughts flow clearly and consistently when driving and he had reviewed the possibilities of Indian build up on all fronts by the time he reached the Operations Room, where he was joined by the others, including the C-in-C, within a few minutes. The C-in-C, General Mohammad Musa, had given thought to the problem on his own many a time. He knew exactly what the intentions of the enemy were and how was he likely to achieve his objectives.

1. See Notes 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, on pege 90.

They went into a huddle. The atmosphere in the Operations Room was serene and calm. No one was perturbed. A sense of cool determination pervaded the room. The C-in-C opened the discussion. He first asked if there had been any further developments and then addressing the Director of Military Intelligence Brigadier (now Maj Gen) Irshad Ahmed asked him of the latest information regarding the enemy build up. The D.M.I. gave out what was known of the enemy concentrations until then and also the appreciation from the enemy's point of view. He referred to the build up he had reported two days earlier and the changes that had come to light since then. His appreciation was that the Indians would put in determined attacks on Lahore and Sialkot and confine to containing attack on all other fronts, in the initial stages. This question had been discussed, by the C-in-C with his staff, many a time before and there was no need to go into its details again. There had been no information from Sialkot regarding any large scale Indian advance except at Jassar. The C-in-C and the CGS were both of the opinion that Jassar was being used as a diversionary movement only. It was not yet clear but it appeared that the previous forecast of General Headquarters that India was likely to launch Indian Armoured Division from Samba against Chawinda as the focal point still held good. As a result of this forecast the Staff College, Quetta had carried out Defence Exercises with regard to that area and most of the commanders and their staff were acquainted with the whole of the area and the likely tactics that the Indians would employ. The C-in-C and the General Staff having already apprised the field commanders of the plan could not do much except to watch the course of events and by keeping abreast of the developments remain one move ahead of the enemy all the time. As time passed and there was no sign of 1 Indian Armoured Division having been launched the feeling in the Operations Room became crystalised that the place chosen for the deployment of Indian armour was the Sialkot front. It was reasonable too. The terrain in front of Lahore was not as good as in Sialkot Sector. There was a more weighty reason in favour of using armour in Sialkot. As explained earlier the Political Objective decided upon by the Indian Government was the complete annihilation of Pakistan which resulted in the formulation of the Military Objective as the occupation of Pakistan territory and not the destruction of the Armed Forces of Pakistan. If General Chaudhuri who has been hailed by Indian writers as one of the greatest military commanders of Asia today,[1] knew his subject, he would put his armour where it had a clear run for miles in front of it. Lahore rested with its back on river Ravi, clearly a tank obstacle and a bottleneck. On the other hand, a thrust from Chawinda meant a clear run upto Wazirabad without any formidable obstacle except the canal for which enough bridging material had been arranged. If, by a diversionary attack against Jassar and Sialkot city they could entice away the defending force to the two flanks it would give them a clear run upto Wazirabad without fighting a battle.

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1. Manckekar, op. cit. page 159.

The Indian C-in-C acted exactly as the Pakistani General Staff had appreciated. He had decided to launch his armour from Samba on the firm plain of Sialkot and make a dash for the bridge on Chenab at Wazirabad. As will be seen later this decision cost him heavily. It was a bold plan but as elsewhere, the actions did not match the boldness of the plan. The Bania in him, coupled, probably, with the interference from the politicians prompted and in a way forced him to over insure on less important fronts, there by making the plan not as effective as it would otherwise have been. If the Indian C-in-C had kept in front of him the objective to destory the Armed Forces of Pakistan irrespective of the fact whether large tracts of our territory had been captured or not while doing so and without counting the number of places at which Pakistan was being attacked he would have been absolved of all blame for the failure of his army. As things stand today, we feel, that he has to shoulder the blame for the failure of his army and it may not be incorrect for the Indian public to associate his government as co-accused with him. The count on the first day, in addition to Pir Sahaba and Haji Pir Pass, regarding which the Indian Radio was jubilent in every communique it gave out, was seven fronts. These seven fronts were Sialkot, Jassar, Wagha, Burki, Khem Karan, Kasur and Sulaimanki. This large number of fronts opened by General Chaudhuri did not upset the plans of General Mohammad Musa and his staff. They had catered for them. If General Chaudhuri had brought about dispersion with a view to dissipating the meagre resources of men and material at the disposal of Pakistan then he was mistaken[1]. Simultaneously with forcing Pakistan Army's General Staff to spread out over a front of 1600 miles he was doing the same himself[2]. If he had kept inferior forces at most of these points and contained superior Pakistani Forces, in order to get the requisite superiority at the decisive place then his decision to open so many fronts would have been militarily justified. As it became clear to the Pakistani General Staff on the very first day that the enemy had attacked on all fronts with a superiority ranging from 3:1 to 4.5:1 they were satisfied that they will not be forced to make major moves from one front to another except possibly in one or two cases. The

1. As a leading foreign correspondent had said, "These two fronts were intended to be diversional attacks to scatter Pakistan's smaller army over a wider front and weaken the defence around Lahore. Man for man and unit for unit, it is probably safer to say that the Pakistan Army is at a higher standard of training than the Indians." B.B.C. 1410 hours, 10 September 1965.

2. Lieut.General Kaul has commented on this aspect when he says, "He (Indian C-in-C) was not justified in taking....offensive over two extensive an area, which prevented him from concentrating sufficient forces any where". Kaul, op. cit., p. 478.

odds against Pakistan Army on various fronts on the first day of war, the 6th of September, 1965, in terms of infantry battalions were as follows:—

	Pakistan		*India*	
Tithwal Sector	Pak 1	3	3	11
Uri Sector	AK 2		8	
Haji Pir Pass	2 Pak	5	20	
Punch Sector	3 AK			
Akhnoor Sector	..	6	18	
Sialkot Jammu Axis		2	9	
Chowinda (two days later)		4	24	
Jassar	.. 2		3	
Wagah	.. 7 (including 2 in reserve)		17	
Burki	.. 2		7	
Khem Karan	5 on 6 Sep		13	17
Hussainiwala—Kasur	7 from 7 Sep onwards.		4	
Sulaimanki	.. 2		4	
Sind	.. 2		8	

The story of how the commanders and men met this challenge on various fronts will unfold itself in the following pages. A mention, however, must be made of the manner in which the common man on the street and the administration stood the test in their "Hour of Trial". The Armed Forces are from amongst the nation. It was only natural that the nation which produced men of unbeatable spirit must possess courage and determination of the highest order.

Unmindful of the Indian numerical and material superiority, the Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, issued his Order of the Day with confidence in his Army and faith in God. He was not wrong when he said, "Officers and men of Pakistan Army, this is the HOUR of TRIAL and Glory".

He gave details of the areas where the Indians had invaded and continuing he said, "Our gallant troops defending these areas have stopped the enemy's advance and have inflicted heavy casualties on the invaders. Within hours of the start of the fighting our Forces have stabilised the situation and are in complete control of it.............." How correct he was when he went on to say, "The future of our generations to come depends on your actions. You and the other two Services, as defenders of the country, provide a bulwark of FAITH and determination against the evil designs of the enemy". He concluded by placing his trust in God and said, "March forward with the grit and determination for which you are known all over the world. God willing, victory will be yours". The Army that he had commanded and trained for this day stood to their posts like a granite wall.

The C-in-C, Pakistan Air Force, when addressing the men under his command had said, "We are faced with a total war and are required to perform our supreme task". The brave men of the Air Force rose to the occasion and defended the skies of Pakistan in a superb manner.

The President of Pakistan, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, when addressing the nation at noon on 6 September, had voiced the feeling of the whole nation when he had said, "The hundred million Pakistanis whose hearts beat with the sound of لا اله الا الله محمد الرسول الله (None is worthy of obeisance except God) will not rest till Indian guns are silenced for ever". It was neither exaggeration nor an empty threat to India. It was a simple statement of facts. The nation literally rose like one man and faced the "Hour of Trial" with grim determination.

The C-in-C Pakistan Navy, Vice Admiral A. R. Khan, when addressing the Silent Services of Pakistan, in his Order of the Day, had said, "India has aggressed and is waging an all out war against Pakistan. Our brave comrades in the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air Force have already given the enemy a telling answer and inflicted heavy blows. The nation stands solidly behind our Supreme Commander and the Armed Forces." The unity of the nation had never been illustrated more forcefully than it did in Pakistan as a result of the Indian aggression.

The people of Lahore, the sentinal town of West Pakistan, took swords, lathies, guns, pistols or whatever they found handy and hurried towards Wagah to meet the enemy. It was with great difficulty that the Army could persuade them to return to their homes. The President's speech reassured them when they did return to the town. At street corners and outside tea shops where large crowds had assembled, all over the country, the words of the head of the State were being listened to with

great keeness. There was an applause when he said, "Our brave soldiers have gone forward to repel the enemy. The Armed Forces of Pakistan will prove their mettle". The country knew that with the Grace of God the devoted sons of the nation will rise to the occasion and write history with their blood and sweat.

The men in the trenches, on high seas and up in the air were not alone. The whole nation stood behind them.

Not wishing to disturb the peace of the world, the Army in most cases had not prepared their defensive positions before the outbreak of war. Now the nation came forward and joined the men in uniform. Young and old from the nearby villages turned out and insisted that while the Army manned their weapons they would dig their trenches. No amount of persuasion could send them away from those dangerously exposed positions. Thousands joined as Mujahids and hundreds of them laid down their lives side by side with those in uniform. The bonds of brotherhood had become eternal. The sacred earth of Wagah, Burki, Kasur, Chawinda and numerous other places shall ever remain witness to the mingling of the blood of men in uniform and their brothers in civies.

The reservists and the pensioners did not wait for the call up notices. They rushed to recruiting centres and the training centres without notice or call. The men on leave rushed back and in some cases found it difficult to locate their units due to not having waited for recall notices. There was, inspite of it all, no mad rush or any disorganised movement. The trains ran as usual, the roads were kept free for military convoys. Mention of military convoys brings to memory the unprecedented expression of love and esteem by the villagers close to the roads leading to the various fronts. To quote a foreign correspondent, "With high spirits, the villagers were offering the army men the cold unfiltered water drawn from their wells, as well as sweet cold drinks with great affection. The people and the rulers in the hours of emergency, are all together".

Troops had to move from various places at a moment's notice and military transport was not always available. It created no problem. Hundreds of trucks, lorries, buses and taxies, filled with oil and petrol would assemble in a matter of minutes and the owners would be hurt if their vehicles were not selected. The drivers of these vehicles, many of whom had not heard a shot fired in anger, went to the forward most areas, withstood shelling smilingly and were keen to be allowed to make more trips to the forward localities. Thousands of tons of ammunition and supplies had to be off loaded at various railroads. The army could not be utilised on such tasks. Throughout the war at places like Daska and Raiwind, hundreds of volunteers worked day and night in unloading railway wagons and loading lorries. The well-to-do of the towns concerned provided delicious pulao to the volunteers.

The people felt pleasure if the army would permit them to take cooked food to the trenches. Jeeps, cars and station wagons filled with choicest food and fresh fruit could be seen heading for Wagah and Burki inspite of repeated requests by the army not to do so. To them it gave pleasure to feel that they were one with their armed forces. Flowers¡ Who has heard of garlands of sweet smelling flowers for the guns? But it is true. People would carry baskets full of garlands to the troops in front and when the soldiers declined this luxury people would garland their guns. They would have done so with the Machine guns also but they were seldom allowed beyond the gun areas. The people in Lahore heard that the men in the trenches needed Qurans for their daily recitation. The news spread like a wild fire. It appeared in newspapers and within a couple of days the shops were empty of copies of Quran. They had all been sent to the soldiers on the various fronts. The President of Pakistan, was voicing the sentiments of the whole nation when he said, "The Indians do not yet realise what people they have taken on. Dedicated to their Faith and convinced of the justice of their cause, they will fight as ONE MAN in the name of GOD whose promise to mankind is that the right shall triumph." We know that it did.

It was Pakistan's first war. Even countries which have made a habit of going to war once in a while find it difficult to observe complete blackout. Not so in Pakistan. The Government had ordered a blackout and blackout it was. The youngsters, all over the country, saw to it that no flicker of light showed from any door or window in their neighbourhood.

It was felt that India may use para troops. The whole country became a defended area. All bridges, cross roads and canal banks were guarded twenty-four hours. Without any previous planning the villagers, under the direction of Union Councils, kept a roster and the guards very politely checked every vehicle passing through their areas. The vigil was so complete that in rear areas like the Salt Range every hill and every peak had a sentry round the clock, and many a motorist with full lights at night felt a shiver through his body when stopped and questioned by these grim and menacing self-appointed volunteer soldiers of Pakistan. The President of Pakistan appealed to the nation for contributions to the Defence Fund. The response was immense and beyond all expectations. Over 50 crores of rupees were collected in a matter of weeks. There used to be queues outside banks to deposit contributions.

The strangest thing of all was the total absence of crime in the country. There were no thefts, no robberies and no murders. Even the habitual criminals laid off. There were no traffic accidents, no overspeeding and no breach of traffic rules. The nation had learnt the greatest thing—Self Discipline.

No matter what status a person held or profession he followed, it did not matter if it was a man, woman or a child, this nation of one hundred millions souls had become one in body with that unshakable faith in themselves and their Armed Forces that one is forced to believe that the age of miracles is not yet over.

The greatest loss in war can be that of "Morale". It was in this field that Pakistan triumphed most. Not only that there was no loss of morale but the high morale displayed by the people, was something to be proud of, something to remember always, and a thing to be passed on to the future generations that this War with Bharat enhanced the Morale of ten million Pakistanis, and cemented them, "کانهم بنیان مرصوص Like a structure of molten lead. Q".

Furthermore while status a person held in profession be followed [illegible] [illegible] a man, woman or child, the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] one is ready [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and their Armed Forces that one is [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

The greatest [illegible] reward can be that of "Medal". It [illegible] [illegible] Physical [illegible] most. Not only that [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] but the high morale displayed by the people [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] something to remember always and a thing to be [illegible] to the future generations. That the War with Bharat occasioned the Medals of [illegible] Pakistan, and [illegible] them, [illegible] [illegible] like a structure of modern lead. [illegible]

CHAPTER IX

THE ETERNAL CITY - DATA KI NAGRI

The threat of Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Prime Minister of India had come true. India had chosen and found the time and place of attack on Pakistan. In the time old Chanakian style the rulers of India had launched a full scale attack on Pakistan without either declaring war or giving an ultimatum. The secrecy with which preparations for the invasion of Pakistan were made was so great that the object of the forward movements was kept hidden even from the invading army until the last moment. The men had been told that they were going on a route march. Indian high command was afraid of leakage of information and possibly of a few last minute desertions. The men were, however, ordered to put on their best uniforms as there would be a ceremonial march at the end of the route march. The author of the Police Action in Hyderabad, General Chowdhri—C-in-C Indian Army, was hopeful of another lucky break[1]. He, therefore, had decided to march through the streets of Lahore in new uniforms. His advisers were confident that the mighty white elephant at his disposal would, through its sheer momentum, carry him forward to Lahore Gymkhana by the same evening. The next few days were to be used in mopping up operations. He was impetuous enough to advise his senior commanders to keep their mess kits and medals handy and to issue invitations to senior civil officials to join him at a cocktail party at the famous Lahore Gymkhana the same evening.

The military Governor of Lahore had been nominated and administrative services earmarked. The police force, to enforce law and order of the type that India had practiced during the days of partition, aided by Jan Sangh mobs, was to follow the army. After all, the world at large was to be told, after a fait accompli, that it was no more than a Police Action.

The Indian High Command was confident of the unawareness of Pakistan to such an extent that they chose the Assembly Areas for their forward troops a few Hundred yards from the Pakistan border. Move to the Assembly Areas started at 10 P.M. on September 5, 1965 and by a little after midnight the mighty Indian Army was poised for the march into the dreamland which would, not only allay the land-hunger of their rulers, but would also remove the hunger and starvation brought on to the land of Bharat by her warlords. The acquisition of Pakistan was also to be the first step towards the fulfilment of the dream of Greater India which the Indian demigods had hoped would stretch from Indonesia to the Dardanelles. The steel steeds of India started fuming and puffing

1. After the invasion and occupation of Hyderabad in September.1948, India had given out that it was just a Police Action. Lieut General Kaul speaking of the command qualities of Indian C in C, says, "the largest tank formation he commanded was a division with which he never fought in any battle but only against ill armed and irregular Razakars in a Police Action in Hyderabad". Kaul, op. cit., p. 477.

from soon after midnight. The checking and cross checking of formation and unit positions on the start lines was complete by 3 A.M. on September 6, 1965. The zero hour was drawing near and with it was increasing the anxiety of the Indian Commanders. They felt, as all commanders in their position should be able to feel, that their troops, who by now had been told the purpose of their presence on the border of Pakistan, were a little jumpy and not as elated as the occasion demanded. This eventuality must have been foreseen. A good doze of rum was administered to the men a few minutes before the order for advance was given. At 3-30 A.M. (4 A.M. by Indian Standard Time) the green light went up all along the front and the Indian Army rolled into Pakistan. The arrow had been shot. There was no going back. Not after all these preparations. No detail had been omitted. The fact that the imaginary fall of Lahore appeared in Indian papers makes one believe that the programme for the day had been issued to Director General of Public Relations, who had issued the communique regarding the progress of first day's fighting even before the fighting had started. The capture of Lahore being on the cards for the first day's events, the press was told to publish its fall without any mental reservations. After all Pakistan was a small country, its army was too small to man the 1600 miles of the front and above all, according to Indian High Command, it was not prepared[1].

As a further step to reach Lahore while the people of Lahore were still asleep the border posts manned by West Pakistan Rangers were not to be attacked but circumvented in the initial stages and then surrounded and annihilated at leisure. The main object was to advance to Lahore unseen and unobserved. It is to the credit of the West Pakistan Rangers that they forced the enemy to deploy at the very outset and fight for every inch of Pakistan territory. They were neither trained nor equipped to fight a first rate army but they did. Unknown to the Indians the Rangers were expecting them[2] and were able to put up a more stubborn and a much stronger resistance than the Indians expected. The Rangers, however, could not be everywhere and the Indian Army was able to roll on towards Lahore until they suddenly hit the forward positions of Pakistan Army in the early hours of the morning. Instead of surprising Pakistan Army the Indians were themselves surprised. They had been allowed to march into Pakistan without much hinderance. They were


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1. The Operation Order of 25 Indian Infantry Division for the attack on Pakistan had said, "The defences of Lahore have not been prepared and are not manned ...."

2. General Headquarters Pakistan Army had issued a signal to the Army and HQ West Pakistan Rangers on the evening of Sep 4, 1965 that an Indian attack appeared imminent and although efforts were to be made to avoid an escalation of fighting yet the defensive positions were to be occupied.

The D. G. Rangers, Brigadier, (now Maj Gen) Khuda Dad Khan had issued an order on September the 5th to be prepared to meet an Indian invasion.

LAHORE SECTOR



sure that the fighting against Ranger Posts, which were nowhere in larger strength than a section and armed with rifles only had been localised and even if they had sent back information of Indian invasion it would not be possible for the garrison in Lahore and elsewhere to get ready, collect arms and ammunition and come out of their cantonments before the Indians were inside the town of Lahore itself.

The Indians were banking on the acute effect of such a severe blow to Pakistan. They probably felt that with the fall of Lahore the whole of Pakistan would be at their feet. They approached the BRB canal without much concern but their consternation and the resultant disorganisation was beyond description when they suddenly came under heavy small arms and machine gun fire. By now it was first light. Figures could be seen to have halted, faltered and fall down. Others came forward but met the same fate. The Indian advance had ended. A halt had been called. Not by those who held the initiative, superior strength and unlimited resources in men and equipment but by those who were fewer in numbers and could not boast of similar resources. They were few but they had faith in God and had the satisfaction of fighting for honour, truth and justice.

The city of great fame and wealth, both spiritual and material, was selected by India as the first target. The feeling of mass creates queer ideas. The man controlling the mass gets the feeling of drunkeness and losses his sense of proportion. As a result he hurls the mass aimlessly. The very sense of controlling powerful mass is enough to make him blind to factors which may blunt the mass at his disposal. At times the mass is spongy inside and cannot build up any momentum at all. The Indian High Command were all victims of this feeling. The Indian Commander, Indian Corps, opposite the sacred city of Lahore, had 2 Infantry Divisions and one Independent Brigade under him. He was so confident of the powerful force under his command being invincible that like a school child of eight learning arithmetic he divided the figure of 2 by 2 which was the number of axis that he wished to advance on. The answer was one. So he allotted one Division to each axis, Wagah and Burki, and sat back. The Independent Infantry Brigade could be kept in hand as reserve. This simple exercise in arithmetic was to continue down to battalion and company levels. His distribution of the Corps Artillery was very just and fair, giving equal number of batteries and guns to each Infantry Division strictly according to the arithmetical formulae. It was so simple and yet people used to tell him that it needed brains to formulate a plan for attack.

The Pakistani Commander opposing him was not so fortunate. Major General Mohammad Sarfraz Khan had in all seven infantry battalions and a front of 89,000 yards to defend.

He could not do the simple arithmetical exercise and sit back. He considered the likely axis and having allotted sectors to brigades kept a little reserve in hand. 103 Infantry Brigade was given the right Sector, from including Hudiara Drain to exclusive of Railway line Lahore—Wagah. The left sector stretching upto Ravi was given to 114 Infantry Brigade. 22 Infantry Brigade with only four companies of infantry and 23 Cavalry less one Squadron was kept as the striking force. The positions had been occupied after midnight on the night 5/6 September. Although it had earlier been planned to lay a mine-field in front of BRB canal, there was no time to do so.

G. O. C. 10 Infantry Division had placed a small screen of a platoon, on the main Wagah axis from R & S battalion under Major Arif Jan. This small force cost the Indians heavily. Major Arif Jan allowed the Indian to come close and then opened fire at short range. In view of inadequate light this was the only course open to him. This platoon not only held up the Indian advance along the main Wagah road but inflicted very heavy casualties on them. The Indians, however, on their flanks had managed to by pass them. Rather than surrender they put up a gallant fight. Major Arif Jan and his small band of men will for ever be remembered as a force which fought to the last man and the last round. Not one left his post. Not one of them was taken prisoner. They all achieved the highest distinction that man can get. They became martyrs to the honour, glory and safety of their country and countrymen.

The battalion astride the Lahore—Wagah Road was 3rd Battalion of the Baluch Regiment. A little after first light they saw the Indians advancing astride the road. In front of the advancing Indians were a large number of refugees, men, women and children, hurrying across as if driven by a pack of blood thirsty fiends. The Baluchis could not engage the enemy until the refugees had crossed the bridge. It was risky but they could not shoot their own people. The stout resistance put up by the small R & S section under Major Arif Jan had upset the entire schedule of 54 Indian Infantry Brigade allotted to this Sector.

The Indian commander had three approaches to this position and he had allotted a battalion to each one of these. 13 Battalion of Indian Punjab Regiment, on the left of Indian flank was, as a result the first to gain contact with Pakistani defenders. This happened at 0600 hrs opposite Jallo railway Station. Heavy toll of the Indians was taken by the company in this position supported by own artillery. In fact the artillery fire was so accurate that the enemy fell back never to venture forward again.

The next to approach the defensive position in this Sector was 15 Battalion of the Dogra Regiment, following the main Wagah axis. They reached the killing ground supported by tanks at 0645 hours and

having lost two tanks in the first few minutes called it a day. The company of 3 Baluch in this part of the Sector had the moral support of many a senior officers being with them. The battalion commander Lt Col Tajammul Hussain Malik and the Brigade Commander, Brigadier Aftab Ahmad Khan who with the Engineer officer Lt-Col Suleman Khan and the gunner Lt-Col Imdad Ali Khan were all present in their midst. They were watching the Indian advance from the road bridge at Batapur. It may not have been strictly according to the customs of service, but the presence of these senior officers on the main axis made a great deal of difference. They were in a position to see the situation all the time rather than get it at intervals.

The enemy got exasperated and instead of using his third battalion (3 Jats). as planned, switched it also on to the main road. This attack came in at 0800 hours and was again stopped but it was felt that the thin screen on the outskirts of Dograi had successfully accomplished its task. This company of 3 Baluch was, therefore, pulled back at about 0900 hours. At about the same time Pakistan Air Force joined in the shoot and came out of it with a heavy bag of tanks, trucks and large clusters of men. The place was in shambles. The front companies were running back, the rear companies were being pushed and goaded forward. The Supply Services and the Engineers who had been kept unduly too far forward, by the Indians, with the hope of their being used for providing additional crossings over river Ravi, provided excellent game to the gallant pilots of Pakistan Air Force. An eye-witness who was standing on the bridge at that time when explaining the beautiful sight the P.A.F. planes produced, said how they swooped down to the level of tree tops and having circled swooped down like eagles again and again. The Indians had permitted thousands of Jan Singhis to get into lorries and trucks commandeered in Amritsar, and to follow the Army into Lahore, for shopping at will. Foreigners reaching Pakistan after the war have given a description of the traffic jams created as a result of these civilians trying to run back to safety, in their transport, when they saw the army in front being plastered by Pakistan Air Force.

The enemy realised the importance of Batapur bridge and inspite of the heavy losses that his forward troops had sustained he was putting in attack after attack on it. The artillery of both sides was pounding the area all around it. The bridge was still intact and was not blown until midnight 6/7 September. Enemy tanks were hardly six hundred yards away. A few vehicles from the Indian side strayed across and were all immobilised on the road. They proved very useful later on. They provided cover to the defenders in moving about in the vicinity of the bridge. The artillery and small arms dual continued throughout the major part of the day. The enemy had committed all the three battalions of the leading brigade. The night was spent by our troops in digging in and replenishing and by the enemy in reconnoitring for a likely crossing over BRB canal.

The new formation brought forward by the Indians was 50 Indian Para Brigade. It arrived on the evening of 7 September and went into attack against B company of 3 Baluch the same night. This company had tenaciously kept the far bank of BRB under control and although it had hardly about 50 men on the other side, yet these devoted and daring band of men kept the Para Brigade away from them. The Indian Infantry never came to grips with our men. They were the attackers. It was upto them to get into a dog fight and force the issue. The previous day's experience of coming forward boldly had dampened their spirits. They invariably shelled the positions for two hours before every attack. The moment the barrage lifted the Indian Infantry would get up, shout "Jai Hind" and "Charge" from a distance of 300 to 400 yards and immediately the Pakistan Artillery opened up or the small arms fire was brought on them they would hug the ground. This performance would be repeated twice or thrice and then wireless messages could be intercepted saying "Heavy Casualties. Falling Back". At the other end some commander could be heard shouting "You————Go forward". The Indians, on this front, however, did not relish "going forward," little knowing that the move backwards would be equally costly. The Indians changed over to night attacks, on the next night, but even the cover of darkness did not provide enough security. The men spoke, coughed and shouted "Jai Hind" to ward off the fear created by the demons of darkness and whizzing bullets. The numerous night attacks paid no better dividends than day attacks. Early in the morning on 8 September the enemy was seen withdrawing and were hastened backwards by a few bursts of MMGs and LMGs. One could not afford to waste ammunition on harmless enemy homeward bound.

The Indian commander, on this front, now calculated the economics of killing Pakistani soldiers in terms of rupees, and new paisas and felt that considering the family pensions and children's allowances to be paid to the families of the dead it was cheaper to confine to artillery shelling. It also was a safer method of passing the day. It kept both sides busy and helped in filling up the pages of situation reports giving laudatory details of imaginary counter attacks by Pakistanis beaten back by the brave Sena. These, however, to their discomfort were not all to be imaginary. The G.O.C. was instructed by the C-in-C to probe forward with the small Striking Force at his disposal. This he did on 8 September. It meant crossing the BRB.

The striking force, 22 Infantry Brigade, composed of four companies of Infantry and 23 Cavalry less one squadron, crossed over at Ravi Syphon early in the morning on 8 September. The force was being commanded by Brig A. Qayyum Sher. The infantry compliment consisted of 18 Baluch less two companies and 15 FF less two companies. After crossing over the force had to go along the East bank of BRB canal as the area on the other side was marshy for at least 6 miles. The move was most risky and precarious. The bridges over BRB canal having



This abandened Jeep bearing Divisional Flag and stars belonged to Maj-Gen Narinjan Parshad Commander 25 Indian Division

been blown up, there was no other approach to the enemy positions. Going along for miles, on the raised far bank of BRB, was like carrying a demonstration on the the parade ground in full view of the enemy. The enemy air could not have got a better target but knowing their confirmed inaccurate straffing and rocketing the undertaking was worth the risk. The impossible also at times produces surprise and it did. The enemy succeeded in knocking out two of the leading tanks but only at the final stage just before the leading elements were getting into open ground. The crew of both these tanks under command of Risaldar Ghulam Ali, continued firing although their tanks were on fire. This helped the rear elements to push forward and fan out into the open. By 0830 hours the East bank of BRB canal upto Bhaini bridge had been cleared. The enemy, inspite of artillery and air support and well dug in positions, could not stand the forceful and determined attack of this small force and did not even stay long enough to face the bayonet charge. The flash of bayonets at the distance of a few hundred yards appeared to have been enough to make the Indians go helter skelter only to be killed and wounded while fleeing. A few were helped by the cover afforded by high crops and were able to disappear behind them. The Indians who fought fairly stubbornly on other occasions appear to have been surprised by this very limited offensive of Pakistan at a time when they were still hopeful of entering Lahore triumphantly.

A little time was spent on consolidating the position opposite where once Bhaini bridge stood and soon the advance was resumed. D Coy 18 Baluch, again led the attack supported by A and B squadron of 23 Cavalry. By 13 hours the forward elements had cut the Road Lahore—Wagah at Mile stone 13 thus covering a distance of 12 miles in approximately 9 hours, a feat of no mean performance considering the amount of air attacks they had to face on the way and had the full blast of 25 Indian Divisional Artillery being directed gainst them all the time. The enemy withdrew in such a hurry that the jeep of 25 Indian Division Commander, Major General Narinjan Prashad was left behind with the flag flying. The enemy did not halt until he was well beyond Wagah but there were not enough troops to pursue them and then establish new defensive position on an extended front. The operation of going upto Wagah was discussed but dropped with a heavy heart.

On the evening of 8 September, 16 Punjab less two companies and one company 8 Punjab, were placed under command 22 Infantry Brigade. The third company of 18 Baluch, which was previously guarding various bridges elsewhere, returned to the battalion as an addition to the force.

Limited operations were taken in hand on 10 September to clear up enemy positions in the vicinity of G. T. Road but except air activity and intense artillery fire from both sides nothing important took place on this day. As our troops had not followed up, the Indians started creeping back from 11 September onward.

On 12 September the enemy put in a counter attack against positions held by 16 Punjab and 18 Baluch. The attack was not allowed to build up and was repulsed by artillery concentration even before it could really start. The Artillery as usual brought down extremely accurate fire and dispersed the enemy when they had hardly left the start line.

Between 14 and 16 September the enemy put in a number attacks. Most of these were against 16 Punjab and 18 Baluch but they were all repulsed. During this period 18 Baluch laid a very successful ambush in which apart from killing a good number of enemy they captured 10 prisoners who all belonged to the Garhwal Regiment. The enemy was in a better position from manpower point of view. These attacks used to be all of a battalion strength and in practically all cases a fresh battalion was put in each time.

The C-in-C General Mohammad Musa visited the Lahore front on 16th and discussed the situation with GOC and other senior Commanders. Incidently he used the airport at Walton when the Indians were claiming that they controlled the air space above Lahore.

16 Punjab and 18 Baluch positions were again attacked on night 18/19 September but both the attacks were successfully repulsed. A few prisoners were taken and the enemy left behind a large amount of arms and equipment before falling back to the original positions. On 20 September the men cheered Pakstan Air Force chasing Indian Air Force Hunters over the battle area. Two Hunters were brought down by PAF on that day in that area.

16 Punjab and 18 Baluch had been now in the thick of battle for twelve consecutive days and subjected to about two attacks every day in addition to incessant artillery fire. The severest attack came on the night of 21/22 September.

The successive attacking echelons made it appear as if it was one continuous attack. The attacks were, however, repulsed successfully. The enemy attacks continued during the day on 22 September also. The Indians put in a battalion on each side of the road in pre dawn attack. These two battalions were stopped but a third battalion had put in a right hook and managed to get to Dograi, through the gap between the left company of 16 Punjab and the right company of 12 Punjab, This fact was not known to 16 Punjab who happened to be in front of Dograi itself, and they having been cut off from the rear suffered heavy casualties including their CO Lt-Col Golwala who being severely wounded was taken prisoner. The Cease Fire next day intervened before a counter attack could be launched to recapture Dograi.

BURKI SECTOR

The battle of Burki shall ever remain an epic story of intense heroism, cool courage and dauntless spirit of a handful of men opposing immensely larger forces. The story of Burki has appeared in Indian press giving details of the heavy fighting that took place and the forces used by India to capture Burki. It took the 7th Indian Infantry Division 3 days to capture Burki village held by one company of 17 Punjab under Major Aziz Bhatti (Shaheed) the winner of Nishan-e-Hyder, the highest Pakistani Military Award.

The attack on this front was launched by India at 0330 hours, the same time as elsewhere. As in other sectors the Indians, in order to gain surprise, tried to go round the border posts of Sutlej Rangers but were not successful in evading them completely. The Rangers being deployed in Section Posts were not able to stop the enemy. They, however, put up a stout resistance and succeeded in upsetting the Indian schedule. 13 Infantry Brigade (3 bns) had reached its defensive positions at 0115 hours. A company of 12 Punjab had been sent out to Hudiara village but with strict orders not to dig-in. This company was relieved by a company of 17 Punjab under Major Shafqat Baloch on the night of 5/6 September. The Gwandi Check-Post was run over by the advancing 7 Indian Infantry Division soon after 0330 hours. The Indians took approximately two hours to cover the two miles to Hudiara village with no opposition except the Ranger posts. These two hours had given Major Shafqat Baloch and his company time to dig down a little, on the outskirts of Hudiara village and along the Hudiara drain.

The enemy came in sight a little after 0500 hours but were allowed to come in within effective range of small arms fire. An infantry company of less than one hundred men was pitched against an infantry division supported by armour. The enemy inspite of his strength could not succeed in his frontal attack and tended to move towards the right of our company. By about 10C0 hours the company commander decided to fan out along the Hudiara drain instead of the village itself, as he was in danger of being cut-off from the enemy's flanking movement being made under cover of heavy artillery barrage and tank support. The Indian account as published in the Indian Press said, "Further advance was held up by stiff opposition from Nurpur village and the far bank of Hudiara drain. Automatic fire was intense and enemy artillery opened up with everything they had."[1]

It is most amazing if the Indian Commander Major General Sibal thought his advance was being held up from village Nurpur. There was not a single Pakistani soldier anywhere near Nurpur and unless one of the Indian units had strayed into that area and was shooting up the advancing Indians, there can be no explanation of intense fire coming from there.

1. Melville De Mellow,.The Battle of Burki, Sainik Samachar dated January 18, 1966.

The Indians according to their own account "put in a left hook on the village of Nurpur", but there was no one there. Major Shafqat having seen Indian tanks going to Nurpur had fallen back from his position on the Hudiara drain at about 1500 hours. The Indians, however, had to set their records right and report that "By 5 O'Clock the same evening Nurpur had fallen to our troops. Ten minutes later, our troops had swept across the Hudiara drain, inspite of hail of fire the from enemy."[1] There was no Pakistani soldier within two miles of Hudiara.

The Indians did not venture beyond the Hudiara drain until the next evening inspite of the fact that there was nothing between them and Burki village at a distance of approximately 4 miles. The Indians claim having captured "Barka Kalan by 7.30 P.M. with a fresh battalion".[2] There were no Pakistani troops in this village and one wonders at the inaccurate messages sent back by Indian forward troops and being accepted as true.

The statement given by Major General Sibal, regarding the defence of Burki, to the Indian Press would be viewed with a little amusement by those who have been to Burki either before or after the war. He is reported to have said, "We also realised that our air attacks, our artillery bombardment and even tank fire would have no effect against these very strong and well-entrenched emplacements". There was no emplacement, no concrete pill box or barricade of any nature in or around Burki. There was an understrength rifle company of 17 Punjab commanded by Major Aziz Bhatti (Shaheed) with the only other company on the East bank of BRB canal some distance away to the south of Burki. According to the Indians the attack on Burki was supported by the whole of Divisional Artillery and the available armour, in addition to the mortars and other supporting arms at the disposal of the Brigade. It has been admitted by the Indians that it was a brigade attack (48 Indian Infantry Brigade had been replaced by 65 Indian Infantry Brigade) and the Divisional Commander "decided to use tanks by night in the assault role...."[3]

The defenders of Burki had already overstayed across the canal much longer than they should have done. They were a delaying force only. The main defensive positions of 103 Infantry Brigade were on the west bank of BRB Canal and except to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy they were not achieving any tactical gain. They pulled out of the village on the night of 10/11

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1. Giving exaggerated accounts appears to be common in the Indian Army. Lieut General Kaúl says, " I am constrained to mention,. that there were numerous instances of officers during the.Kashmir operations who sent up to higher authorities situations which were exaggerated. There was a tendency to enlarge upon what actually happened, to one's credit...." Kaul, op. cit., p. 127.

2. Melville de Mellow, op. cit.

3. Melville de Mellow, op. cit.

September only after they had exhausted their ammunition and after having fought the enemy to a standstill for 3 days and 3 nights. They were thus, able to inflict very heavy casualties on the enemy. The Indians have complemented their tank commander for crossing the minefield, when not a single mine had been laid by Pakistan troops. They simply had no time to do so. The Indians have given credit to the Pakistani Engineers for having destoryed the bridge on BRB canal just as they were nearing it while in fact all the bridges on this canal had been destoryed under orders of GOC Lahore on the night of 6/7 September.

The Indians after having shelled the position from the morning of 6 September, had started attacking Burki on the 8th of September and it has to be kept in mind that the company under Major Aziz Bhatti had no contact with the main position since the night of 6/7 September when the bridge had been blown up. To have withstood nine successive attacks in the course of three days and having been constantly pounded by all that the enemy divisional artillery and armour could throw at it, is an unparalleled act of heroism, not only in this war but in any war fought under similar conditions. These handful of men had no concrete bunkers to protect them, no deep dug-in trenches, no supplies were being sent to them and their ammunition could not be replenished except at night and under very hazardous conditions. The company to the south of Burki and across the BRB canal stood its ground most valiantly and did not permit the enemy to caputre the far bank until the cease-fire. On the 23rd of September the Indian Battalion Commander in the area approched the Pakistani Commander asking to vacate the position as he had all along been reporting that the canal bank had been captured by him. The Pakistani Commander refused at which the Indians during the night put in a battalion attack as they did in Khem Karan, Sulaimanki and Rajputana maintaining as elsewhere that Pakistanis had occupied the position after the cease-fire. The Pakistani Commander did not wish to commit a breach of Cease-Fire Agreement and withdrew to the near bank.

From 11 September until the Cease Fire the 7th Indian Division confined its activities to artillery and small arms fire and it was evident that it had no more fight left in it. Lahore, the Eternal City—was as far away as on the first day.

September only after they had exhausted their ammunition and after having [illegible] the enemy [illegible] for [illegible] days and 3 nights. They were thus [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. The Indians [illegible] [illegible] their [illegible] commander for crossing the [illegible] when [illegible] a single [illegible] had been laid by Pakistan troops. They [illegible] had [illegible] to do so. The Indians have given [illegible] the Pakistani [illegible] for having destroyed the bridge on the B.R.B. canal just as they were [illegible] [illegible] all the bridges on the canal had been destroyed under orders of GOC Lahore on the night of 6/7 September.

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CHAPTER X

MORNING TEA THAT NEVER REACHED KASUR

The Indian invasion of Kasur Sector had been synchornised with that of Lahore Sector. 11 Infantry Division raised, on an ad hoc basis, a few months earlier, had been assigned to defend this Sector and to destory any enemy break through either from Ferozepur, through Hussainiwala or via Bedian and Khem Karan, in an effort to outflank Lahore. The Division, having been raised during the emergency had not yet been brought up to full strength and apart from other shortages had only seven infantry battalions. The Divisional Commander, Major General Abdul Hamid, had decided to fight in fronto f the BRB canal and to carry the battle into the enemy territory as soon as opportunity arose.

The Indians had been seen carrying out reconnaissance of the border area a few days before the invasion. The suspicion of the G.O.C. had been aroused and he had ordered the digging of defensive positions on 4 September but, in order not to worsen the political situation, had taken care that all work on defensive positions was to be done during the hours of darkness only.

The position became weaker on 5 September when 21 Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Sahib Dad Khan, (13 Baluch and 5 FF) was moved out of the area. This left only five infantry battalions, with the Division, to defend a front of approximately 28 miles.

News came into Division Headquarters at about 0345 hours on 6 September that Indian movement had been observed in front of the Ranger post at Bedian. By 0500 hours it was clear that the Ranger posts all along the border were under enemy attack. Soon the Indians decided to forego the element of surprise, which had already been lost, and opened up with mortars and artillery. The enemy had planned a two pronged attack; one aimed against Bedian Head Works and the other directly leading to Kasur along the Road Patti-Khem Karan - Kasur.

The two main enemy attacks were directed against Bedian, by 5 Guards battalion, and Kasur along Khem Karan axis by 9 J and K Battalion. By 0900 hours both the attacks had come to a standstill. Both attacks had been of a battalion strength each and supported by armour. Defending Bedian, facing the enemy attack, was a company of 1 East Bengal Regiment. They withstood the assault most admirably. The enemy received proper reception. The Senior Tigers, as the battalion is called, held their fire as seasoned troops are expected to do. They had a plucky young gunner Captain as F.O.O., who had his O.P. on top of a tree. He gave them an excellent supporting fire even though wounded during the early hours of the morning.

HQ 106 Infantry Brigade was shelled at about 0600 hours but the Indians did not achieve much. There was only one casualty as a result of it.

On Kasur - Khem Karan road, which appeared to be the main axis, the battalion holding up the Indians was 7 Punjab. The first attack having been held up, the right flank was attacked the second time. 7 Punjab forward platoon, on this flank, had to fall back in the initial stages. This encouraged the Indians and 13 Dogra, came rushing on and took Rohi-wala village, only to find themselves in a trap. 7 Punjab put in a well planned counter-attack with one company and put the Dogras to flight. Their battalion 2nd-in-command Major Milkiat Singh with 14 others was taken prisoner and the rest managed to extricate themselves, leaving over 60 dead on the field.


There had been subsidiary attacks along the rest of the front also. They had been directed against village Punwan and Ballan wala with the idea of securing crossings over BRB canal. These were not allowed to develop and were stopped effectively.

1 East Bengal Regiment faced another battalion attack at 1000 hours in front of Bedian. This also was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy.

Enemy 4 Indian Mountain Division, had the support of 2 Indian Independent Armoured Brigade and an unusually large compliment of infantry and artillery. It had under it 17 infantry battalions. Opposing it were 5 battalions stretched out over a large front. As a result the point of Indian attack, selected at will due to the initiative being in their hands, gave to the Indians a superiority of 5 to 1 in addition to armour. The artillery support of 11 Division was also much less on 6 September as compared to what the Indians had.

The Indians continued to attack again and again throughout the day. An intercepted wireless message, earlier in the day, had said, "Speed up. The morning tea will be issued in Kasur". That cup of tea was not to be tasted. Many tasted another kind of cup that day and to no purpose. The old saying, "There is many a slip between the cup and the lip", was said for precisely such occasions. The whole Sector from Kasur to Bedian was under constant pressure, but the pattern was the same. The armour had been spread out over the whole front in the most democratic fashion. The infantry all along could be seen advancing under cover of artillery fire and escorted by tanks. The moment the artillery barrage was lifted the infantry would get up, shout "Jai Hind" three times, as if asking the Pakistani soldiers to open fire. The moment the Pakistanis opened fire the Indians would fall to the ground, repeat the performance two or three times, and then having sent the usual messages of being stopped by heavy fire, they would oblige by providing an excellent target when retreating.

KASUR – KHEM KARAN SECTOR



The time had reached when the battle had, according to plan, to be carried into enemy territory. The enemy attack had been stopped, his armour blunted and the momentum of his advance broken. Now was the time to give him a little taste of his own prescription. The Indians continued attacking during the night, particularly on Bedian, Punwan and Ballanwala but were thrown back in every place. Indian night attacks were no different from the day attack. It appears, that they suffered less casualties during night attacks as compared to attacks during the day. There may have been another difference from the point of view of enemy forward troops. They escaped, due to the observance of wireless silence, the nerve wrecking coaxings and unprintable language of their higher headquarters which must have been a great relief.

11 Division had been given 5 Armoured Brigade for the limited offensive operations planned for this Sector. There could be no question of a major offensive. The Indians had not yet committed their 1 Indian Armoured Division and the infantry compliment of 1 Indian Corps. On 4 September the papers captured from one of the despatch riders had confirmed the presence of 1 Indian Armoured Division in the vicinity of Samba and as a result Pakistan High Command, did not wish to tie up its armour in the relatively untankable country beyond Khem Karan and yet it was not desirable to completely ignore offensive operation from this direction, into East Punjab. While the Indian attack had not yet sufficiently developed against Sialkot, it was profitable to utilise the brief period and inflict as much casualties on the Indian Army as possible.

By mid-day on 7 September 21 Infantry Brigade had returned to 11 Division after being released by GHQ from the special task for which it had been detailed earlier.

The bridge-head necessary for launching 5 Armoured Brigade was ready by the evening of 7 September. It had necessitated, the construction of a bridge on the Ruhi Nala. This bridge so close to the front and under constant enemy air attacks was a difficult task, but it proved what determined troops can do. Pakistan Engineers rose to the occasion and did a very good job of it. 1 FF less one coy and one squadron of 6 Lancers (Divisional Armoured Regiment) crossed over when the Indian Air Force was most active, but at the same time most ineffective. By the evening Khem Karan had been reached and the bridgehead established successfully. The enemy suffered heavily both in men and equipment and a number of Indian prisoners fell into the bag of 1 FF. The equal distribution of Indian Armour to its various brigades and battalions may have sounded well as an exercise in simple arithmetics but in defending Khem Karan, it proved most disastrous to the Indians.

The next day, 21 Infantry Brigade commanded by Brig. Sahib Dad, and 5 Armoured Brigade moved into the bridgehead. 4 Armoured Bde, the other formation of 1 Armoured Division, was also to come into the bridgehead, the moment mopping up operation in Khem Karan had been completed. The Indians tried to divert the attention of Pakistanis from Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian and the adjacent villages. The brunt of two major attacks during the night 7/8 September fell on 1 EBR once again, but they stood their ground firmly and threw back the Indians with very heavy casualties on both occasions. It appeared that the roar of the Tigers was enough to drive away the lesser beings.

The Indians were in a desperate position. Khem Karan, a historic town, and a flourishing trading centre, with a large population was threatened by Pakistan. The would be visitors who two days earlier had promised their men the morning cup of tea, their Chhota Hazri, in Kasur were about to be shut out of Khem Karan also. They launched a full scale Tank/Infantry combined attack. The din of battle, the artillery on both sides pounding the confined space on the northern outskirts of the town and the cries of wounded and dying were beyond imagination. The orders were being shouted in clear by the Indian commanders. The language at times was unprintable, but this does happen with inexperienced small men in high positions. The Indian troops fought well on this day. The stakes were high and the fear of war being carried into their own home and had shaken them out of the over confident attitude of the previous day. Inspite of the greater determination shown by the Indians and their overwhelming superiority the Pakistani troops stood their ground. At about 0900 hours (8 September) it appeared that the Indian attack had spent all its vigour but before the Indians could dig in where they stood, 6 Lancers and 5 FF, commanded by Lt. Col M. Mumtaz Khan, on one axis and 1 FF less one Coy and a Sqn of 15 Lancers under command on the other axis, went into attack. The scene was superb. Never before had an army in spick and span uniforms, meant for the victory parade been disillusioned in such a manner. The well co-ordinated attack of armour and infantry threw them back. The co-ordination of the defences on 11 Infantry Division front had been maticulously gone into by the GOC and his staff. The GOC, who made full use of his helicopters, was always found to be near whichever sector the fighting was severest. This helped him in being ahead of the Indians at every step. The Indian Army had a good proportion of their best fighting material, on this front, but they were pitched against men who were superior to them in all respects and who were fighting for a just cause. They tried to hold this extremely well executed attack but failed. Once thrown back they were unable to reassemble and reorganise. They were, however, lucky. The high sugar-cane and cotton crops gave them cover from the Pakistani pursuers. Khem Karan had fallen into Pakistani hands by 0900 hours and the advance continued.

The move of 6 Lancers was so brilliant an execution of advance forward that the infantry which was being impeded due to the need of clearing

small pockets, snipers and odd MMG nests hidden in crops, could not keep pace with armour. 6 Lancers, under Lieut Col. Sahibzad Gul, by 1700 hours, had captured Valtoha Railway Station, at a distance of 12 miles from Khem Karan. It was a magnificant piece of work. The enemy echelons, all along the route, had been taken by surprise. The Indian contention that Maj General Gurbakhsh Singh, 4 Indian Mountain Divisional Commander had pulled back his men would be acceptable, if in the process the Indians had not lost over 1200 killed and a much larger number in wounded. The amount of equipment and stacks of ammunition left lying by the fleeing Indians belies this explanation of the Indian High Command. It was a debacle of the worst type and should be accepted as such. If the pulling back had been according to plans the braver elements of the Indian Army would not have stayed behind in small pockets. These small groups deserve all the praise and recognition that can fall to the lot of brave soldiers. They stood their ground until eliminated[1]. The advance of 24 Cavalry in the centre had also been successful, though not to the same extent as the right hook by 6 Lancers. 24 Cavalry had crossed the line of Asal Utter, at a distance of 8 miles from Khem Karan. If the Indian contention of pulling back to trap Pakistanis was correct, then Chima and not Valtoha should have been allowed to fall and there would have been no talk of falling back to Beas.

The Commander 5 Armoured Brigade, appears to have made a mistake in gauging the extent to which the Indians had been beaten and demoralised. It did not occur to him that there was no fight left in the Indians opposite his two regiments. He ordered them to leaguer back in front of Khem Karan for the night. They had to come all the way from the territory they had captured, with the dint of their courage and in the face of very strong opposition. To fall back without adequate reasons is never acceptable to a soldier. We can only imagine the feelings of those officers and men who were being told to come back. They obeyed the order but with a feeling of disappointment.

The next day, 9 September, 5 Armoured Brigade undertook the same task as on the previous day. In addition 4 Armoured Brigade got ready to put in an attack from the left with the task of cutting off Road Khem Karan—Bhikiwind at Milestone 32, thus cutting off Chima from the left.

6 Lancers had much less opposition today than on the previous day and were able to advance upto Valtoha R.S. again. 24 Cavalry on their left went a little beyond the limit of previous day's advance but were once again held up at Chima. The Indians in the meantime had made copious use of mines during the hours of undisturbed darkness, and were in fact within well defended localities.

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1. As Lieut. General Kaul has said, "The C-in-C got cold feet" and decided, "while the battle of Khem Karan was still in progress, to take up an alternate position, several miles in the rear, which would have meant giving up some well known and vital places and areas." Kaul op. cit. p. 478.

The Brigade Commander again for the second day in succession, recalled both the Regiments for leaguer back to Khem Karan at sun set.

10 September dawned with another diversionary dawn attack on Bedian, but was repulsed, as usual, with even heavier losses to the enemy.

4 Armoured Brigade was to put in the left hook today. 4 Cavalry, with Lt.-Col. Mohammad Nazir in command, was the leading unit. They put up an excellent performance. Brushing aside all opposition they put in a left hook and reached their objective at 1700 hours, but in the meantime contact with 4 Armoured Brigade Headquarters and the supporting infantry battalion, 10 FF had been lost. The Regiment had lost a large number of tanks on the way due to soft nature of the ground and enemy action. The high sugar crops gave excellent cover to RR and other small parties who had been unable to withdraw or had decided to fight to the last. It was only due to the dauntless spirit of the officers and men of 4 Cavalry that they succeeded in reaching their objective. They had, however, run out of petrol and were very low on ammunition by then. Contact with the rear having been lost, no one knew their exact location and no replenishment of fuel or ammunition could be considered. They stood their ground until 1100 hours on 11 September, when those of them who could not fight back their way had to surrender. It was an excellent operation but due to misfortune full benefits could not be reaped out of it.

The time had come, when 1 Armoured Division was scheduled to move out of this sector. The main objective of stablising this front and inflicting casualties on the enemy, by carrying war into Indian territory had been achieved. There was never any intention of conquering India or any part of it and as such, except to throw back the Indians and punish them at every step, there was no point in upsetting plans elsewhere, for the sake of a few more square miles of enemy territory. The situation on this front having been established, arrangements had to be made, to place the reserves in a sector, where the enemy was likely to put in another offensive. This happened to be the Sialkot front.

The situation in Sialkot had started taking definite shape and 1 Armoured Division (less 5 Armoured Brigade) could be needed there more than in this Sector. It is a credit to Pakistan Western Railway, the way they rose to the occasion and met the defence requirements in an examplary manner. Their performance throughout the war was of an excellent standard and the move of 1 Armoured Division, from Kasur to Sialkot Sector, within full view of the enemy air, was no mean feat.

The move of 1 Armoured Division out of the Sector must have been reported by Indian Air. It raised Indian hopes of once again pushing forward in this Sector. The question of prestige also must have weighed



C ein C Pakistan Army General Mohammad Musa visiting Khem Karn after its capture. General Abdul Hamid Khan and Brigadier Sahib Dad Khan are on his right and left.

heavily on the Indian mind. So far the Indian High Command or may be the Government of India itself had been denying the loss of Khem Karan. Photographs, showing Khem Karan in Pakistani hands, appearing in Pakistan Press, naturally could not have reached the Indian Public and it was no difficult matter to lable Pakistan Radio News as pure fabrication, listening to which in any case was banned in India. In fact the Indians, as they had done in the case of Lahore, had released to their press the fall of Kasur according to plan. They seem to have been so confident of their success that once they planned to take a place, they felt they had already taken it and at once announced as having done so. The mythical Shaikh Chilli of Delhi or Mullah Nasruddin of Isphahan could not have bettered the Indian record in this respect. When such hysterical hallucination captures the mind of the whole nation, there is no possible remedy and the psychiatrists find it beyond their capacity to cure it.

On 12 September, the Indians put in a brigade attack, on Khem Karan, supported by a regiment of armour (9 Deccan Horse). 4 Sikh Light Infantry, which tried to put in infiltration tactics, had the worst of the day. They were nearly annihilated. Including their Commanding Offcer Lt.-Col. *Anant Singh*, 6 officers and over 250 prisoners fell in the bag. 4 Sikh Light Infantry, a good fighting battalion, ceased to exist from that day. The Indians lost heavily in tanks also.

Before this attack died out, a fresh infantry brigade was brought forward by the Indians. Air strikes and intense artillery fire supported the attack. The Indian tanks in this second attack that day were conspicuous for their shyness. This attack also cost the Indian, heavily in men and material without any gain on the ground. During the night the Indians again switched on to Bedian and Jahman but without any success. The 1 EBR had got used to the mode of Indian advance and knew well how to keep them in their place. The Indians had exhausted their moral and material strength and inspite of the prestige value of Khem Karan confined their activities to licking their wounds for the next few days. Good use of tanks had been made opposite Bedian. Tanks of 15 Lancers used to be sent across the canal every night with the result that the Indians feared on attack on Khalra where the Indian Divisional H.Q. was located.

The G.O.C. Maj. Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan, however, did not wish to let them sit quiet for too long. He ordered small probing raids which helped a great deal in further lowering the Indian morale. Commander 106 Infantry Brigade, Brigadier Nawazish Ali decided to put in a limited attack. Two companies of 7 Baluch pushed the enemy out of his positions around Sankhatra and established a firm base for further raids into the enemy territory. Based on Sankhatra A Squadron of 12 Cavalry was able to dominate the area upto Lakhan. This drew in the Indian armour and the squadron of 12 Cavalry had good shooting against Indian tanks including Centurians. A plucky young 2/Lt, Abul Hassan, made

good use of Sankhatra base as FOO and managed to bring down well directed artillery fire, whenever the Indians put in hastily planned attacks in this sub sector.

The enemy reacted as a result, in much greater strength, and on 17 September came out in force, but Sankhatra base was too strong for the Indians. A company of infantry with a squadron of tanks supported by well directed artillery fire, was too much for them to dislodge. The enemy air as usual came to the help of Indian ground troops but their shoo ting was too eratic and they were over respectful of small arms fire. They had suffered in the early stages of war, more than they could afford. They, therefore, always kept at a respectful height. The Indian efforts to recapture Sankhatra were really earnest. Hand to hand fighting ensued on a number of occasions but the defenders were determined to keep the Indians away from the village.

There were minor probing attacks until 21 September, when the Indians realising the approach of Cease Fire got panicky about Khem Karan still being in Pakistani hands. Their biggest and most determined offensive in this sector, as a result,was launched on night21/22 September. They mounted three major attacks in quick succession. In the first two attacks they adopted two brigade frontal attack while in the third attack there was only one brigade leading the attack. All the three attacks were preceded by heavy artillery shelling. It had become a habit with the Indians to time pre-attack bombardments to exactly two hours. This time it was much longer. Starting from 2230 hours this earth shaking pounding of Pakistani positions lasted until 0430 hours. All three attacks against Khem Karan failed to dislodge the Pakistani defenders and the net result was the pile of Indian dead which could not be removed for days and polluted the atmosphere for miles around. All three attacks had been well planned and showed determination. However much one may belittle the Indian failures one cannot deny that except for the first day or two the Indian Army fought well in this sector and the very fact of their readiness to accept heavy casualties speaks highly of the courage and determination of their soldiers. If they failed to achieve their objective against an army much smaller in number it is only because they were pitched against men of higher moral qualities who were fighting for a just cause and possessed a much stronger FAITH in GOD.

Not satisfied with having butchered the youth of India a day prior to the Cease Fire the Indians launched a fresh battalion against the rifle company of 7 Baluch at Sankhatra. This caused them further losses and they had once again to fall back without achieving success. Such fruitless and senseless butchery of their own men could not be understood on Pakistani side. If this was not mass murder nothing else could be. "Absolute power had corrupted the Indian Government absolutely". It is a pity their dumb masses are not in a position to take them to task

for such callous handling of their brave troops. The Indian effort to capture Bedian Head Works was of no less intensity. The defences, however, stood firm until the end and contributed a great deal in inflicting heavy casualties on the Indians.


The end had not yet come. India had asked for extension of time for the Cease Fire and had been granted it. There were still a few more hours left. A couple of brigades in the reserve had had no blood letting. Why should they not be sacrificed to the whims of the politicians as Maj-Gen Narinjan Parshad had complained? They were brought forward, given tank support, and with all the artillery at the General's beck and call a final effort was made to re-capture Khem Karan. It proved no better, although the C-in-C Indian Army had ordered the recapture of Khem Karan at "All Cost". All the cost available with them was not adequate to give them what had been taken from them in a fair and clean fighte Khem Karan defenders could say,

"نہ بہ زور و نہ بہ‌زاری نہ بہ زر می آید"

CHAPTER XI

THE INDIAN ELEPHANT COMES TO A GRINDING HALT AT CHAWINDA.

SIALKOT SECTOR



Sialkot sector had always been upper most in the minds of Pakistan. Across it lay the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which in addition to the outright injustice of the case and India usurping it forcefully, it posed a direct threat to the innermost areas of Pakistan. Any threat based on Kashmir would come at right angles to the threat from India itself thereby weakening defences facing India and could not be anything but a source of great anxiety to Pakistan. As far as India was concerned, Kashmir was ideally suited as a jumping ground to attack Pakistan. The military build up during the last few years under the assumed threat from China had given India a good excuse, if she needed one, to build up the strength in Kashmir to unusually large six Division. Indian infantry brigades in Kashmir have the habit of having upto seven infantry battalions as a measure of solace and over insurance.

Pakistan could not afford to keep more than one medium size infantry division in this sector. 15 infantry Division containing 7 infantry battalion only was placed in Sialkot. Its armour compliment consisted of 25 Cavalry and two tank delivery units, The Division was commanded by Brigadier Sardar Mohammad Ismail Khan.

The Indian garrison opposite to this small force was 26 Indian Division with four oversize brigades and two armoured regiments. It had been appreciated that the enemy could launch a three pronged attack from the following directions; Dera Baba Nanak, Samba and Jammu. The areas of responsibility of the brigades of 15 Infantry Division were as a result, as follows:—

101 Infantry Brigade (2 bns) (Brig. S.M. Hussain)	Astride Sialkot Jammu Road
104 Infantry Brigade (One Inf Bn only)	Area Uggoki as Div Striking Force.
24 Infantry Brigade (Two Inf Bns plus one Armed Regt) (Brig Malik Abdul Ali Khan)	Area Chawinda.
115 Infantry Brigade (Two Inf Bns) (Brig Muzzafaruddin)	Area Jassar.

6 Armd Division commanded by Maj General Abrar Hussain, which in fact was no more than an Armoured Brigade, was placed in Daska area to be used as required. It had under it, two Armoured Regiments and one Infantry Battalion, The Guides Cavalry, 22 Cavalry and 14 FF with proportionate supporting arms and services.

The Indian build up in early September opposite 15 Division was substantial. The Indians had brought in three Infantry Divisions including one oversize mountain division and their crack 1 Indian Armoured Division. The details of these were to be known as fighting developed. The Indian plan in this sector unfolded itself gradually and was most unrealistic. It had neither taken the capabilities of the Indian soldier into account nor had been fair in assessing the fighting qualities of Pakistan Army. It smelt of Hyderabad Police Action. General Chowdhuri had decided to attack with one strong division at Suchetgarh and a brigade at Jassar. He knew the strength of both 15 Infantry Division and 6 Armoured Division and expected the Armoured Division with its armoured regiments to be equally divided between the two garrison of Jassar and Sialkot. The attack having been launched on 6 September would in the opinion of Indian C-in-C, draw the whole of Pakistan Army in this Sector to these two corner points. When Pakistan garrison was fully sucked into these two extreme corners and was committed completely the main attack from Samba would roll down the plains lead by Indian Armoured Division. According to General Chowdhuri there would be nothing to stop this mighty force; not even a section of Infantry. The garrisons at Jassar and Sialkot would be too committed to extricate themselves and even if they tried to fall back to interfere in the main attack they would be only following the Indian Divisions and would never be permitted to re-establish any worthwhile defensive line. General Chowdhuri's optimism was really infectious. It premeated down to the brigade commanders' level but no further. The lower levels have to be more realistic. They are too near the ground and they are the ones who have to capture ground and hold it or give it away. To them higher planning and lines across the map mean little. When it came to that level the situation looked different but more of that later.

As planned by India, the first place that took the brunt of Indian attack in this Sector was Jassar. 3 Punjab was holding the bridge and a part of it was across it, in the little Pakistani enclave across the river Ravi. The Indians started shelling at 0315 hours, a quarter of an hour earlier than they crossed the border in other places. An hour later the attack came in, led by one infantry battalion and the Indians succeeded in securing foothold in the enclave. 3 Punjab put in a counter attack at 1000 hours on 6 September and had thrown back the Indians by 1200 hours. Simultaniously 4 FF cleared the Indian enclave on West bank of the river. There does not appear to have been much resistance to this action. The lack of enthusiasm on the part of Indians to defend their positions on the right bank of Ravi was a clear indication that the Indian attack against Jassar was merely a feint. If they had meant to invade Pakistan from this direction in earnest, it would have been easier for them to build up across the river, by making use of the enclave as the initial bridge head.

The artillery compliments of 15 Infantry Division which had earlier helped 10 Infantry Brigade, in Chhamb and Jaurian also returned during night 6/7 September and the position became more reassuring.

The Indians were to continue giving the impression that the attack on Jassar was in real earnest. Between 0300 and 0630 hours on 7 September, they put in three attacks supported by massive artillery suppport and tanks. They succeeded in capturing the far end of the bridge eventually. The bridge as a result was blown up at 0800 hours the same day. The troops on the far end were ordered to swim to the home side as it was not considered adviseable to leave a few unsupported companies across the river. The Indians throughout the day, continued to try to enlarge their gains along the bridge but all their attempts were foiled.

26 Indian Division advancing along the main Sialkot—Jammu road did not make any headway on 6 and 7 September.

14 Indian Infantry Division rolled down across the wide stretch Charwah—Bajra Garhi on the night of 7/8 September. The attack started at 2330 hours. 3 FF fought delaying action and gradually fell back to the main defensive line around Phillorah. 3 FF was holding area Gadgor and adjoining villages. Although vastly outnumbered the battalion stood the most intense shelling and kept to its positions. A few platoon localities exchanged hands once but were immediately recaptured. The fight for every inch of the territory had started. It was like a cyclone. Waves clashing with waves and creating an uproar in the dark but the few Pakistani soldiers stood steadfast. Attack after attack was coming and yet the thin line stood firm like a wall of steel.

The unit was ordered to fall back to Chawinda early in the morning on 8 September. By then, they were in danger of being cut off. They did so at first light. By the morning of 8 September the enemy with elements of 1 Indian Armoured Division had captured Maharajke, Charwa Chobara, Gadgor and Phillorah villages.

The advance of 26 Indian Division along the main road to Sialkot had also been checked and the enemy was hardly able to throw back the screens pushed forward by 19 Punjab and 13 FF on the main road Sialkot—Jammu.

6 Armoured Division, Commanded by Major General Abrar Hussain, was now moved forward and given the responsibility of stopping the main enemy advance opposite Chawinda in conjunction with 24 Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik already in position. The Brigade had under it, 2 Punjab, 3 FF and 25 Cavalry. In fact, what it amounted to was that an Infantry and an Armoured Brigade, were defending against this very strong Indian offensive.

8 September gives the image of a series of hammer blows on a small size but ultra strong anvil. Each blow produces blinding flashes. It is the test of strength and quality of metal between the anvil and the hammer. After a little it starts becoming evident that the hammer blows have started losing their vigour and frequency and the metal of the hammer has started cracking. The anvil appears to be adamant, determined, neither to shift the place nor to evade the blows but at the end of the day is a little dazed at the strength and audacity it has shown and then smiles. There is more to come and gets ready to receive that also in the same manner.

The Indians had occupied Phillorah during the early hours of the morning but the appearance of 24 Infantry Brigade opposite them in the morning, in an offensive mood, made them fall back. Bajrah Garhi had four enemy tanks. The moment one was hit by Pakistani armour, 25 Cavalry, the other three disappeared. The enemy was gradually pushed out of Chobara also by 24 Infantry Brigade and 25 Cavalry.

On the morning of 9 September, 10 Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier Azmat Hayat Khan also joined in and had taken up positions along side 24 Infantry Brigade.

9 September again was a busy day. The enemy tried to edge towards our left and making use of road Maharajke-Sialkot and road Bajra Garhi—Sialkot, to put in a right hook.

This move was foiled immediately it became apparent and the enemy withdrew in haste. The enemy Operation Order had laid down the main axis as Ramgarh, Chobara, Phillora. One Centurian Regiment was to push through along it while the other, a Sherman Regiment, was to be on the right. This regiment appears to have attempted the right hook but could not sustain it. The other Centurian Regiment, plus a squadron, was to be on the enemy left in area Daigi. 4 Horse had been kept by the Indians in reserve.

The enemy put in a counter-attack on Chobara with an armoured regiment and an infantry battalion. This was successfully beaten back. The enemy had used his air on a number of occasions but the Pakistan Air Force had every time appeared on the scene and chased them away, before they could contribute much to the battle.

15 Infantry Division Headquarters itself were attacked by enemy aircraft on the morning of 10 September but there were no casualties. The GOC Major General Tikka Khan who had taken the command from Brigadier Sardar Mohammad Ismail, had organised tank hunting parties who were successful in destroying a number of tanks during the night of 9/10 September. This put a stop to the night movement of Indian tanks opposite Sialkot.

On 10 September, the Indians subjected the Jassar positions to very heavy shelling but did not try to advance forward. They seemed to have been given large quantities of artillery ammunition merely to expend while sitting at a distance from Pakistani troops.

The Indians, opposite 24 Infantry Brigade, in the area of Gadgor, tried to make a flanking move from the left but failed to make any headway.

A great deal of enemy movement was observed during 10 September behind the enemy lines. It was evident that regrouping and re-allocation of tasks was being undertaken by the Indians. The original plan had failed. They hoped to succeed with the changed plan if........... But they were soon to know that the "ifs" do not turn out to be in favour of mighty hordes all the time.

Sialkot and Jassar received their share of shelling again on 11 September. Enemy tried to advance along the main axis but failed. Khaira village fell to the Indians but was counter-attacked and retaken. Shelling by the Indians along their main axis of advance was very intense. It lasted from 0200 to 0800 hours. The Indians also used air which, however, failed to do any great damage. At 1100 hours, the main enemy attack, mainly armour, came against Gadgor and Phillorah. 11 Cavalry, Guides and 25 Cavalry took the brunt and stopped the enemy. It was a magnificient battle; tank against tank and reminded of the armour battles of Second World War. There was determination on both side, In fact it was a test of stamina and determination. There were fairly heavy casualties on both sides. There had to be. To say that Pakistan stopped the Indian invasion without losing anything would be highly unrealistic. An invading enemy does not throw bouquets of flowers at the defenders. An enemy, with well trained and fully equipped troops and with vast superiority in men and material can hurl at the defenders far more than they can pound him with. The test of fighting is, who can take stronger and more numerous blows and not budge an inch. The army which can accept losses in life and equipment and the nations which can lose heavily in men and material and remain undaunted are the ones who come out of wars as victors. For the Indians to have bragged that they inflicted heavy losses on Pakistanis does not make sense. The point is, what effect had those losses on Pakistanis. Did they flinch ? Did they waver ? Did they quit their posts ? The answer is, NO. Then what did India achieve ? Pakistanis fought and fought well. They must have undergone losses but a loss in battle is a loss only when it fails to achieve the objective. When the loss saves the nation it is no more a loss.

سر خاک شہیدے برگہائے لالہ می پاشم
کہ خوش بانہال ملت ما ساز گار آمد — اقبال

The only gain to the Indians that day was Phillorah village. This also was lost because the Indians were pushing across thousand of refugees from the villages occupied by them on the first day. To have advanced under cover of refugees was the most unsoldierly act on the part of Indians but then there it was and not much could be done about it. For three days they had kept them confined without food and water and now on 11 September they had used them as human shield. Pundit Kautilya had come to their aid but even this guile was short lived. It could not be repeated day after day. There were no more left to be used after the 11th. PAF brought about successful air strikes that day, against Chobara and Charwa.

A certain amount of regrouping and reallocation of areas was carried out on 11 September by Pakistan also. 1 Armoured Division less 5 Armoured Brigade had also arrived in the area and could be used as and when found necessary. The attack against Phillorah had cost the Indians heavy losses. 25 Cavalry had been successfully engaging the enemy armour throughout this period. They had been able to account for 29 tanks against a loss of only 4 of their own. As a result of the re-organisation our own locations were as follows on 12 September :—

Chawinda Area.	24 Infantry Brigade with 2 Punjab 3 FF 14 Baluch 25 Cavalry.
Badiana Area.	10 Infantry Brigade with Guides Cavalry plus C Sqn 11 Cavalry, 22 Cavalry less one Sqn.
Pasrur Area.	14 (P) Brigade. 11 Cavalry less one Sqn 9 FF
Sialkot Area.	15 Infantry Division with under comd. 101 Infantry Brigade 2 Baluch 19 Punjab 104 Infantry Brigade 9 Baluch 20 Lancers less one Sqn.
Jassar Area.	No change.

Khairi and Chak Phulra posts and high ground in the vicinity, were captured on the morning of 12th in Sialkot Sector.



Result of Indian bombing of the City of Sialkot.

The Indians sent a company of Gurkhas towards Zafarwal, who posing as Chinese, to the villagers, started digging trenches. On approach of our patrol, they retreated leaving behind one prisoner from 5/5 Gurkha Battalion, belonging, to 196 Indian Infantry Brigade, a part of Indian Mountain Division.

On 13 September, the first enemy move of tanks took place in the area of village Dogri and was immediately stopped. At 0700 hours the Indians tried to probe with a strong contingent of tanks, 25 or more, from Gadgor and Chobara but were effectively stopped by our forces. Chawinda then became the centre of Indian attacks. That day, over 20 enemy tanks were destroyed and the enemy advance effectively halted. There was no relaxing of effort by the enemy on 14 September either. Enemy tried to advance on Chawinda on two axis, each with one infantry brigade and one regiment of armour. These two axis were Road Phillourah—Chawinda and railway line Sialkot—Chawinda. Pakinstani troops had formed a sort of crescent with Chawinda itself jutting out as the star poised between the two tips of the crescent. The Sitara-oHilal dispositions worked. The Indians battered against Chawinda from the front and from the left but made no headway. Every little move meant more and more casuatlies to them. The air on both sides remained active and Pakistan Air Force, as usual, had the upper hand. On 15 September the tank to tank battle was further intensified.

1 Armoured Division was waiting behind 6 Armoured Division to wind up this clash of steel, the moment the initial fury of Indian onslaught subsided. Lieut General Bakhtiar Mohammad Rana SPk, SQA., M.C., the Corps Commander and Major General Sahibzada Mohammad Yakoob Khan, who had just taken over the command of 1 Arm Div., had so located the forces in this sector as to deliver crushing blows to the Indians once they entered the killing ground. The Indians had been lured inside the crescent and surprisingly, they had not been able to push aside, even the farthest point held by 24 Infantry Brigade.

At 1430 hours, the Indians launched the third of their abortive attacks that day. By the evening the enemy had lost about 30 tanks and had started withdrawing. It appears that this was either meant to be a ruse or a withdrawal without sanction from higher headquarters as immediately after last light the Indians started coming forward again. This again was infantry—tank combined attack. Pakistani troops fought back heroically and the enemy attack was repulsed once again. The GOC had, during the day, asked the Corps Commander to be given 4 Armoured Brigade but the latter was confident that the existing troops would be able to stop all enemy efforts to break through. He intended using the 1 Armoured Division for the offensive operations the moment it was clear that the Indians had committed all their reserve formations

in this Sector. After this battle, the GOC in consultation with the Corps Commander, carried out a certain amount of reorganisation of the forces on the following lines :—

19 Lancers and 10 (SP) Field Regiment were deployed to cover the gap between Chawinda and Jassoran.

Locating Battery was moved to 15 Division Area.

1 FF and 7 FF were placed under command of 1 Armoured Division for offensive operations.

16 September proved the correctness of the forecast that enemy will try to push his armour through the gap Chawinda-Jassoran. He had not realised that behind this gap, he would meet stiff opposition and was likely to be sandwitched in this narrow gap.

The enemy attack came opposite the gap formed by the triangle Bhagowal-Badiana-Chawinda.

15 Infantry Division was ordered by the Corps Commander to exert pressure towards Bhagowal and 4 Armoured Brigade was warned to be ready to move into battle area when the situation demanded. In the meantime the battle progressed in an extremely fierce manner in the area around Jassoran and Badiana. The triangular formation had helped in luring the enemy forward and Chawinda defenders, the men of 24 Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier Malik Abdul Ali rose to the occasion. The enemy was allowed to bye-pass even the town of Chawinda from the North-West and reach Chawinda Railway Station. Such havoc was caused to the Indian armour and infantry in this narrow triangle as has rarely happened since the battles of Flanders in the First World War. The ground was literally piled with dead bodies. Three Indian battalion commanders lost their lives in trying to reach Mile Stone 5 behind Chawinda. It must be said to the credit of the Indian Army that they fought with commendable courage and determination on this day. The W/T message to the first battalion commander who pushed his way upto within a few hundred yards of the road was rather interesting. It had said "Get Mile Stone 5 and Maha Vir Chakra is at your feet." This brave soldier died within a few hundred yards of the Mile Stone in question and was decorated posthumously.

Two more battalion commanders followed in his footsteps and gave their lives a little to his rear. The battle raged. The Indians coming in wave after wave and the Pakistanis determined to shoot to kill inspite of devastating artillery fire directed at their hasty dug in positions. The Commanders in the rear, at GHQ and Corps H.Q., must be given due credit for the correct evaluation of the position.

There was no panic. They did not deploy any unit or any formation unnecessarily. They had confidence in their men and their commanders in the field. They knew that material superiority and large numbers do not always decide the outcome of battle. Inspite of the determination shown by Indian troops it was throughout clear that they would have to be far better men, than they were, to overcome the spirit of Pakistani soldiers. As one Pakistani Company Commander said, "It was a sight to remember all one's life and to get inspiration from it always." By the afternoon, the battle was over. Chawinda stood where it was with the same men in control of it. The Indians left behind them over two thousand dead and a large number of prisoners.

17 September should have been used by the Indians for licking their wounds but it appears that they still had fresh troops to push into the furnace that Chawinda was. It had become a matter of prestige with them. They attacked Chawinda at first light but failed to make any headway. The place was too hot for them. They tried to get into the gap between Butar Dograndi and Janewal and gave to19 Lancers a good opportunity to do some good shooting. Then two squadrons of enemy armour tried to attack Chawinda from due west. This move was halted by 25 Cavalry and the artillery. The Indians withdrew, leaving a Centurian intact, five destroyed and 5 PsOW behind, belonging to 17 Horse. 1 Indian Armoured Division had, by now, been completely disorganised and its morale was at the lowest ebb. The shortage of infantry in this Sector had been felt acutely by Pakistani Commanders. 20 Baluch was as a result placed under command 6 Armoured Division and 6 FF which had arrived in Daska was also ordered forward.

The Indians changed their tactics on 19 September. Instead of putting in concentrated heavy attacks, they started attacking scattered village localities with small integrated groups and at the same time, continued shelling the whole area throughout the day. These small groups, however, did not achieve anything. In actual fact, this piecemeal use of troops cost them greater losses, both in men and in the area already under their control. 6 Armoured Division launched a limited attack and cleared the enemy out of Batur Dograndi, Sadreke, Mundeke Berian, Jassoran and Fatehpur. Chawinda was also attacked by the Indians but its defences withstood the onslaught as usual. The whole area south of railway line was also cleared of the Indians.

The Indians turned to infiltration tactics during the night 18/19 September and met a certain amount of success in the initial stages. They managed to recapture Jassoran and infiltered through a number of gaps under cover of darkness. This, in the end, cost the Indians very heavy losses. Early next morning these isolated groups were surround-

ed and heavy casualties inflicted on them. In addition 4 Officers, 4 JCOs and 54 Other Ranks were taken prisoner. The Indian High Command had spread a false propaganda that Pakistanis did not take prisoners. This proved very costly to them in manpower. Their men as a result of this propaganda, were reluctant to put up their hands but once the fact became known that Pakistanis had no intention of undertaking the impossible task of killing the million strong Indian Army, they started coming forward to be taken as prisoners of war, not only willingly but at times with keenness.

The artillery, throughout the battle on this front, had taken heavy toll of enemy infantry and armour and many times Indian concentrations had been broken up merely by well directed artillery fire.

Jassoran, which had been taken by the Indians during the night, was attacked and captured by 1800 hours by A coy 7 FF under Maj Abdul Rabb Niazi. In this action alone 4 enemy tanks were captured intact and 13 were destoryed. Heavy causalties had also been inflicted on the enemy. In addition to dead and wounded, the Indians lost 35 men as prisoner of war, in this action. Enemy air was fairly active during 19 September and so was Pakistan Air Force chasing them away every time they appeared on the scene.

Early morning on 20 September the Indians launched a half-hearted attack. It appeared later that this was merely to cover their withdrawl from positions badly threatened by our forces. They suffered casualties as a result of this attack and 8 prisoners were taken. The Indians launched an attack on this day on the front of 15 Infantry Division also but they were successfully repulsed.

The Indians carried out a limited attack on 21 September against Fatehpur, held by 20 Baluch, but withdrew leaving behind six destroyed tanks and a few prisoners. The enemy air straffed our forward positions causing a few casualties. Efforts were made to clear Alhar of enemy early in the morning but did not succeed. The place was fairly heavily held.

On 22 September, activity was confined to artillery dual. The Indians withdrew from a few villages after burning them. 19 Lancers destroyed a few enemy tanks in Alhar but no large scale move was undertaken.

The C-in-C visited this front and decorated some of the officers and other ranks, who had earlier distinguished themselves during the fighting in this area.

The cease-fire talks had made any counterattack a matter of untimely wasted effort. 23 September, as a result, was also a quiet day. The Indians confined their activities to heavy artillery shelling but made no move forward. One enemy patrol fell into our hands and was captured with its officer.

The battles of Chawinda will remain as events of great magnitude. Chawinda showed to what heights human courage and determination can reach. It was, throughout a trial of strength, not material alone, but spiritual as well. It was also a test of soldierly qualities, of training, of discipline and in general the knowledge of The Art of War.

CHAPTER XII

SIDE SHOW THE SULAIMANKI

The defence of Sulaimanki Sector was the operational responsibility of 105 Infantry Brigade located in Bahawalpur. When the situation became tense in early September, the Brigade Group moved into the its defence localities on 5 September.

The Brigade Commander, Brigadier Mohammad Akbar decided not to give the Indians an opportunity to take the initiative in their hands. He decided to attack Sadiqa and Jhangar, the moment it was known that the Indian Army had invaded Pakistan. The task was allotted to 10 Punjab. Opposite them was an Indian Brigade Group supported by a squadron of medium tanks.

The attack was mounted at 1820 hours on 6 September. It was led by Major Hikmatullah with one company 10 Punjab and a platoon of the Rangers. The Indians tried to bring in all the fire at their disposal but only for 5 to 10 minutes. At the end of this short burst of activity, they left their posts and all their arms seeking safety in flight. Four of them were taken prisoners, a few were killed and the rest escaped. There were no casualties to our troops.

The other objective decided upon, for the closing hours of 6 September, was Jhangar. D Coy, 10 Punjab, under command of Major Mohammad Aslam Janjua attacked this objective without any pre H Hour shelling. Here the Indians put up better resistance. Hand to hand fight ensued and grenades had to be used to ferret them out of their bunkers. The Indian casualties inside the bunkers were large including the company commander of the area. The remaining Indians fell back to a discarded kiln in the vicinity but were chased out of this position also. Hand grenade had to be used once again. A few only were able to get away. The Indians left 19 bodies in the kiln. 3 prisoners were taken. The second phase of this attack was a small post in village Noor Mohammad. This proved to be an easy affair. A platoon was able to deal with this post.

The objective given to the 10 Punjab had been achieved but the Commander Lt-Col Amir Hamza Khan was tempted to keep up the momentum of the advance and continued upto village Pakka which had been kept for the final phase to be undertaken by 4 Punjab. This unscheduled attack brought about, as it should have done, the situation which often happens and its recurrence cannot be avoided under such circumstances. The battalion became a target of our own artillery and enemy MMG fire simultaneously. The battalion commander was quick to appreciate the situation and at once halted the battalion advance. Although dark he quickly managed to reform the battalion and left enough room for 4 Punjab to carry out their share of the task.

4 Punjab had done a march of 16 miles to reach the battle positions that very morning but the news of Lahore having been attacked and they so far away, was enough to redouble their determination to avenge the losses which they thought, their companions must have suffered at Wagah and Gawandi.

The attack of 4 Punjab was led by C Coy under Major Mohammad Abdul Rashid. They left their positions at 2200 hours. The movement had perforce to be slow as the enemy positions were behind waterlogged area. The deeper portions of the Sem lake were waist-deep but they waded through it under heavy small arms and mortar fire and by 2230 hours the enemy had evacuated Pakka village also. Five prisoners were taken. The major portion of the enemy had disappeared in the dark. 4 Punjab had only 4 ORs wounded.

One could not expect the Indians not to retaliate. They started shelling our positions early next morning, 7 September, and continued this economic method of retaliation throughout the day. Pakistani positions had no overhead cover but fortunately there were no direct hits. The hidden hand of Providence directed all the shells to fall in open spaces between the trenches. As night approached the intensity of enemy shelling increased. The patrols reported enemy concentrations near Gurmukh Khera. At 2000 hours, a battalion of Indian 14 Punjab Regiment, composed of Sikhs, put in an attack on A Company of 4 Punjab. This company behaved in an extremely cool and calm manner. It showed very high quality of fire control. The Sikhs were allowed to come right upto the middle of the company position. The Indians saw the villages ablaze as a result of their shelling and were happy to have reached the objective without any opposition. In their joy they sent up their success signals. The Very Lights showed them up as nothing else could have done and they received well aimed rifle and LMG fire from very close quarters. This sudden volley of small arms fire in the middle of rejoicing, produced the shock effect, which in other circumstances, thousands of artillery shells could not have done. The Indian commanders, were shouting orders in vain:—

"Take Position"

"Charge"

"Hamala Karo"

"Jai Hind"

All these calls were of no avail. The men could think of nothing except their safety. They ran back as they had seldom run before. The Indians reinforced this sector by 67 Indian Infantry Brigade but did not venture


to attack our positions until after the Cease-Fire. 1 Baluch was planning its further attack on 15 September, when it was pulled out of this sector. 4 Punjab was relieved by 22 Punjab, a newly raised battalion, mainly composed of retired soldiers.


105 Infantry Brigade, inspite of its numerical inferiority, kept up pressure on the Indians and was able to reduce a number of small posts one by one. By the time Cease Fire was agreed, this brigade had at least 30 Indian villages under its control and had succeeded in capturing over 150 square miles of Indian territory.

The Indians tried hard on 25 September to recapture the territory, they had lost, but had to sit quiet after the unpleasant experience of 3/9 Gurkhas, who apart from heavy casualties in dead and wounded, lost 5 tanks and 2 officers, 4 JCOs and 45 ORs as prisoners, during only one night's operations. The Indian Brigadier came forward the next morning and requested for stopping the battle which he himself had started. His request was agreed to as he promised not to attack again.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SHIFTING SANDS OF RAJPUTANA





A Pakistan Army soldier on duty at Munabao.

Sind was the second front opened boastfully by India, when a company of Indus Rangers in Gadro village, was attacked by an Indian battalion and two squadrons of armour. The Rangers halted the advance for over three hours but being outnumbered and not having any A/Tk weapons, had to withdraw. The Indians occupied the village with all the fanfare that All India Radio and the Indian Press could make. The idea was clear. The move fitted into the Indian Strategic Plan. As the BBC announced, "Indian troops are meeting no resistance and have captured the town of Gadro, six miles over the border. They are now said to be advancing on another town called Khokhrapar,15 miles further on. This new front is in desert country as a route towards Pakistan's most important cities—Hyderabad and beyond that Karachi, which is about 200 miles from the frontier. And with this new assault, fighting is now going on between the two countries in five sectors spread along some 850 miles of border. This extending of line will help India, which has far more infantry divisions to deploy along it than Pakistan......"[1]

The real object of India in opening a large number of fronts and trying to grab as much of territory as possible, has been explained earlier, but as elsewhere, her troops were not destined to succeed in their efforts. The march to Khokhrapar remained, as to many other places, only an arrow mark on the maps in Army Headquarters India. It never was allowed to materialise.

In pursuance of instructions from Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, 51 Infantry Brigade, (2 inf bns, 18 Punjab and 8 FF) had moved from Karachi on 5 September and were getting into their battle locations when the Indian invasion came.

Commander 51 Infantry Brigade, Brigadier (now Maj General) K.M. Azhar Khan, asked permission to undertake offensive operations instead of waiting for the Indians to attack Khokhrapar. GHQ were reluctant to let this brigade disappear into the vastnesses of Rajputana desert but permitted the undertaking of a limited offensive. The town and railway station of Monabhao was the nearest Indian target. It lay six miles inside Indian territory and was being used by them, as railhead, for the desert campaign in this area. It was held by a battalion of Mahratta Regiment and three companies of RAC.

The pre-attack shelling was undertaken on the evening of 9 September by a troop of mortar battery. There was not a great deal of ammunition to be used but the Indians needed even less to evacuate their positions. Only 17 rounds were fired. 18 Punjab put in an attack on 10 September but the Indians did not wait long enough to fire the mortar shells they had stacked near their mortars and fled.

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1. BBC, 8 September 1965, 1915 hours.

The Indians as usual, denied the fall of Munabao and did not admit until foreign correspondents had visited the place. The Indian casualties in this encounter could not have been very heavy and their running away cannot be explained, except that, their soldiers from the south of India, had no sympathy with the war which was of Northern India's making.

The next place to fall, on 13 September, to 51 Infantry Brigade was Panchilla, pronounced like Panchshila. The men, a company of 8 FF, who captured this post had better luck. The Indian put up better show. The result was that, one JCO and 33 ORs were captured in addition to a number of Indians killed. The quantities of rum found among the rations left behind by the Indians, spoke well of the minute care given to proper logistic support of the army, in this sector, by the Indian High Command. D Company of 18 Punjab, commanded by Major Mohammad Taj, put in a well directed attack on Shakarbu Post on 15 September. The enemy was holding the post with one company and was well entrenched. The Indians put up a fairly good fight but did not wait for the final charge. They left a number of dead and the trenches were found to be well stocked with ammunition, rations and rum.

Kharin Post was close by and as movements of men and vehicles were observed it was decided to capture that post as well. The day was still young; it was only 1500 hours, and the men were keen for another dash forward. They were not very fortunate. The Indians sensed the attack and when the company reached the enemy position, it found plenty of rations but no Indians. They had left in a hurry.

The Indians, however, came back and launched a counterattack, supported by tanks, at 1730 hours. The platoon commander of the forward-most platoon, Subedar Mohammad Elias handled his platoon in a superb manner. The two leading tanks were destoryed by one round each of RR which discouraged the others. The counterattack gradually slackened and by 1945 hours the Indians started breaking contact and eventually retreated, having suffered fairly heavy casualties.

A Company 8 FF, commanded by Major Aqil Dad, raided the enemy position in the area of Jaisandar on 17 September. The information must have been incomplete. It was thought that there was hardly an enemy infantry battalion at this place. It, however, turned out to be occupied by the entire 30 Indian Infantry Brigade, consisting of 3 Guards, 1 garhwal and a Border Police battalion. The raid was a complete success. The outer cordon was broken through and two Indian companies badly mauled. This forced the Indians to put in a number of counterattacks, on the positions held by them, a little while ago. Indians suffered, as a result, very heavy casualties. The company commander, although wounded earlier on, continued to exercise control, and withdrew his company after a good day's fight.

The next target was Roheri. By then the local Mujahids, Hurs—Free men, had joined the ranks of Pakistan Army as volunteers. An infantry patrol aided by Hurs raided this post. The Indians put up better resistance at this post but eventually evacuated it. Initially it was not meant to occupy Roheri, but as it appeared to be an ideal base for deep patrolling and raiding the Indian posts in the rear, it was occupied and made good use of until the end. The Hurs loved this sort of task. They are born fighters and an extremely disciplined body of men. They obeyed orders as if they had spent a lifetime in the army and were perfect sportsmen. They refrained from looting and burning or shooting after the enemy turned his back. It was against their code of conduct in battle. The country was also suited for deep raids. Rajputana, in this part, is a vast desert, full of sand dunes, dotted with occasional stretches of undergrowth but has very little water. It is fairly hard soil in places but mostly there are soft patches and M.T. movement is not easy. Troops used to long marches alone can operate in it. The Indians do not seem to have chosen the ideal troops for this area. They had:—

5 Maharatta Lt Infantry from Maharashtra ..	30 Indian Inf Bde
3 Guards (a mixed unit)	—do—
1 Garhwal (from swampy area of Terhi Garhwal)	—do—
6 RAC (a mixed unit) ..	—do—
7 RAC (a mixed unit, with a sprinkling of locals)	—do—
4 Maharatta Lt Infantry from Maharashtra ..	85 Indian Inf Bde
17 Madras (from Madras)	—do—
13 Grenadiers (a mixed unit—Camel borne) ..	—do—

51 Infantry Brigade, had to undertake the major portion of its fighting after the Cease-Fire, when the Indians launched a major offensive all along this front to avenge their past defeats. It resulted in some severe battles but except adding to the number of their casualties the Indian did not achieve anything. They lost 5 officers, 3 JCOs and 50 ORs as prisoners in the battle of Sundra alone. 8 FF commanded by Lt.-Col G.M. Janjua despatched a company to defend it against the Indian attack by 4 Maharatta Lt Inf. They, not only drove them back but also having inflicted heavy casualties, stopped them from coming forward again.

The invasion of Pakistan through Rajputana, the additional front opened with a great deal of shouting from the house tops subsided like a bubble during the war and burst like a volcano after the Cease-Fire but settled down once again. Let us hope that India learns to live in peace in future.

DESERT FORCE

The Desert Force consisted of a few companies of West Pakistan Rangers and Mujahids—The Hurs of Sind. They were allotted the Sector opposite the Indian State of Jaisalmir. Their task was to protect the L of C Lahore-Karachi in the area of Rohri and Khairpur and stop any aggressive move by India in this Sector.

The Indian Forces opposite this small but determined band of men were Rajistan Armed Constabulary and units of Indian Army supported by light and medium artillery. They had also a sprinkling of horse and camel cavalry units.

The Indians started the war in this Sector on 8 September, thus trying to coordinate their efforts with the attack into Sind, against Gadro. Their attacks were not allowed to materialise and in fact they were pushed back.

Desert Force retaliated soon after and attacked Tannot post. The lack of artillery support, did not permit the attack to go in which was, therefore, called off.

The Sector, however, received reinforcement in the shape of 23 FF, a newly raised battalion, from amongst the Army Reservists, and a mortar battery. This made all the difference and the Desert Force was ready to go to the offensive.

The main battle in this Sector was at Sadhewala but this happened after the Cease-fire. The Indians suffered heavy casualties in this actions and it stopped their inching forward movement which, as elsewhere, they had started after the Cease-Fire Agreement.

The Sands of Rajputana are soft. The heavy footed elephant that India is, cannot make much progress in such soil. They blame Rajputana and the Indian High Command has constantly grumbled that its sands are shifting and its loyalties ever since partition tend to vacilate. Whatever be the reasons, the Indian advance through Rajputana, although ushered with the loudest beat of drums and trumpets did not materialise. It bogged down in the "shifting sands of Rajputana", because they are too heavy footed to tread on it, much less march across it.



A view of the Kishangarh Fort in Rajistan after occupation by Pakistan Forces.

CHAPTER XIV

THE EASTERN BASTION OF PAKISTAN STANDS FIRM

As mentioned earlier, the lack of aggressive action on the part of India against East Pakistan when invading West Pakistan, was the result of two major factors. First was the reluctance of India to fight the war on two fronts simultaneously. Many a ruler of Delhi in the past had got bogged down in the riverine areas of East Pakistan. India, therefore, did not wish to be caught in East Pakistan, while still fighting in the West. The danger of losing the war was too great to tempt the over cautious Indian mind to embark on such a hazardous campaign, while the bulk of Pakistan Army in the West had not been dealt with.

In addition to Indian High Command's reluctance to fight a war on two fronts was the second reason which was the inappropriate season for fighting in East Pakistan . By avoiding a head on clash in September, in the East as well, India was postponing the fight to the proper campaigning season there which is from November to February.

The fear of Chinese reactions could not have influenced the Indian decision. Pakistan is one sovereign state and East Pakistan is an integral part of it as much as West Pakistan. After defeating Pakistan in the West, India could not have been expected to recline back and avoid marching into East Pakistan for fear of reactions from her northern borders. The lack of activities was not total abandonment of the idea of invading East Pakistan but a mere postponement of it. Mr. Chavan's statement that, "India did not wish to extend the present conflict to East Pakistan unless compelled by Pakistan",[1] had no meaning. The emphasis on "Present" conflict is meaningful. Mr Chavan could always turn round and call the invasion of East Pakistan as the result of a new conflict. As a matter of fact Mr. Chavan was more specific in his very next remark when he added, "*At the Present Moment*, I do not visualise on taking any action to escalate the war in that field..........."[2] He never said that they had no plans whatsoever to invade East Pakistan. In reality the campaigning season for East Pakistan had not yet arrived.

14 Infantry Division, Commanded by Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan, was responsible for the defence of East Pakistan. It had two infantry Brigades under it:—

23 Infantry Brigade located at Jessore

53 Infantry Brigade located at Comilla

Although the Indians had been making threatening moves since the end of August 1965, East Pakistan garrison had not undertaken any defensive precautions as a result of instructions to avoid trouble as much

1. The Statesman, Delhi, Sep. 9, 1965.

2. Ibid.

as possible. On 4 September GHQ had, along with the rest of the Army, ordered 14 Division also to take defensive positions. These were occupied by the evening of 8 September 1965.

Indian intentions regarding East Pakistan are clear from her use of the Indian Air Force. The Indian Air Force acting in conformity with their plan for West Pakistan, bombed Chittagong, Kurmitola, Jessore, Rangpur and Sirajganj. Except for slight damage to railway track at Rangpur there was no loss of military or strategic nature. The story of punishment given to the Indian Air Force is the subject matter of a separate chapter and need not be repeated here. One can safely say that the small contingent of Pakistan Air Force stationed in East Pakistan rose to the occasion and proved their superiority over the Indians as a combat air force.

The Indians instead of being ashamed of having attacked non-military and non-strategic targets in East Pakistan were proud of this fact and apart from announcing it on the West Bengal Radio, used it as a morale booster in Calcutta and other cities by announcing it by loud-speakers at railway stations and other crowded places. The internationally conscious Indians denied the news on All India Radio while spreading it as much as possible inside India itself. It is always difficult to unravel the Indian mind and guess the underlying motives of such contradictory behaviour. The Indian attitude of blaming someone else is clear from a news item regarding the suspension of trains between the two countries after the outbreak of war. It said, "These Pakistani nationals were unable to proceed to their destinations owing to the suspension of trains between the two countries by Pakistan."[1]

As a further proof of East Pakistan having been included in the Indian Grand Strategic Plan, one can cite the fairly frequent artillery and mortar shelling of Pakistan's forward positions by the Indians.

Ganges, Brahmaputra and Kusiyara flow into Pakistan from Indian territory. These approaches were also the responsibility of East Pakistan garrison. The size of East Pakistan rivers makes them virtual inland straits and to defend these approaches meant turning the Army into a Naval Force, but with the help of Pakistan Navy it was achieved without much difficulty and the undertaking appears to have become very popular with the troops.

A great deal of Indian Goods Traffic between Assam and West Bengal had been dependent on Pakistan rivers. The boats plying inside Pakistan were seized and the personnel interned. This traffic had been a

1. Statesman Delhi, September 9, 1965.

perpetual source of nuisance in the past and the war was a boon in this respect that it has put a permanent stop to this irksome nuisance. The first time Indian ground troops opened fire in this threatre was on the morning of 9 September when the Indian forward troops in Gitaldaha fired with rifles, LMGs and MMGs and in addition fired 30 rounds of 25 pounders. Except one Ansar receiving minor fleshwound there were no casualties. The night 8/9 September had been spent by the Indians in laying mines in front of the bridge at Lalmunirhat. While laying mines they kept firing intermittently with MMGs and 25 pounder guns. It appeared that the Indians were trying to keep the war atmosphere alive until the time for the planned invasion of East Pakistan arrived.

The Indians repeated this performance on 10 September again. Under cover of this spasmodic fire the Indians continued strengthening their defences and military build-up wherever they felt necessary.

The Indian Air Force bombed and straffed Shibganj at 1730 hours but returned without hitting anything of military value. On 11 September the Indian Air Force was again active. It tried to bomb and straff Shibganj airfield at 1000 hours but they were off the target throughout.

The Indian Infantry was also active for a little while opposite Gitaldaha when they fired bursts of LMG and 35 rounds of 3" mortars. They, however, stopped firing the moment Pakistani troops retaliated. The Indians again opened fire in the evening and used 25 pounders also. We suffered one killed and two wounded as a result.

Such intermittent fire became the usual Indian practice. Patrolling was undertaken by both sides but the Indian patrols always gave away their location by opening fire on the slightest noise in their vicinity. This invariably resulted in prompt retaliation by our troops. These activities only ceased when the Cease Fire Agreement came into effect and not before.

The war was as much in East Pakistan as in the West. Due to the nature of terrain, the soil and the rainy season India did not wish to undertake any large scale offensive then. She made it amply clear through both ground and air action that she did not wish to deprive East Pakistan of the honour of fighting side by side with their brothers in West Pakistan.

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The Indians repeated this performance on 10 September again. Under cover of this spasmodic fire the Indians continued strengthening their defences and military build-up wherever they felt necessary.

The Indian Air Force bombed and strafed Shibganj at 1730 hours but returned without hitting anything of military value. On 11 September the Indian Air Force was again active. It tried to bomb and strafe Shibganj airfield at 1000 hours but they were off the target throughout.

The Indian Infantry was also active for a little while opposite Gitaldaha when they fired bursts of LMG and 35 rounds of 3" mortars. They, however, stopped firing the moment Pakistani troops retaliated. The Indians again opened fire in the evening and used 25 pounders also. We suffered one killed and two wounded as a result.

Such intermittent fire became the usual Indian practice. Patrolling was undertaken by both sides but the Indian patrols always gave away their location by opening fire on the slightest noise in their vicinity. This invariably resulted in prompt retaliation by our troops. These activities only ceased when the Cease Fire Agreement came into effect and not before.

The war was as much in East Pakistan as in the West. Due to the nature of terrain, the soil and the rainy season India did not wish to undertake any large scale offensive then. She made it amply clear through both ground and air action that she did not wish to deprive East Pakistan of the honour of fighting side by side with their brothers in West Pakistan.

CHAPTER XV

THE "HUNTERS" ARE HUNTED

Pakistan did not wish to widen the field of conflict started so wantonly by India. If war had been of Pakistan's choosing the escalation of war would not have seemed undesirable to the Government of Pakistan. There had been ample occasions when Pakistan could have thrown in her Air Force into the conflict during the days of fighting in the Rann of Kutch. Indian Air Force had been constantly committing violations of Air Space over Pakistan territory but Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan had held back his Air Force as he was convinced that war was detrimental to both and if reason could not be seen by the fire puffing, blood thirsty and short sighted Indian politicians, he could at least do his best to delay the total war as long as possible. When the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri threatened to fight Pakistan "on the ground of our own choosing". Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan merely warned him of the consequences of such action when he said, "Does he realise that this will mean a general and total war between India and Pakistan with all its unpredictable consequences. How can such a reckless and provocative statement be made by a highly responsible person? If such a situation is forced on us nobody can expect us not to meet the challenge."[1]

India realised that Pakistan would undoubtedly meet the challenge. In fact that was exactly what India wanted. Her eighteen years old desire to bring about Akhand Bharat could only be achieved if she defeated Pakistan. The pace of development in Pakistan was becoming too threatening from India's point of view. The country which in 1947 had started with an annual budget of 800 million rupees only and which according to Indian experts was economically not a feasible state had by sheer dint of courage and hard work become a force to be reckoned with. Given a few more years Pakistan was likely to outstrip India, with the latter's ever-present tendencies towards Balkanisation, which had already started in view of the Uttar Pardesh dominated politics of this heterogeneous subcontinent.

It happend as was expected. When, for the first time India found that the Pakistani troops had started hitting back in right earnest in Chhamb on 1st September, the Indian field commander gave the agreed signal to AHQ India for "a bottle of whisky."[2] This signal was no more secret. The pseudo-warriors of the Indian cabinet had let the cat out of the bag. The intercepted message was reported back post-haste and Pakistan Air Force was warned to be ready for the Indian reception up in the air, befitting their status and importance. The Indian Air Force, as usual, were late in arriving. Their spokesman[3] has given a lengthy excuse but the fact remains that the "bottle of whisky" asked for in the morning arrived rather late in the afternoon.

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1. First of the Month Broadcast, May 65, The Dawn, May 2, 1965.
2. Indian code word for Air Support.
3. Dewan Berindranath, The War with Pakistan, Asia Press, Delhi, 1966, p. 20. and Harvest of Glory, Government of India, Publications Department, p. 15.

Two F-86s and one F-104 which were on a CAP, (Combat Air Petrol), nearby, were directed to meet the Indian Vampires and Canberras heading for Chhamb. Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Ahmed Rafiqui (Shaheed later awarded HJ and SJ posthumously) and Flight Lieutenant Imtiaz Bhatti were flying the F-86s. They both got two Vampires each. The first contact and, in fact, the first bag was very promising from Pakistan Air Force point of view. Vampires were to leave the sky after that. The Indians never used them in combat again. They denied the Pakistani pilots during the next few days opportunity of getting any more kills of this mediocre aeroplane.

Squadron Leader Rafiqui (Shaheed) is no more amongst us to tell us the story of this first combat with our neighbours but Flight Lieutenant Imtiaz Bhatti giving the account of this inspiring air battle said:—

> "Close to the area we descended fast, looking all round and below us for the enemy aircraft. At about this time we also learnt that the C-in-C was flying around in the area in a L-19. We did not see him. We later on discovered that he had left well before we got there. Our search succeeded and I saw two enemy aeroplanes. They were crossing underneath us and I informed my leader about it. He immediately acknowledged "contact"..............Rafiqui said he was going for them......While covering his tail I spotted two Canberras 9 o'clock from me at 5000-6000 feet........Then I spotted another two Vampires trying to get behind him. I instinctly broke off and positioned myself behind these two. In the meantime leader had knocked down one of his two and was chasing the other. About now I had my sight on one of my own and was anxiously waiting for my leader to bring down his second and clear out of my way. When the Vampire on which I had my gun traincd, closed in on Sqn Ldr Rafiqui, too dangerously I called out to him to break left. Within the next moment he shot down his second, reacted to my call and said: "No. 2 your tail is clear". Simultaneously within the same moment I pressed my trigger and hit one of them. Having disposed off one I shifted my sight to the other and fired at him. In the chase I had gone as low as 200 feet off the ground below. When I shot at my second prey he ducked and went into the trees. We had bagged four in our first engagement with the enemey and were thrilled......"

The reason for the Air C-in-C being in the operational area was that Air Operation HQ (Theatre) had appreciated that the Indians would react immediately to our Army's threat in Chhamb sector. Their failure to react quickly appeared strange. The Air C-in-C, as a result, decided to fly over the battle area to gain personal impressions of the battle area. He took off from Chaklala in a T-37, and was piloted from Gujrat onwards by an AOP pilot flying a L-19. Air Marshall Nur Khan then proceeded to the HQs of 1 Corps from where he warned the Theatre HQ (Air) that the interference from Indian Air Force was imminent. As a result the

CAP for the day was extended beyond the normal time laid down for it hitherto. His timely warning enabled the PAF to engage the Indian Air Force although they were so late in arriving on the scene.

In this fight which had lasted hardly a couple of minutes the Pakistani pilots had tasted blood. They were to keep this taste throughout the war. The intensive training had paid high dividends. An Air Force whose C-in-C visits the combat area in a L-19 is too dangerous an adversary for those who are just learning the art of war. While the Vampires were being shot like partridges the Canberras had disappeared. This pilot explains the attitude of all Pakistanis towards war at that time:—

> "We feared lest we should have acted beyond our charter in shooting down the Indians, as we had not been able to get the final clearance from Sector Op Centre. On landing at our Base we met the C-in-C. He congratulated us on our success. We felt relieved that our action had his approval".

It is never good to keep the national Armed Forces under too much restraint. The enemy misinterprets such an action as weakness. "Eye for an eye" is the correct policy when dealing with nations like India.

This little action had a tremendous morale raising effect for the troops on the ground who had already seen the Indian Army on the run. The success of their Comrades in Arms in the Air was a further proof of what determined troops can achieve against superior numbers. Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik who had seen the Indian Vampires going down had at first thought that his machine gunners had done it and as he remarked:—

> "I said jolly good show. But as I looked a little further up. I saw our fighters circling around to spot the Vampires they had shot down. The Vampires were no more and the skies were clear for us. The Pakistan Air Force fighters dived in a parting salute and returned home after a good job done".

As the Army headed towards Jaurian they made a request for a little softening of its defences by the PAF in the morning on 2 September. Two formations of F-86s were detailed. As Squadron Leader Alam said afterwards, "Our mission was successful", there could be no more brief description of the day's activities. There was no opposition from the Indian Air Foce at all. They were still licking their wounds of the afternoon of 1 September. Today the PAF were lucky in another direction. They had spotted tanks moving out of Akhnur. Very soon most of them were in flames and the rest hid under the trees. In addition a number of signal and other vehicles had been burnt by them to ashes. A good day's bag. The next day, 3 September, one of the six Gnats, with it pilot Squadron Leader Brij Pal Singh Sikand, found it prudent to land and

surrender as he had got scared of two F-104s. He landed at Pasrur and spent the remainder of the war in the safety of POW camp. His Gnat was flown into Sargodha on the afternoon of 6 September when the all out war had already broken out and India had taken the initiative for a full war both on the ground and in the air.

There had been action in Chhamb-Jaurian Sector in the meantime. On 4 September three successful missions were flown in close support in the battle area. In the bargain one Sabre was hit by ground fire. The pilot, however, bailed out and was picked up by our own troops. The unfortunate part was that our ground troops had difficulty in distinguishing between own and enemy aircraft and as Flight Lieutenant Amanullah Khan said :

> "Own Ack Ack was a greater hazard for us over the battle area. They were accurate and taking us for Indian raiders, did what the Hunters and the MIGs between them could not, *i.e.* bag a valuable Sabre......"

War so far had been confined to Kashmir itself. The Indians were violating Air Space by coming across international border but Pakistan had been meticulously avoiding the right of pursuit. PAF, however, joined in the kill at Jaurian on 5 September as well. They silenced a good few guns which were covering the retreat of the Indian Army. Two of our planes suffered damage from ground fire in this action but both made the Base safely.

6 September dawned with the Indians stepping across the International Border. The PAF had been informed as soon as the extent of the invasion was clearly known. It was clear that Sargodha Base would be on top of the priority list of targets selected by the enemy. An impetuous senior Indian Air Force officer had once spoken in Chavanian style and boastfully announced during a conversation, "PAF Phooh. It is chicken feed. We will come in a massive raid and give a short shrift to your Air Bases." His next sentence divulged both the Indian intentions and the cause of all trouble between the two countries. He had concluded by saying, "That would be the end of the long outstanding argument—the partition of the subcontinent." The chicken feed was to choke—nay strangle the mighty Indian Air Force.

PAF did not wait for the promised "massive raid" of the enemy and took on a limited task in close support of Pakistan Army on Wagah front. The result was wonderful. The Indians found themselves hemmed in from front and above. The President Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, in his capacity as Supreme Commander, had given an OK to the Air Force to act as the situation demanded. It was no more a

political problem. It was now entirely a military question. The Political Objective of Pakistan was TO DEFEND PAKISTAN. With such an Objective the action of Air Force was clear. To keep the air above the Army clear. This naturally included the safety of all our Air Bases as well. C in C Pakistan Air Force, Air Vice Marshal Nur Khan ended his Order of the Day with the words, "I wish you all success and good hunting."

Two F-104s had gone up in a pre-dawn CAP. Flight Lieutenant Aftab Alam Khan and Flight Lieutenant Amjad Khan were the pilots. They were directed, by their Air Controller, to proceed to Chhamb but half way were directed to Rahwali. Arriving there they could see nothing. The sun was not yet up and they were too high—at 28000 feet. Aftab Alam came down and was able to see 4 Mysteres. What a sight. In no time he had brought down one. The others bolted across the border. Their leader had shouted"Aye boys. Run. It is F-104," and they had all run except one. At 0930 hours the same day the PAF created havoc amongst the convoys coming to Wagah. They were at it for 20 long minutes. There were no enemy interceptors. Rumours say that hundreds of lorries filled with civilians coming to Lahore for shopping in the wake of the would be victorious Indian Army saw the spectacle in front of them and arrived back at Amritsar in post-haste, never to think of such joy rides again.

Close support missions that day all proved very useful. The massive raid on PAF bases had not yet materialised and the Indians little knew what was in store for their own Air Bases by the time the day ended. The C in C, PAF had laid on and ordered pre-dusk fighter-bomber strikes against Indian Air Bases at Pathankot, Halwara and Jodhpur, to be followed by post-dusk strikes by Bombers against them. Protvidence helped them. Visibility could not be better. The leader of the Sabre strike mission over Pathankot saw on the way out, 2 Gnats who, however, had not spotted our planes and went their way. As Squadron Leader Haider said, "The airfield lay sprawled below us, offering everything it could boast of neatly laid out on a plate." All the aircraft pulled up and let the Indians have what they deserved. They all made three attacks each although only two had been planned. There was no interception except a rather late collection of wits by A/A gunners. The bag by conservative estimates was 7 MIGs, 5 Mysteres, 2 C-119s and the Air Traffic Control buildings were damaged. Good shooting by all counts. All returned home safe with one aircraft damaged by ground fire.

Adampur and Halwara were also visited by a mission to each place. By the time they could scramble the surprise element in the midst of the rush, had been lost due to the successful attack on Pathankot. Both

missions were well received. At least to the best that India could lay on and that also much ahead of the target. In the very first encounter, of the mission to Adampur, the leaders F-86 brought down the Hunter which was going for him. The guns of one of the Sabres got jammed. The third, piloted by Flight Lieutenant Hatmi, took on the second of the two Hunters that had first appeared. Suddenly a second pair appeared and Flight Lieutenant Hatmi turning round got one of them. The other two ran for their lives and disappeared. Hatmi's plane had been hit, in the air battle, but he got back safe. On their way back Squadron Leader Alam had one more kill and damaged another Hunter whom fate had brought across their path. The damaged Hunter was piloted by the son of the Indian Vice President, Zakir Hussain, who was given by the Indians a Vir Chakra for bringing home a badly damaged aircraft.

The other team, the one given Halwara mission, had a similar story to tell. It was nearly 1800 hours when they reached their target. Visibility had deteriorated to "poor" so they had to come down to 2000 feet. They could not see much even then so they returned but on their way back the three of them were challenged by ten Hunters. They came in twos. 3 to 10 were the odds. The result was, 4 to 2 kills in favour of PAF but it was unfortunate. The guns of the leader, Squadron Leader Rafiqui (Shaheed), SJ had jammed and he instead of racing home kept in the combat area. This brave soldier of his country, who had been the first to open an account with the Indians sacrificed his life when he had a chance of escaping but that would not have been in accordance with the traditions of his country and his people. In fact he would not have been true to himself. His citation included this sentence, "The end for him was never in doubt. He chose to disregard it and in the process his aircraft was shot down and he was killed but not without his action enabling this formation to shoot down three more Hunter aircraft."

B-57s were not left out that first eventful day. Six of them took off a little after 1700 hours for Jamnagar. Flying over Mandvi and Bhoj they went down to 50 feet Above Ground Level (A.G.L.) The light house at Mandvi proved a helpful navigational aid. By the time they finished the place was ablaze and in complete shambles. The Indians had been surprised. Their interceptors had no time to get off the ground. Even the A/A-fire was not in evidence. The return journey was no problem. Darkness had closed in and the mission having completed there was nothing else for them but to fly straight home.

They went the second time and then the third time. Fatigue was not even thought of. The elation of doing the job and killing the enemy was too great to let them feel tired. Squadron Leader Shabbir Alam Siddiqui and his navigator Sqn Ldr Aslam Qureshi unfortunately failed to return from their third mission.

When the third mission was returning they found Mauripur under enemy attack. The Indians did not do any damage in this raid but then they never came too close. Our A/A guns kept them at a distance.

Another flight of B-57s had gone to Adampur. They took-off at dusk and the journey was in complete darkness. This made it difficult to maintain contact within the Team. A famous identification point en-route helped them to orientate themselves and on they went. Ten minutes more to the target was not much and then the anxious moments were over in the heat of action. The sight of the lit up airfield was very bracing and a matter of great joy. The blaze caused by the leading B-57 helped the others. The Indian A/A was busy but that did not matter. It was Indian A/A after all. The remaining two of the team went into the dive one after the other. When high above again they were over-joyed to see the results of their first encounter with the Indians. The results were far above expectations. One of the planes had been hit by 40 mm A/A but that is all in the game. They all returned safely by 2100 hours. Squadron Leader Najib Ahmed Khan, the leader, later said :

> "That gave us enormous confidence; we suddenly felt like seasoned warriors. The night yet young and the spirit impelling, we looked forward to another mission, which was assigned, a little after midnight."

Due to certain inevitable delays the flight took off again on the second mission at 0400 hours. There was heavy A/A fire but they dropped 32 bombs between the four of them. The result could not be seen due to pitch darkness. They were back safely before day break.

Yet another formation of B-57s went to Pathankot that night. They took off at 2100 hours. The enemy A/A "returned the compliment" as the leader, Squadron Leader Akhtar, pulled the bomb release button. It was a heavily defended airfield but they all returned safe.

Halwara had escaped chastisement until after midnight. One of this team, Flight Lieutenant Alvi, on return from Pathankot took off for Halwara. He took off at 0340 hrs and successfully delivered PAF's compliments to Halwara which took the attack very meekly. Having kept awake the whole night in the expectation of the fall of Lahore, the Indians seem to have dozed off, including their A/A gunners.

The Indians attacked Rawalpindi also that night a little after midnight. They did not wish to be left behind whether they achieved anything or not. The attack on Rawalpindi was no better and no more fruitful to them than the attacks on Karachi. Minor damages to private property and a few innocent civilian lives was all that they achieved. In a

pre-dawn attack on 7 September, the Indians bombed and rocketed Chittagong, Jessore, Lal Munirhut, Rangpur, Shibganj, Thakurgaon and Kurmitola (Dacca). They just caused a little stir. These attacks from the air were a prelude to something big on the ground if......but then it is impossible to conjecture what would be the shape of the world "If" many great events had not taken place in the world. The Indian "If" of Lahore and Sialkot was not destined to materialise. Hence nothing big took place in the East and these widespread air attacks on East Pakistan were not followed up. The total damage thus caused in East Pakistan was two NCOs of PAF (May God bless their souls). The total strength of PAF in East Pakistan was one Squadron of F-86s, pitted against the formidable line up of IAF at Kalaikunda, Barrackpur, Baghdogra, Hasimara, Gauhati and Tezpur. It was a little precarious but then the fun of fighting is in being adversely placed. There was, however, no intention of escalating the war into East Pakistan until India had taken the initiative. Air Marshal Asghar Khan, who had come to Rawalpindi during the war, while discussing the disposal of PIA aircraft in East Pakistan, jokingly said to the Station Commander Dacca, "Do not start a small war of your own". Indians, as usual, came to our help. As elsewhere, they took the initiative in East Pakistan as well.

Early on 7 September Kurmitola was attacked by two Hunters and one Canberra. We lost, in interception, one F 86, but not through enemy action. The cause could not be ascertained as he crashed chasing the enemy at low level. The moment the attack was over a mission left for Kalaikunda under Squadron Leader Shabbir H. Syed. The strike began by a direct hit on a Canberra by the leader, followed by a number of other aircraft which were destroyed on the ground. The Indian interceptors were in the air but did not dare to come near. The team arrived back safely. Not only that, but in order to press home the attack they went back again a little after 1000 hours. This time the enemy was wide awake. Apart from A/A fire there were at least 12 Hunters in the air to greet them. They went through the attack and then faced the Hunters. The fight was most inspiring. We, however, lost one aircraft and its pilot with it and had another aircraft damaged. The two strike missions, between them, had destroyed fourteen Canberras and two Hunters and had damaged six Canberras and two Hunters. A great achievement by all standard of comparison.

In the West the centre of activity was Sargodha. The hammering given to the Indians on the first day of war, of their own asking, had been so tremendous that they were expected to come and retaliate the next day. The first attack came a little before first light. Out of the six Mysteres that had come two were knocked down. A good beginning for the day, effected by an F-104 Cambat Air Patrol.

The first attack had been a surprise and had given no chance to our interceptors to get air-borne but then it had done no damage either

although a whole bunch of them were lined up on the ramp, all ready to go up. "The enemy", as Alam later said, "was amateurish." The PAF pilots, through the attack, had kept sitting in the cockpits although they had been told to vacate their aircraft.

The second raid failed in achieving surprise and found the interceptors ready for them. Four Hunters were in the lead. Two more came in soon after. In a few minutes the fight was over but four Indians with their reputed Hunters were never to see the light of another day. The pilot of the fifth, Squadron Leader Onkar Nath Kakar, bailed-out and was taken prisoner. One Hunter, out of a total of six, returned home to tell the tale of woe and destruction.

"Pea Nut" Alam had emerged as the Giant Alam of War in the skies, the stalwart standard bearer of the air supermacy of Pakistan.

The third raid came a little after 0945 hours. Our warning system had reported 4 Msyteres heading West. They succeeded in hitting one F-86 on the ground and in damaging an abandoned office building but left behind two of their companions brought down by the A/A gunners.

The last raid on Sargodha, that day, came at 1545 hours. As a result of the warning two F-86s had gone up to receive them. There were only four Mysteres this time. One was brought down having disintegrated in the air and one escaped. The other two were bagged by the A/A gunners under Lt Col Nur Mohammad Gondal. The A/A gunners had also had a good day. They had succeeded in bringing down a total of 4 Mysteres during that day, 7 September 1965. This day was historic. It broke the spirit of the Indian Air Force completely. They did not dare raid Sargodha by day again. The air space over the fighter base for the Air battles of Pakistan was cleared once for all.

On the 7th of September, the Army was not forgotten. A mission of Four F-86s went for an armed reconnaissance in Fazilka Sector and close support over BRB canal and Charwa in Sialkot area. A good deal of damage was done to the Indian Army in both sectors and a number of their vehicles and tanks were destroyed.

Srinagar air field was also visited on this day where three Dakotas were destroyed and damage was done to Air Traffic Control building. During the night B-57s carried out eight attacks on Halwara and two on Jodhpur airfields. In two days PAF had accounted for over 50 enemy aircraft and damaged 8, in addition to any damage done by night bombing and the four Gnats on 1 September. Our loss so far had been ten aircraft, five from enemy action and five due to operational flying accidents.

The Indian attack from Samba on Chawinda was launched on 8 September. Pakistan Air Force joined their brothers in arms of the Army and flying 20 aircraft sorties gave blow after blow to the Indians until they were brought to a standstill through the combined efforts of the Army and the Air Force.

Another mission went to Khem Karan. They created havoc in the Indian lines. One F-86 was, unfortunately, shot down by own A/A fire on Khem Karan front. These gunners earlier in the day had bagged an Indian aircraft and captured the pilot. In the heat of war they had reached the pitch where the trigger is pressed first and questions asked afterwards.

An audacious mission, involving high altitude bombing set out for Jodhpur airfield. They were on the target at 2040 hours, released their bombs promptly and without interception headed homewards. The mission had been a success.

In a pre-dawn strike on 9 September, Jammu-Samba Road was given as the target to B-57s. Tanks, vehicles and concentrations of enemy troops received the early morning plastering at 0415 hours. Enemy A/A tried to intervene but without effect. Another mission of four B-57s went to pay a visit to Jodhpur. It was too attractive a target to be left alone for long.

On 9 September, 7 Canberras paid a return visit to Pakistan and dropped bombs around Risalawala, Chak Jhumra, Sargodha and Awal. No damage whatsoever was done. Their accuracy or may be the will to bring home the attack, was faulty.

That day five Sabre missions went to Sialkot, two to Wagah, two to Khem Karan and nine to Gadro Sector. The bag for the day amounted to 7 Tanks destroyed and 9 damaged ; 76 vehicles destroyed and 8 damaged ; 8 guns destroyed and 7 damaged and 12 railway wagons destroyed. Good shooting by all counts.

Adampur airfield received its share of plastering. Although Indian night fighters tried to chase away the B-57s, they could not interfere and the mission returned safely. Pathankot also was dealt with and inspite of enemy A/A fire they completed their mission successfully.

10 September, in its small hours, saw stray Indian bombing raids in the areas of Risalwala, Chak Jhumra and Sargodha. The word 'areas' is being used because they do not seem to have been aimed at any particular target. From Pakistan side an air patrol led by Squadron Leader Muniruddin had gone to Khem Karan area a little before dawn. A little after his arrival on the target area he was informed of the presence in

the area, of two Gnats by the S.O.C. He asked the S.O.C. to direct him to the Gnats if they had no inclination to come to him. Within minutes he had brought down one of them. The other disappeared. There was no loss or damage to any of our team.

Amritsar Radar Station had by now appeared on the P.A.F. list as an important target. Its exact location had been determined by now. A strong team of 12 F-86s and 2 F-104s was detailed to hit it. The Radar Station was damaged and did not function for at least 15 hours afterwards. In this action two of our F-86s were hit by A/A fire but managed to return to the Base.

The same day the Army in Sialkot Sector received close support from five F-86 missions. The bag that day was not very large. The enemy had time to dig-in and camouflage. The total was 5 Tanks and 10 vehicles destroyed. As one pilot remarked "Business in this Sector was rather dull."

Two close support missions went to the support of Gadro area also. They had more luck. They managed to destroy more than 15 vehicles and 4 rail wagons and create real good confusion and panic.

In East Pakistan the weather had not cooperated with PAF "Indian tail choppers", as the squadron had by now come to be known, for the last two days and also on the morning of 10th September. It cleared a lot in the afternoon and off they went to Indian airfield at Baghdogra. They were, however, disappointed. The airfield had been closed. There were a few machines, one C-119, a Hunter on the alert platform, a Helicopter, a Fuel Bowzer and an unfortunate Vampire taxying along. All were destroyed at leisure. The enemy had nothing there to intercept with or impede the shooting of these sitting ducks. On the way home the team passed over the nearby cantonment of Silligori and gave it a taste of straffing. The mission was successful but most uninteresting. It was too tame and one sided. The B-57s also did their best that day. A number of single aircraft sorties went out to Halwara from last light onwards. The weather, that evening, was bad and due to low clouds only a few of the missions were completed but the few that did, inflicted considerable damage. No damage was done to any of our planes.

A section of B-57s went to support the Army in Sialkot Sector and engaged tank concentrations. It was a delicate mission. The head on clash between the tanks of both sides was on and slightest navigational error could end up in disaster to own troops. At night there is all the more need for accuracy and precision. The first aircraft left at 2130 hours and the rest followed at 15 minutes intervals. When over the target they could not locate the enemy positions. As a result of a brain wave the

leading pilot fired a burst from his gun. The enemy responded at once and gave away the full pattern of his position. They paid heavily for this impetuosity.

Early morning on 11 September, Halwara was also visited by the B-57s but due to some functional faults only 3 x1000 bombs could be dropped. Luck was on the Indian side. No damage, however, was caused to any of our planes, inspite of the usual angry reception by the Indian A/A gunners.

Sargodha was visited, in the early hours of the morning, by six Canberras. They dropped a number of bombs, as they had done a number of times earlier, on the canals. The shining surface of the water appearing only in patches through the trees was probably being mistaken by them for taxi-way, or may be the runways of the airfield. The accuracy on these also was questionable.

The close support by the PAF to the Army in Sialkot Sector proved of immense value. Five missions were sent to this area on 11 September. In all they were able to knock out 14 Tanks and 75 vehicles. In one case they had caught an Indian Tank Unit while they were refueling somewhere in the vicinity of Philaurah. The A/A fire in reply was not effective at all. There were no casualties in any of these missions.

Another mission of F-86s, joined this terrific clash of steel around Charwa. They were unfortunate and could not spot the tanks but managed to find concentrations of Indian supply vehicle which were plastered properly. At least 23 were destroyed.

Wagah Sector was not ignored either. Three missions went to the support of 10 Infantry Division. The bag was moderate here. It comprised 3 Tanks, 3 Field Guns and 25 vehicles of various types.

The Indian Radar Station at Amritsar had come back to life. An F-86 mission was detailed to send it to sleep again. Flight Lieutenant Bhatti in the lead was to draw the A/A fire and thus help the others in pinpointing the target which was well camouflaged.

The Indians had all along co-operated with this arrangement and it had paid good dividend throughout. The formation set out at 0800 hours flying low level all the way. When the leading aircraft was on the target they pulled up. The A/A at once opened up. The target, as a result, became defined and the others in the formations, in the rear, let the Radar site have all they possessed. The Radar went out of action again, but the Indian A/A had succeeded in getting its price. We lost one F-86 and its gallant officer Squadron Leader Muniruddin Ahmad in the bargain.

A mission went to Srinagar but in regard for the UN planes parked there the airfield was spared. On the way back they managed to spot some military vehicles near Gulmerg. Fifteen of these were destroyed. A tragedy happened on this day. Our own A/A brought down a B-57 suspecting it to be the enemy. It was most unfortunate.

Adampur, Halwara and Pathankot airfields were hit on that night again. It had become, more or less, a routine affair. The missions were completed successfully inspite of the enemy A/A. It seemed that they were in understanding with the Indian gunners to shoot at a tangent rather than straight at them.

On 11 September, a Brigade of 1 Armoured Division was moved, by train, during daylight, from Raiwind to Gujranwala. The air sentinals of Pakistan stood guard and the enemy air dared not come near throughout this important move.

12 September was heralded with a heavy bombing attack along the Pathankot—Samba road. They flew low up to Pathankot and gained height after passing it. Thereafter they delivered their lethal load in the area. On the return journey they were troubled by the night interceptors and also enemy A/A but nothing untoward happened. The All India Radio next day announced that PAF had used Chinese four engine bombers for attack in Pathankot Area. Our concentrated bombing must have appeared to them as such. The efficiency if not the ethical sense of Indian Air Force has never been of a high order. The other day they brought down a trainer aircraft of Lahore Flying Club in broad day light and, declared that it was a combat aircraft of Pakistan Air Force.[1]

The Indian Air Force spared Sargodha on night 11/12 September and instead paid a visit to Multan and Nawab Shah. One cannot imagine the reason for their doing so and trying to harass civilian population. It is too far fetched an idea to say that they had lost their way and ended up in those places by mistake. If it was not stark callousness, then it was sheer inefficiency and neither of them do credit to the Air Force of a nation like India. Underneath the desire to hurt civilians could be the urge to create panic all over Pakistan. If this was the case then it would admirably fit in to the Political Objective of India and the resulting Military Objective and Indian Army's Grand Strategy of exterminating every Pakistani and taking over physical control of the territories.

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1. Mulyankar of Hindustan Times had to say, "On the day the trainer aircraft was brought down it was described as a military plane. Air Force pilot who can mistake a trainer mono plane not capable of speeds beyond 150 miles per hour for a military aircraft has no business to belong to the service."

Pakistan Times, February 20, 1967, p. 10.

Lahore and Khem Karan Sectors were also visited by PAF that day. Fighting on both these Sectors had been heavy and the defenders of the skies also got their share of the shoot. They bagged 18 Tanks and over 60 vehicles, damaging a few. The PAF also carried out armed ground reconnaissance tasks in Rajistan Sector. They noticed the Indians advancing on Dali and Pakistani troops moving forward to stop them. The two sides were hardly 6-7 miles apart. They dealt with the advancing Indians to their heart's content and on return informed the F-86 strike mission which was scheduled to follow them, of the location of the enemy. The F-86s that went had a grand time and did a lot of damage to the Indians. These attacks held up the Indian advance considerably and indirectly enabled the Pakistan Army to get ready for their reception on their arrival and throw them back with heavy losses.

The routine bombing missions to Amritsar, Jodhpur, Pathankot and Jamnagar went as usual. The Radar Station at Amritsar had been plastered the night before but the best course open was not to let it get a chance to revive again. The C in C, PAF, Air-Vice Marshal Nur Khan briefed the mission personally. The attack was word perfect. The bombs were dropped in the drill book fashion. The A/A were there, but then, they were always there, playing the tune to the ceremonial march or was it the "retreat" for their own boys. The de-briefing satisfied the C in C who was waiting for them at the Operation Room.

The Jamnagar mission was also successful but as the pilots said, "It was no fun. The place is already in shambles. There was only one A/A gun alive and that too is no more."It appears that after the previous pounding the Indians realised that there was nothing left at Jamnagar to defend.

During the early hours of 13 September, in fact a little after midnight and again at 0330 hours, 10 Indian Canberras visited Lahore and Sargodha areas. Minute enquiries revealed no damage of any sorts.

They had dropped flares in a few places but do not seem to have hit any thing. If the damage was not noticed in Pakistan, in the Indian records the exploits of Indian Air Force ranked as high as stories of Mahabharata. The All India Radio had said, "Sargodha belongs now only to past history. It is no more there on the face of world map." It was not their fault. It was the fault of the attitude of mind which was the creation of the belief that Mahabharata episodes are historical facts and the Machivellian theories of Pandit Kautilya are religious injunctions. Mass hallucination can play wonderful tricks on human societies. Unfortunately there is no known cure for it.

Early in the morning three missions, each of four F-86s went to Sialkot area. The fighting there on 13 September was making very com-

plicated patterns and although rare, it was one of the occasions where Indian Army did close up with the defenders. The PAF had, therefore, to be over-cautious in swooping down on their prey. The bag, as a result, was very modest, 6 Tanks destroyed and 4 damaged and a few vehicles destroyed. Their very presence must have been effective. Pakistani soldiers on the ground had by now got used to the feeling of the very presence of their Comrades, up in the air, and it was the question of, "We will not let you down," being said, in an undertone, on both sides.

The close support drill was excellent. It could not have been better. The pilots were briefed before take-off in great detail. To be on the safe side they always tried to contact the local Army Air Contact Team and get the latest location of own troops before going into attack. In this way our own A/A could be warned of their approach. The PAF had to fly low over own troops and then blast the enemy. Contact with ACT, in the excitement of battle, was not always possible and that was the reason why a few tragic incidents of shooting down of our own aircraft had taken place.

Due to the intensity of the fighting in Sialkot area four additional missions, for close support, were also flown that day. Armed reconnaissances were also carried out but the closeness of the two armies and the extremly accurate fire of own A/A did not permit them to inflict damage to the forward elements of the enemy freely. Gurdaspur Railway Station, the track between Pathankot and Gurdaspur and Pathankot airfield were given a good doze of plastering a little before mid-day.

We lost one plane in that mission and with it a very brave officer, Squadron Leader Alauddin Ahmad, SJ.

The state of Indian Air Force at this time could be judged from some of the intercepts of Indian R/T message. The Indian pilots were found to be reluctant to take on PAF. They put forward various excuses which ranged from low state of fuel, lack of radar contact, imaginary mechanical defects and poor control from their controllers.[1] The PAF found this state of affairs very boring and at times our fighters had to go deep into the Indian territory on the odd chance of making contacts with stray Indian fighters. They succeeded in this wild goose chase but rarely. One such case was when Squadron Leader Muniruddin Ahmad (Shaheed) S.J. had bagged a Gnat on 10 September.

On 13 September a fighter mission went to Amritsar and Beas area. Two Indian Gnats met them. One of them was a good fighter and the boys enjoyed the fight with him. He shook them off his tail twice

1. Indian Armed Forces have suffered from this malady since fighting in Kashmir in 1948. General Kaul in his forth right manner has said, "There were cases where officers got specific orders from their higher commanders but found many lame excuses for not obeying them implicitly". Kaul, op. cit, p. 127.

but Flight Lieutenant Yousuf Ali Khan got him eventually. As Yousaf Ali says :

> "He was a daring good fighter. He deserved the honourable burial the Indian Government gave him."

The other had disappeared immediately contact was made.

Except the attack on Amritsar Radar the B-57s had been used for night bombing only. With the reluctance of Indian fighters to come out for interception it was now decided to use them in day-time also. One of these missions went to Jammu at 1300 hours. They found a number of transporters on the airfield. Not before they went into their second attack did the Indian A/A gunners wake up from their afternoon siesta. They managed to do very accurate bombing and were able to return undisturbed. Although they had been briefed to level bomb the place, the sight of transporters like sitting ducks was too tempting not to have dive bombed them. The transporters burning and a few light aircraft blown to bits "was a sight worth seeing" as the leader put it.

Another mission went to Srinagar airfield and left at 1710 hours. The beautiful Kashmir Valley was woken up by the blast of bombs on runways and other parts of the airfield. An Indian Dakota and a UN Cariban, parked close to it, blew up immediately. The UN aircraft had been spared previously and it had no right to be where it was in the midst of an all-out war. The mission returned back safely.

After dusk it was the turn of Halwara and Adampur to be visited by B-57s. The distribution was, two to Halwara and four to Adampur. The very first two bombs that fell on Adampur airfield were amongst the aircraft pens and the blaze showed that six aircraft were on fire. The second two bombs fell on what looked like a fuel dump. Flames 50-60 feet high leapt up immediately. The flames were still visible when the mission were back about 50 miles from the target area. The mission to Halwara was also able to deliver its bomb load without any interruption.

Having failed to inflict irrepairable damage to Sargodha the Indian Air Force Bombers turned their attention to Peshawar and Kohat on the night 13/14 September. Immediately after midnight the outer belt of early warning system reported 15 Canberras approaching Pakistan. It soon transpired that to-day they were not heading for Sargodha. Rawalpindi and Peshawar were, therefore, warned. The spoof element, 8 Canberras, went off the scene and the remaining seven split themselves into two waves of five and two and headed for Peshawar and Kohat respectively. It looked as a well planned approach so far. The leading Canberra was on Peshawar at exactly 0100 hours 14 September. The

Indians preceded their bombing by dropping flares but even then their accuracy left much to be desired. They damaged a few houses in Garhi Arbab and elsewhere on the outskirts of Peshawar, killing in the process 57 civilians mostly women and children.

If they had been accurate—but then this again is a big "if". They had all that they could wish to destroy on Peshawar airfield that night. God protects those He wishes. Not even a stray piece of shrapnel hit anything material to the defence of Pakistan. The Anti-Aircraft gunners under Major Karamat Hussain spread an excellent umbrella of shells above the air base and that had pushed the raiders over to the cantonment area. They got to Peshawar all right but that was all. Where they failed was the final determination to remain on the target when releasing the bombs and they had forgotten that, that moment really counted most.

The Indian bombers did not come through their mission against Kohat any better. One of the returning Canberras from Peshawar was destoryed by one of the F-104s which were lying in wait for them.

14 September was the day when the PAF in East Pakistan got an other chance from the usual inclement weather. A mission of F-86s went to Barrackpur. Between them they bagged there one C-119 transport aircraft, one Canberra and a Dakota. The Traffic Control building also did not escape their attention. They were allowed to return in peace and all in one piece.

Agartala was the other target that the PAF Dacca visited that day. They were disappointed to find neither any craft on the ground nor the welcoming Anti-Aircraft gunners. The Traffic Control buildings and the barracks were there and there was no reason to spare them. They plastered them with all the lead they had. Later reports from Pakistan Army sources disclosed that apart from the destruction caused, the Indians had to use three trucks to clear the casualties amongst service personnel who had not yet moved out of the airfield.

14 September was the last day when PAF based on East Pakistan went out to harass the Indian Air Force. It was necessary to conserve their energy for unforeseen occasions.

On 14 September the PAF, in the West, supplied six missions for close support and armed reconnaissance on Sialkot Sector alone. Khem Karan Sector was also paid attention to. They spotted heavy concentrations of tanks and vehicles moving forward towards Khem Karan in the vicinity of Valtoha. As a conservative estimate 16-20 Tanks must have been destoryed or put out of action. Two of our Sabres were hit but they all returned safe to the Base. The information of heavy Indian concentration was passed on to the Army which proved useful for

future planning. Another mission while proceeding to their target, on the way, noticed enemy Canberras escorted by Gnats bombing the town of Kasur.

Rajistan also received its share. A mission each of F-86s and T-33 had a good day against gun positions, vehicles and troop concentrations. On this day, 16 September, the ground battle being at its peak, the air battle had reached its ebb. If the Indian plans had been the workofprofessional soldiers and airmen it is inconceiveable that the air operation plan would not have been integrated with that of the Army. To have put in the largest and severest of armour attacks and then have kept back the Indian Air Force seems most curious. If this mistake was not due to political interference as it is unlikely to be, then the only other reason that can be attributed to lack of Indian Army/Air co-operation is professional jealousy between Indian soldiers and airmen.[1]

PAF pilots were keen to undertake close support missions and they carried them out admirably but that did not completely satisfy their professional urge. It was a one sided affair, as there was no Indian Air Force to challenge them and thus liven up the day's work. Squadron Leader Alam, SJ, went out in the afternoon on a wild goose chase into enemy territory over Beas. He was lucky. He came across two Hunters. Af er a good deal of manoeuvring and positional moves and counter-moves he managed to destory them but in the meantime his No. 2 had been claimed by the Indians as the price. The pilot was, however, able to bail out and ended up as a POW. Alam had upto date destoryed 9 enemy aircraft and damaged two. Incidentally, they were all Hunters. He had hunted them down admirably.

The routine B-57 missions went to Halwara and Adampur. Although the weather was not good and due tothe plastering these twoplaces had been given during the previous nights it was considered that a light treatment would be useful to keep the heat on. A mission went that night to Ambala in order not to leave the Indians in doubt that the long arm of PAF could reach out to their very heart.

On the morning of 17 September 6 Indian Canberras visited Sargodha on the usual exchange courtesy call business. They returned home doing no harm as usual.

Ground activity in Chawinda area was also on a limited scale. The enemy attack had come to a grinding halt. Only one F-86 mission was detailed to this front on 17th. It could not see much enemy movement.

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1. Lieut General Kaul appears to have felt some such short coming although his advice is that the Indian politicians, "should not abdicate the political control of war, which of course, they must conduct under advice of their suitable Service High Command." Kaul, op cit, p. 479. He blames the Service Chiefs for the failure of Indian Armed Forces.

Another mission across BRB canal had slightly better luck. They managed to destory 12 troop carriers. Yet another mission of Sabres went to Rajauri area and managed to destory 15 vehicles on an A.O.P. strip at Galuthi.

Gadro area was also looked into. No tanks were visible. They must have been well camouflaged. A goods trains near Gadro railway station had to accept all that the PAF wanted to throw in that area. Two wagons exploded as a result.

Just before midnight Ramgarh received concentrated bombing in addition to destorying some enemy tanks and guns. An ammunition dump and a fuel dump were also blown up.

The Indian Canberras failed to turn up in the early morning on 18 September but PAF visited Ramgarh a second time during this night and delivered further heavy blows.

Ground activity on 18th was slacker than usual. There were very few close support tasks for PAF as a result.

A few sorties went to Zafarwal and Chobara but did not find much enemy activity.

The mission to Khem Karan area had better luck. They found 14 tanks near Assal Uttar and a number of vehicles. Although camouflaged they were spotted and dealt with.

Ferozepur and Amritsar were visited by a combat air patrol of Sabres. They were soon challenged by four Gnats. One to one they took on the fight in earnest. It was both interesting and fruitful. Within a couple of minutes two Gnats went down burning. The other two backed out of the fight. By now the Sabres were also low on their fuel and turned homewards with no damage to themselves.

That night Jamnagar was visited by B-57s, in case it had started reviving and Ambala because the first attack on it had been of the nature of a trial run. Surprisingly Ambala did not greet them with the usual A/A fire. The bombs were, therefore, dropped according to plan without any interference from any quarter. The Jamnagar strike could be included in the undertaking of 19 September as it started after midnight. Jamnagar had not been visited for a number of days and it was felt that a good deal of repairs must have been carried out by now to make it worthwhile to be given another doze of explosives. The anticipation was correct. Not only that, but the B-57s got A/A reception as had not been given by Jamnagar ever before. But after the bombing the pilots had a look at Jamnagar and found that the flames of fires created were also roaring

as never before. Heat had been generated by both sides with equal intensity but the B-57s were luckier. They returned unscathed.

Having had rest the enemy was ready for another try against Chawinda. The world was talking of Cease-Fire and if India could achieve a breakthrough before the finalization of the talks she could trun a deaf ear to the world. Indians must have thought it was worth it. They mounted another large scale tank attack, on the morning of 19 September. This massive atack was beaten back by 0600 hours and the PAF had to hurl into the battle area 36 1000 lbs bombs. This was followed by a starong Sabre attack at day break. They bagged 19 tanks and 6 vehicles and one Gnat as a bonus in the air. He tas one of the four which had started interfering in the close support task. Flight Lieutenant Mayo Dev Vijay succeeded in bailing out and became a POW. Photo reconnaissance missions,were also carried out that day and a mission each hit Ferozpure and Jammu Radar Stations and delivered ective blows.

Jodhpur was on the top of cards for 20 September to be dealt with, by own bombers. There was complete blackout at Jodhpur and to get their correct bearings they droped one bomb when they were sure, of being close to the arifield. The Indian A A gunners played up as usual and gave away their exact locations. The bombers appreciated the gesture and released the remaining bombs on the trrget. A minute later flames were licking the air. A fuel dump had been hit. Halwara also was punished that night. In return, the Indians called with four Canberras. Their effort against Sargodha was no more successful than on previous occasions.

A mission against a Divisional HQ in Silkot Sector was unsuccessful but the two against Assal Uttar and Suchetgarh yielded some results. The achievements totalled only 2 tanks and 21 vehicles.

Since the morning the Indian Air had been active, at intervals, over Kasur, Sulaimanki, Narowal, Gujranwala and Lahore. The F-86s and F-104s had been going out to meet them as frequently as they came but every time the PAF found the skies clear when they reached the area. In the afternoon, however, the fight did take place. The strengths were: PAF 4 Sabres and IAF 4 Hunters and 3 Gnats. The fight was thrilling. After two of the Hunters had gone down with their pilots the Indians quickly disengaged and cleared the battle area. Pakistan had lost one Sabre in this fight but the pilot had bailed out safely within our own territory.

Early on 21 September a mission of three B-57s left for Ambala. The airfield was hit very effectively by all three of them causing a great deal of damage to the runways. The A/A fire was fairly thick but they all seemed to have been bestowed with charmed lives and returned safely.

Jodhpur was also pounded that night by B-57s. The mission was equally successfull. Halwara and Adampur were assigned three bombers each and received full blasts of proper doze on the targets. The Adampur guns were very tame on this occasion. They must have learnt a lesson that to open up against an attacking aircraft also amounts to telling him where exactly you are.

So far the patrols kept in readiness to intercept the retreating Canberras had not succeeded. They always kept low enough to be practically out of range of Pakistani Radars and then climb up and disappear. To night, however, the vigil paid. The control was able to inform the patrol in time. The Canberra as a result was given the chase and brought down on Pakistan's side of the border near Fazilka. The pilot Flight Lieutenant Manmohan Lal was captured by the Army and handed over to PAF for interrogation. His navigator had perished with the aeroplane. The Indians had brought a few guns forward enough on Lahore front and had started shelling Lahore. The PAF were called in and soon the guns stopped firing. Badin received a heavy pounding that morning from Indian Canberras using 4,000 lb bombs. Only half of them had, however, exploded. Except being a tactical surprise the raid did not achieve much as it did not hit anything of military importance. The Canberras had fired rockets as well. A large number did not burst and only two hit a Radar Tower which caught fire. The angry Indians straffed the village of Badin as well. The fire was extinguished fairly soon, before it had done much damage.

During the day Lahore Sector received five Sabre missions. The Indians had again shelled the outskirts of Lahore. They were dealt with properly. The Sabres that day destoryed 15 Medium and 5 Heavy Guns, 2 Tanks and a number of vehicles. The number of casualties inflicted to Indian Army personnel must have been considerable.

Close support was provided to Gadro-Dali Sector during the day. After a spell of a few days luck sided with F-86s in this Sector. They destroyed 3 Tanks, a troop carrier, four ammunition trucks and a few additional vehicles. The attack on Badin took place when this mission had reached Hyderabad on their way back but being too low on fuel they were not able to divert to take on the Indians at Badin.

The last night mission of B-57s took-off on the night of 21/22 September and delivered 21 x 1000 lbs of explosives successfully. No return visists were paid by the Canberras that night.

India had been allowed 15 hour of extension for the Cease-Fire and she used it as a last bid to capture more territory. The hunger for more land is upper-most in the Aryan mind and even when on the verge of ceasing hostilities, the Indian ruling party was over keen to uselesly push

the youth of its nation into unproductive ventures. On the last day the Indian attack on Wagah front was as relentless as on the first. The Pakistan Air Force were given another chance to pounce on these iron clad creeping monsters heading westwards. It was the same spot and nearly the same time where they had started the close support mission on 6 September. As on that day they succeeded in making sizeable number of kills. They destroyed 5 tanks and 12 vehicles.

Another mission of Sabres went to Khem Karan. They were able to destory two tanks, one medium gun and a number of vehicles in addition to straffing troops still in the process of being rushed forward to recapture Khem Karan.

Two tanks and two guns were destoryed by another mission in Attari Sector. The same day the Army A/A gunners brought down Flight Lieutenant Carriapa in Khem Karan itself. He was the seventh and the last Indian pilot to become a prisoner of war. The last day of the war had seen the largest number of sorties, 68 in all, provided by PAF. The last sortie went at 2302 hours. At 0300 hours on 23 September, the Cease-Fire came and put a curtain to the undeclared invasion by India.

"He who rules on the sea will soon rule on land also"

Khairuddin Barbarosa.

CHAPTER XVI

THE INDIAN NAVY'S ROPE TRICK

Be it Army, Navy or the Air Force, it has to be allotted a definite role in the Strategic Plan worked out by those who are entrusted with the defence of the country. The Strategic Plan, as explained earlier, must contribute materially and in a positive manner to the achievement of the Military Objective worked out by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of that country. The Military Objective as we have seen, emulates from the Political Objective decided upon by the Political Leadership or in other words the Government of that country.

Turning to India, we find, that the conduct of the Indian Navy during Pak-Bharat War, appears to be conspicuous for the complete absence of action on its part. The opposition members of the Indian Parliament have given a clue to the reasons put forward by the Government of India for placing the Indian Navy in cold storage throughout the duration of the war of their own chosing. The opposition members, in the Indian Parliments demanded that India must further build up her Navy and strengthen her sea-ward defences. This may have created the impression that Indian Navy was numerically weaker than Pakistan Navy and that may have been the reason why the Indians decided not to risk their meagre Naval forces. A glance at the Naval Forces of the two countries will show their relative strengths.

	Pakistan	*India*
Aircraft carrier ..	—	1
Cruiser ..	*1	2
Destroyer/Frigate ..	7	21
Minesweepers ..	8	7
Fleet Tanker ..	1	1
Submarine ..	1	—
Other Vessels ..	—	16
Fleet Air Arm Aircraft ..	—	80

In view of this obvious superiority in the number of ships at its disposal there must have been strong reasons for the complete inaction of the Indian Navy. The movements of the Indian Navy since 1964 also show that it was well prepared and in fact early in 1965 it was ready for action, at least outwardly.

In march 1964 the Indian Navy was busy in their exercises, off the coasts of Bombay and Cochin, in the area where the enemy could be no other than Pakistan. At the end of these exercises, the Indian Fleet led by I.N.S. Vikrant, the Aircraft Carrier, as the Flagship, cruised around to show the might of India to friends and neighbours of Pakistan in

* Converted to a cadet training ship.

the Persian Gulf, on a friendly goodwill visit. India knew that the ties of this friendship were unbreakable but the Indian Pandits were still following the advice rendered by Pundit Kautilya in 300 B.C. He had said, "The king who is situated anywhere immediately on the circumference of the conqueror's territory is termed the enemy........The king who is likewise situated close to the enemy but separated from the conqueror only by the enemy, is termed the friend of the conqueror".[1]

How sadly is India mistaken in her judgement of the friends of Pakistan. She must understand that honest nations do not behave in the Kautilyan fashion. If ever India finds friends they will be amongst people with the same or at least with Machiavellian mentality and not much reliance can be placed on the expressions of friendship by people of such mentality.

Reverting back to the story of the activities and preparations of the Indian Navy we find that on return from the Persian Gulf cruise the Indian Navy carried out exercises in the Gulf of Kutch. The time and location of these exercises is worthy of notice. It was the year 1964 and as yet there were no ripples or white horses on the shallow and calm waters of the Rann of Kutch. The programme for 1965 was until then known only to the Indian warlords. These exercises were mainly in the realm of Anti-Submarine, Anti Aircraft and Strikes on imaginary Naval Forces, by Vikrant's carrier borne aircraft. The area and type of exercises could have one and only one enemy in the minds of the exercise planners of the I.N. It need not even be named.

Early in 1965 the coast of the Rann of Kutch again witnessed the sailing of the Indian Armada. The Vikrant grounded its aircraft to carry the Army equipment, ammunition and water to the port of Kandla. There were continued Operations in which all the three services participated. The move across the Rann of Kutch was the utimate objective of these operations. If everything had gone according to plans, the advance from the Rann of Kutch to Hyderabad would have taken the Pakistan Army by surprise. This, as we know, did not come off. Then there was the bellicose threat of fighting on the ground of their own choice The question arises that when the war of their own choice at the time and place of their own election did come about why was it that the Indians kept their Navy tied up in their harbours. The answer is that, it had no worthwhile role to play in the scheme and the Grand Strategic Plan worked out by the Indian High Command, or they were not willing to give battle.

It may be asked as to why was it that the Indian Navy had no place in the Indian Strategic Plan. The answer to this question is in the nature of the Political and the resultant Military Objective of India. The fact of

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1. Pundit Kautilya, op cit p. 290.

there being no role for the Indian Navy in the Grand Strategic Plan lends strength to the arguments already given regarding the exact nature of the Indian Objectives, both in the Political and the Military fields.

To recapitulate, as has already been mentioned, the Indian Political Objective was the complete annihilation of Pakistan. This had resulted in the Military Objective of capturing as much territory as possible. The Indian Navy, therefore, had no part to play. It could not sail its ships up the Indus. If it could, it may have been assigned a role. The only other role it could play was to help in grand scale landing operations. This meant the presence of Indian Navy in coastal waters for long enough to provided targets to Ghazi, the submarine that Pakistan possessed. This obviously they were not prepared to risk. There is no suggestion that the Indian Navy did not have the courage to undertake such an operation. The fact was that the surety which the Indian Army had given of its early and certain successes kept, both the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force out of the war more or less. The Indian Air Force was affected only to the extent that it felt it had no reason to fight the war as an Air Force and acted as merely a supporting Air Artillery to the Indian Army but, as far as the Indian Navy was concerned, it had no role whatsoever, and hence it did not plan to undertake any mission at all.

There are certain accepted principles of war and its conduct. There are no short cuts and any nation venturing to cut corners lands itself into immense trouble. There is always a limit, a maximum limit which the Armed Forces of a nation set before themselves after their Military Objective is fixed or finalised. The forces then work out a concept according to which each will fight that war. The Navy or for that matter any other service, cannot put before itself a limit and a concept to which its sister services cannot contribute anything. In other words the role of each service helps to formulate its concept of war but this concept and this role can in no case be of a nature where the role of any of the others will be in the negative. If that happens then it would be better not to have that service at all. The role and the concept of Indian Navy could not have been "No movement out of Indian harbours". This is why it is maintained that because the Military Objective of India was conquest of territory and the Indian Navy was not equipped for it, therefore, it failed to get any role. In the absence of any role it could not have a concrete concept of how to fight Pakistan Navy. That precisely was the reason why it performed the "Indian Rope Trick" and disappeared from the Indian Ocean, a vast sea which the Indian politicians wish to be called as the Indian Lake, although the Indian public calls it the 'Kala Pani'. They will have, in future, to assign a concrete role to the Indian Navy, if their ambitions are to remain as high as in the past. Panikkar, the exponent of Indian sea power, controlling the destinies of the lands bordering on the

Indian ocean, had predicted that, "The future of India will undoubtedly be decided on the sea."[1] The verdict of the war at sea clearly went against India and it is not surprising to find that they also failed in achieving their object on land as well.

To continue the narrative, we find that in the months of July and Aug. 1965 the Indian Navy was out again carrying out exercises with the British Navy. The venue this time had shifted closer to East Pakistan. At the end of these exercises Rear Admiral B.A. (chippy) Samson, the Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet was being feted in Calcutta and was scheduled to dine with GOC Calcutta on 1 September. This function was cancelled and he was ordered to proceed to Bombay posthaste. The attack on Chhamb, in Kashmir, by Pakistan, took place on the same day. How is it that Indian High Command ordered the cancellation of social functions in Calcutta before the event took place and particularly when the absence of Flag Officer Commanding from Bombay did not affect the happenings in Kashmir. His presence near the major portion of his Flotila was, however, necessary in view of the impending invasion of Pakistan and he was ordered to report back to Bombay. If the full scale invasion of Pakistan was not already being planned by India then there was no justification for this action. It appears that the action taken by Pakistan in Chhamb Sector was very timely and considering that India had already made all preparations for a full scale war it was the best defensive move under the circumstances.

The carrier borne aircraft which were earlier in Cochin were also moved to Bombay area about the end of August. We do not wish to read too much in this movement but the fact remains that these little things add up and help in the confirmation of the often avowed intention of the Indian leaders and it is difficult to ignore them altogether.

In this connection one more fact needs mentioning. The following unclassified flash signals may clear certain doubts regarding the pattern on which the Chanakiyan Indian mind worked :—

1st Signal

6/9/65

Flash/Unclass

FROM NAVAL HEADQUARTERS (India)

TO HOLDERS OF INDIAN GENERAL MESSAGES

356. I.G. (.) WAR HAS BROKEN OUT WITH PAKISTAN

061025

1. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, George Allen and Unwin, London, Second revised edition. 1951 p. 15.

2nd Message

6/9/65

Flash/Unclass

FROM	NAVAL HEADQUARTERS (INDIA)
TO	HOLDERS OF INDIAN GENERAL MESSAGES

357. I.G. (.) CANCEL 356 I.G. OF 6 SEPT

3rd Message

6/9/65

Flash/Unclass

FROM	NAVAL HEADQUARTERS (INDIA)
TO	HOLDERS OF INDIAN GENERAL MESSAGES

362 I. G. (.) 356 I.G. of 6 EP WAS ISSUED UNDER THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT PAKISTAN HAD DECLARED WAR (.) THE FACT IS THAT THEY DECLARED A STATE OF EMERGENCY (.) THIS IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION

1207

Was it the War Guilt which was worrying the Indians. May be, but we shall never know. There is one thing certain from the last message. The Indian Navy had not been given a role in this war. The Indian Naval Units were only being informed of a ttate of emergency at a time when the Indian House of Parliament had already given a standing ovation to Chavan, their Defence Minister, when he had announced, with a malicious grin, the invasion of Pakistan by the Indian Army.

The news of Indian invasion of Pakistan was received by the C-in-C Pakistan Navy Vice Admiral A. R. Khan as soon as it was clear what the Indian intentions were. He had been summoned to Rawalpindi to attend the meeting called by the Supreme Commander Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan and to discuss the situation with the three Commanders - in - Chief and the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. C-in-C Navy, before proceeding to Rawalpindi ordered the Naval units to move to their pre-assigned war stations forthwith. By 0730 hours on 6 Sept all the ships had cleared Karachi harbour which was a commendable feat. From then on, until the cease fire, the fleet remained at sea. During the whole of this period the ships were fueled and were provided all forms of logistic support at sea.

In addition, control was immediately taken, of all shipping movement both in East and West Pakistan and all movement between the two wings. The C-in-C, Pakistan Navy also ordered the Chairman, I.W.T.A. in East Pakistan to seal off all river routes used by Indian steamers through East Pakistan and to seize all Indian river craft and their cargo within Pakistan.

The role or tasks of Pakistan Navy had been laid down as :—

First. Defence of the ports of Karachi and Chittagong.

Second. Assist the Army in the Riverine Defences of East Pakistan. This included any operation necessary in direct support of the Army, in East Pakistan.

Third. To prevent any sea borne invasion of Pakistan.

Although the task of protection of our shipping had not been included yet Pakistan Navy had always considered this of vital importance and had included it in its Charter of Duties. As a corollary to this, interference with enemy's Sea Lines of Communication became an additional task.

Pakistan Navy moved out to sea both in the East and the West and undertook the fulfilment of these tasks in right earnest. The very fact that the enemy did not feel inclined to meet Pakistan Navy on the high seas established the fighting superiority of this comparatively small Navy. The Navy continuously kept contact, through various means with any moves that the Indian Navy made. It was noted that as a general pattern the Indian Navy was spread out along the length of Indian coast and was keeping to the ports both along the East and the West coast of India. The training of Indian Military minds seems to have been identical in all the three services. We have noted how both the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force were deployed and in a way scattered, to grab as much as possible, thus bringing about an unusual dispersion of their forces.

The Indian Navy did not disperse in an offensive role but instead dispersed in the defensive role, if we can accept that it had a role at all. What appears to have happened was that when the Indian Naval Staff were told that they had NO ROLE in the war with Pakistan, they felt that in case they were attacked by Pakistan's "superior" Navy they should be able to defend everywhere. This meant dispersion but then the over-cautious Indian mind did not wish to leave any of its numerous ports without adequate cover. Hence the decision to keep a few ships in every port of consequences. One feels the utter lack of military approach to the problems of war by Indian Commanders of all three services. However charitably one may look at the conduct of Naval Operations by the Indian High Command one cannot help passing an adverse judgement

on the poor appreciation of the situation. They made certain assumptions and even when the things did not go according to plans they failed to re-examine those assumptions. The result was as the world knows. No action at all by the Indian Navy. Mankekar the Indian apologist, had to admit that "It must be conceded that the Indian Navy was caught napping". One can feel his reticence to use stronger language.[1]

Whatever the previous thinking, Pakistan Navy found that the sea routes to both East and West Pakistan had to be kept open. This meant the control, direction and supervision of all merchant shipping from and to Pakistan and the inter wing movement of traffic. Without going into the details as to how it was done it can be said to the credit of Pakistan Navy that this task also was fulfilled in an admirable manner. Indian Navy, having either hidden itself in safe havens, or finding the task beyond its capacity did not venture out to interfere in Pakistan Merchant Navy's movements. Pakistan Navy was all allong in a position to completely blockade Indian shipping but did not do so. They wished as in other matters that India should make the first move. One wonders if the Indian inactivity on the seas was not mainly to avoid such a situation. Knowing the Pakistani mind the Indians acted on Chanakyan advice and saved their merchant ships from falling into Pakistani hands by not making the first move. Whatever the reasons for Indian Navy's inactivity and whatever the task allotted to it, the world knows that it failed to protect the Indian coast from attacks by Pakistan Navy.

When the Indian Naval Units failed to move out of their ports for the first two days of war, the C-in-C, Pakistan Navy, decided to provoke them and lure them out. Indian Navy had followed the advice of the Naval historian, Commander Granfell, when he had said, "The belligerent that considers itself weak may fall back on the defensive and keep its main fleet in harbour, avoiding a decisive battle.............." The historian in this case was conscious of the need of tendering advice to the other belligerent also. He had said, "..........Another method of getting a fleet sometimes out of harbour is to entice it out by carrying out some operation which would serve to demonstrate the inaptitude of the enemy navy thereby rousing public opinion in the enemy country to a high enough pitch to force their fleet into activity."

Following this second principle it was decided to carry out a raid on the Indian coast. Dwarka was selected, not because it was the nearest or because it was the tiniest. It was selected for a number of reasons. It held (*i*) Early Air Warning Radar. (*ii*) Radar Guidance Beacon for guiding Aircraft to Karachi. (*iii*) HF/ DF Station guiding the Indian Canberras on to Karachi. There was yet another reason. The place was far enough from Bombay to lure the Indian Navy into the open sea, if it decided to venture out of its safe havens.

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1. **Mankekar, op cit, p. 142.**

Dwarka received its doze of medicine immediately after midnight 7/8 September.

The Naval Task Force, commanded by Commodore S. M. Anwar was ordered on 7 September, to move from its Patrol area and proceed to Dwarka to undertake the bombardment of Radar and other installations in that coastal town of India. The Task Force, altered course and steamed towards the Indian coast, soon after dark. A few radar contacts were reported by the ships enroute, but except one which was identified as a merchant ship, the rest were positively clouds or false echoes.

At 0013 hours the ships altered course and reducing the speed, were formed up in their correct formation to start the bombardment. Having given a few minutes to settle down, on the bombardment course, the Task Force was ordered to open up, by the Force Commander. All ships fired simultaneously. The Indian shore battery tried to fire back but was silenced within the first minute of the commencement of the bombardment. At 0026 hours a single Indian aircraft appeared. It was engaged by Alamgir and brought down. Within minutes more aircraft appeared. It appears that Indian Air Force had come out in force to engage the Pakistan Navy. Appreciating the development of air threat the Task Force Commander formed up the force in an air defence formation.

The Indian Air Force kept up their effort to locate the ships for at least an hour but seem to have failed in their efforts. Nature had also helped Pakistan Navy. Within minutes of the task having been completed low clouds appeared, as if from nowhere, and coupled with darkness made visibility, from the air, nearly impossible.

The success of the operation must be attributed to the excellent standard of training and fire discipline achieved by the Navy. Hard work over the past years had paid dividends. The navigational efficiency, good gunnery and sound planning had helped in achieving surprise, and the high morale of all officers and men had made it possible to execute this bold but simple plan in the shortest of time. As "Morning News" had said in its editorial. "That speaks volumes of the high degree of operational readiness and of efficiency of both the sea going force and the shore establishments. It also is a testimony to the fact that our sailors never allowed the numerical superiority and the weight of armaments to affect their morale."[1]

An eye witness reported after the war, "The military installations and railways buildings in Dwarka are in complete shambles. Within minutes of the bombardment having started the ammunition dump at the fort exploded and added to the general confusion. The attack was a

1. Morning News, Karachi, Thursday, December 9, 1965, p. 6 editorial.

complete surprise to the authorities and the people." A shopkeeper of Jamnagar who visited Dwarka a few days after it had been bombarded had to say, "I went to Dwarka because my sister lives there. When I arrived there I was shocked to see the amount of damage. The railway line had been damaged at three places and I had to walk to the town from a long distance away...........".

This short and crisp Naval Operation resulted in great deal of panic all along the coast of Gujrat and Kathiawar. It demoralised the already worried civilian population of this State. Apart from Dwarka itself, large scale exodus of population took place, from Oka, Port Bunder, Jamnagar and Bombay.

The Indian frigates that were known to be there, quietly slipped away into the Gulf of Kutch under the cover of darkness and remained in those shallow waters for the rest of the war. The Indian Air Force tried to avenge the insult to their sister service but losing an aeroplane early in the conflict turned around and finding the night too dark returned to Jamnagar only to find it being plastered by the PAF.

Pakistan Navy and its submarine particularly, waited in vain for the enemy to come out and give battle The Indian Naval planners had also read the second part of Commander Granfell's advice and knew that in the Aryan dominated Indian colony of Bharat there was no possibility of "public opinion" rising to a high pitch. Indian Navy, therefore, failed to be forced into activity.

Pakistan Navy resumed its task of patrolling the approaches to and from Pakistan ports. Routes between the two wings, for the merchant navy, were altered. It meant sailing longer distances but that did not matter very much. It meant a few more days and a little extra cost but the main thing was that the sea routes remained open. During the war 41 ships entered the port of Karachi and 40 ships sailed out of it. Sixty ships entered and sailed out of the ports of Chittagong and Chalna. This number included those carrying either vital stores for the defence services or important cargo for the civil population. In one case Pakistan Navy Units escorted a ship from Aden to Karachi. Similarly whenever supplies of petroleum products were expected into the ports of Pakistan and oil tankers, coming from various sources, had to be provided escorts, the Navy was able to meet the situation without, in any way, affecting its other operational tasks.

Ghazi, the submarine, throughout remained just outside the entrance to a major port of India. The Indians suspected its presence and on two occasions sent anti submarine frigates to destroy it. They were too small a prey for the submarine to bother about, and they had no desire to close into battle or place themselves in a position where

the submarine might decide to go for them. It appears they purposely carried out search for the submarine where they knew there was nothing and returned to give a negative report.

Commander Niazi the Captain of Ghazi eventually got tired of fruitless vigil. His orders were to sink the Indian heavy ships i.e. the Air Craft Carrier, Vikrant, or either of the two Indian cruisers. These three ships had gone into sick bay and their commanders were determined not to get them ready for operations for as long as the war lasted. Commander Niazi, therefore, requested permission to sink whatever came within his range. Naval Headquarters was reluctant to waste effort on smaller ships but eventually permission was given on, the night of 19/20 September, to use his own discretion.

On the evening of 22 September, the opportunity appeared to him at about sun-set. There were four enemy ships which Ghazi thought were all frigates. It is possible that one of them was a bigger vessel. Aided by shore based ALIZE aircraft they were pretending to be hunting for the submarine. Ghazi closed in and placing herself in the correct position fired her torpedoes. She heard two hits. The Indian vessels and aircraft tried to locate Ghazi but she had been trained to avoid such a search. India later denied that any Indian frigate had been sunk but she never said that none of her Naval ships was sunk or hit. The time when contact was made was late and seeing through the periscope the observer may have mistaken a bigger ship for a Frigate. Pakistan having announced that her navy had sunk a Frigate gave the Indians an excuse to deny the sinking of such a vessel without saying any thing more. The Indian contention that Pakistan Navy had hit a ship of Imperial Iranian Navy is so rediculous as not to be even worth commenting upon.

It is beyond dispute that Pakistan Navy inspite of its small size was able to fulfil its tasks. It forced the enemy to take shelter behind the air cover and coastal defences of its well protected ports. In the words of Panikkar Pakistan Navy was able to fulfil its object which "is to secure control of an area of the sea, thus preventing enemy ships from approaching the coast and interfering with trade and commerce......."[1]

It was able to destroy valuable and important coastal defences of one port and an important Radar Station. Pakistan Navy by taking bold action and tackling the problem in a military manner was able to achieve more than was expected of it. By using the Navy as a naval force should be used, Pakistan was able, in addition to the above, to keep all her sea routes open and protect the shores of Pakistan to the fullest extent. The enemy, although superior in force, was forced to remain inactive throughout the war. Even if it had tried to fulfil the task of defending the ports

1. Panikkar, op. cit, p. 96.

of India, a land which had given so much to them and their rulers, they would have had to come out of their hiding places. Quoting from Panikkar again, the Indian Navy had forgotten that "A navy merely based on the coast degenerates into a subsidiary wing of the army. The Indian Navy whether large or small must learn this lesson."[1] The fact that the Indian Navy ignored this advice and did not venture out of its well protected harbours cannot be without reason. As already brought out there can be only two reasons for it. First that Indian Navy was not allotted any role at all and the second that with all its facade of an efficient and brave service it was commanded by people who dared not venture into the open seas.[2]

The second reason appears slightly improbable. It must, therefore, be concluded that the Indian High Command wished its costly Navy to remain inactive and did not allot a task to it. On further thought one finds that there can be two reasons for not allotting the Indian Navy a task and a role. Either, as already mentioned, it could not contribute anything to the Political and the Military Objectives of India or its composition was such that it did not carry the confidence and trust of the rulers of India. The second reason appears rather remote. It is, therefore, safe to conclude that land hungry Bharati rulers with their age old prejudices against all sea travel (Kala Pani) did not consider that their Navy could play any role toward the fulfilment of the Objectives they had set before themselves and the nation. Whatever the reasons, one fact emerged from this war and that was that the small but well trained and efficent Naval Forces of Pakistan triumphed over a much larger Indian Navy. The retirement of Vice Admiral Soman, the Chief of Indian Naval Staff, which was announced in the Indian press on 29 September, within a week of the hostilities having ended, could not be without significance. The Indian Government, possibly under the pressure of public demand had censured one of its fighting services by the announcement of the retirement of its commander-in-chief six days after cease-fire. The lack of action by the Indian Navy was of the magnitude that even the Indian propaganda machinery which is well versed in the invention of news failed to find ways and means of building up the achievements of this very important service. Morning News of Karachi had very aptly remarked, "It is significant that the Indian propaganda machinery which claimed successes on land and in the air, did not lay any such claims against our Navy."[3]

Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, when addressing Pakistan Navy on January 23, 1948, had said, "You will have to make up for the smallness of your size by your courage and selfless devotion to duty for it

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1. Ibid p. 97.
2. Menon may have had solid reasons for declaring that the Indian "Navy should be at the bottom of the sea." Kaul, op. cit, p. 207.
3. Morning News Karachi Thursday December 9, 1965 p. 6. editorial

is not life that matters but the courage, fortitude and determination you bring to it."[1] They and their comrades in arms in the Army and the Air Force have proved to the world that those who with courage, determination and faith in God remain steadfast in the hour of trial triumph in the end, no matter how small their numbers may be.

كم من فئة قليلة غلبت فئة كثيرة باذن الله

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1. Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches, Feroz Sons Ltd. p. 45.

CHAPTER XVII

CONCLUSION

What was the outcome of war. This question has been asked by various people, each with a different object in mind. There is no doubt that it ended in a failure as far as the aims and objects of the attacking Indian Army were concerned. The world powers eventually did realise that the war was being waged in a very sensitive corner of the globe. They stepped in through the Security Council of the UNO and a Cease Fire was brought about before the "largest democracy of the world", the pet of the Western World, could be humbled thoroughly and completely. The war may not have been so undecisive if India had not been saved from the flames she had lighted herself to commit Satti, in the time old Vedic fashion.

The question of winning or losing a war depends on the Objective with which a country takes the field. The Political Objectives of sovereign States are known through the statements and policies of the leaders of those States. Let us once again examine the Political Objectives of Pakistan and India as expressed by the leaders of these two countries from time to time.

Quaid-e-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, had in his forthright manner, said, on June 3, 1947, four months before the transfer of power in the sub-continent took place, "Grave responsibility lies on the shoulders of Indian leaders. Therefore, we must galvanise and concentrate all our energy to see that the transfer of power is effected in a peaceful manner.'[1] This, however, was not to be. As we have seen the Indian Minister in charge of Law and Order, in the words of the British Force Commander and Abul Kalam Azad, the Congress President, was not concerned with peaceful transfer of power.[2] He saw to it that the Hindu-Muslim riots were engineered wherever the Hindus were in a majority and then he used his police to shoot down and arrest the few Muslims who escaped the fury of the Hindu mobs.[3]

When the partition of the sub-continent did take place Qaid-e-Azam was pained to see the results of the Indian leaders' shortsightedness. He had to say, "Unfortunately the birth of Pakistan was attended by a holocaust unprecedented in history".[4] He did not brandish a sword and gave no threats but merely advised, "The fitting response to the machinations of our enemies would be a grim determination to get down to the task of building our State on strong and firm foundations, a State which should be fit for our children to live in. This requires work, work and more work."[5] Not a word of rancour or threat, but the establishment of

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1. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, op, cit. p. 1.
2. See page 48-50.
3. See page 47.
4. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, op. cit. p. 22.
5. Ibid p. 23.

a firm State, "fit for our children to live in," the very thing the enemies of Pakistan were anxious to hinder and prevent. As opposed to the attitude of Pakistani leaders Mr. Patel was speaking of the reunification of the sub-continent once again[1] and sulking because Nehru did not approve the policy of killing more Muslims and driving the remainder into the newly formed State of Pakistan.[2]

It is clear that the Political Objective of Pakistan was not to conquer any part of Indian territories. As far as Kashmir is concerned it is neither a part of India nor can it ever be unless the people of Kashmir express their desire through a plebiscite. India is committed to this and cannot evade it either by force or treachery. The Government of India which had solemnly promised in 1948 that, "The question of accession is to be decided finally by a free plebiscite; on this there is no dispute," has not yet felt any pangs of conscience for failing to keep her solemn promise of nineteen years. Nehru, who is no more, had said, "We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people ......"[3] and yet the various Governments of India including that of Nehru himself have tried to evade and finally to refuse to face the issue.

The Political Objectives of India, as has already been pointed out, has been of a different nature. India had in the beginning been promising to hold plebiscite in Kashmir because her intentions had all along been to finish Pakistan and she hoped that once that was achieved there would be no one left to be interested in a plebiscite in Kashmir. The first man to accept Pakistan from amongst the Indian leaders was Patel[4] and yet it was he who on 14 August 1947 had said, "Sooner or later we shall again be united in common allegiance to our country".[5] The pattern of Indian thinking emerges clearly. If Pakistan would not agree to merge by persuasion she would be made to accede by force and be merged into Greater India by the Right of Conquest.[6] This, however, was not to be.

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1. See page 49.
2. See pages 48 and 49.
3. See page 62.
4. Abul Kalam Azad. op cit p. 184. Azad said, "I found that Patel was so much in favour of partition that he was hardly prepared to listen to any other point of view."
5. Amrita Bazar Patrika 15 August 1947.
6. As Rushbrook Williams has said, "......many of these leaders—as I know from talking to them looked on Pakistan in their hearts as a purely temporary aberration, and something which prudence had obliged them to acquise in merely for the moment. Hardly any of them expected Pakistan to last for very long....". The State of Pakistan, p. 45.

The sum total of all this is that the Indian leaders had accepted the partition of the sub-continent as a means of bringing about the withdrawl of British power from India, and had planned to capture it while it was still in the process of being organised into a State. It was only natural for the Indian leadership not to get reconciled to the very existence of Pakistan and to decide to exterminate it whenever an opportunity arose. As a consequence of this decision the one and only aim of Indian leadership has been to build up her armed forces to such an extent that it would give her an easy walk over. Her military budget has been rising, every year, at a tremendous pace.[1] Her economic needs have, for years, been met from massive economic aid from the Eastern and the Western Blocks until she altered her Foreign Policy to such an extent that from the autumn of 1962 she started receiving large scale military aid also from U.S.A., U.K. and USSR. Ostensibly the military preparations were meant to be directed against China but in fact the target was all along Pakistan.

The Chinese bogey which is clearly an imaginary threat, created in late fifties, cannot justify the gigantic military preparation of the giant that India is, surrounded by comparatively smaller and weaker nations, unless India desires to swallow them up one by one.[2]

The Military Objectives of Pakistan and India have earlier been discussed in detail. While Pakistan had no other desire except to defend herself, the Military Objective of India was the conquest of Pakistan. There can be no doubt about it. The success or failure of the Armed Forces of both nations has, therefore, to be viewed in the light of these Objectives.

One of the spokesmen of Indian General Staff has tried to cover the failure of Indian Armed Forces by misleading statements like, "who won

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1. We have it on the testimony of Lieut General Kaul that the "Indian defence budget had mounted from Rs. 300 crores in 1962 to Rs. 800 crores in 1965-66 and we had expanded our forces almost double their size in 1962" Kaul, op. cit. p. 471.

2. For a clearer picture of the friendly relations between India and China. See Kaul, page 179. Even when the relations became embittered, India never seriously thought that China will attack her. He says, "A discussion then followed, the upshot of which I understood to be that (since China was unlikely to wage war with India), there was no reason why we should not play a game of chess and a battle of wits with them...." Kaul, op. cit, p. 280

It is worth noting that Nehru never feared China and was merely using the imaginary threat as a means of collecting as much military and economic aid from all sources as possible. Kaul is very explicit on this point. He says, "Nehru believed on seeing reports by some of his Ambassadors, the assessment of his foreign office, the advice of some of his political and other confidents—that the Chinese were really not so strong, as they were made out to be......and on the whole the morale of the Chinese people and their Armed Forces was cracking up, and that if we dealt with them strongly, we should have the better of them". Kaul, op. cit., p. 339. This attitude of Nehru and his advisers resulted in India attacking China in 1962.

the war." Neither country. It was, inevitably, an inconclusive war. It was too short to be otherwise. With the two armies evenly matched[1] and well evolved, no conclusion could have been possible in twenty-two days of fighting."[2]

Indians spokesmen could not deny the failure of their armies to reach a conclusion but we maintain that as far as Pakistan is concerned a conclusion had been reached on 6 Sep, on Lahore and Sind fronts and on 8 Sep, on Sialkot front, in that, the Armed Forces of Pakistan had stopped the invasion in the very first encounters and successfully defended their country. India accepted this truth when she authorised her representative, Mr. Chagla to say, "I accept the Cease Fire here and now", because India had realised that there was no more fight left in her Armed Forces and the only way of an honourable withdrawal left to her was through a Cease Fire.[3] That was the reason why on 15 September, "India informed the U.N. Secretary General that....

India would agree to a cessation of hostilities and cease-fire without any conditions."[4]

The efforts of Indian spokesmen to tell their nation that the Indian Army was fighting an army of equal strength, by calling the clash as, "evenly matched", can only be looked at with sympathy for the Indian public who are considered so ill informed by its rulers. As shown elsewhere,[5] the comparative strengths of the two armies when they met, in terms of infantry battalions was 40: 136. These figures do not include that part of the Indian Army which was kept in reserve or detailed to keep law and order inside India and neither are included in this number, the formations facing East Pakistan and India's frontiers with China. The threat to Pakistan from these uncommitted forces was as real as that of any reserves can be. Knowing that China had no intention of declaring war on India[6], the latter could withdraw her forces from these fronts and use them against Pakistan, as in fact she did with a number of her mountain divisions.

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1. General Chaudhuri does not think that the two armies were evenly matched, writing in 1966, a year after his failure he is still adamant and refuses to consider Pakistan Army as "modern army in any sense of the word". Chaudhuri, op. cit, p. 90. His analysis for the failure of the Indian Army seems to be the lack of morale and not lack of armaments, as hinted by him on page 42 of his book.
2. Mankekar, op. cit., p. 154.
3. Lieut General Kaul appears to have reached the same conclusion as ourselves when he says, "India signed a cease-fire agreement with Pakistan after fighting for only 22 days. The question is, why was this done if India was, as is said, about to knock out Pakistan". Kaul, op. cit., p. 474.
4. Sakumar Biswas, The Three Weeks War, Sarkar and Sons, Calcutta, 1966. p. 87.
5. See p. 103.
6. See note 2 on page 209.

From the morning of September 6, 1965 to the 10th of September
the Objective of the Indian Army was Lahore.
Then suddenly:
The Gripe? became Sialkot.

Four days later the C-in-C Indian Army General Chaudhuri
had to explain in his action why "the Army failed to
go into Lahore."

THE INDIAN EXPRESS TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1965 ***(5)

Lahore Cantonment is our Army's aim

From S. V. BEDI
Express News Service

LAHORE FRONT, Sept. 20

From the morning of September 6, 1965 to the 20th of September the Objective of the Indian Army was Lahore.
Then, suddenly,
The Grapes became Sour.

Amrita Bazar Patrika, Saturday September 25, 1965 (7)

Army chief explains why Lahore was not taken

PATTON DEBACLE PUZZLE

FROM OUR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

NEW DELHI, Sept. 24. — General Chaudhuri explained why Lahore was not taken by Indian forces, a subject which has been much talked out. We never really intended to go into Lahore, the General said.

Four days later the C in C Indian Army General Chaudhuri had to explain to his nation why "We never intended to go into Lahore."

Neutral observers when reporting on the war, both before and after the Cease Fire have testified to the numerical and material superiority of the Indian Army. The correspondent of Field said in his desptach of 22 Sep "Indian forces are five times as great as Pakistanis but the Indians did not have things their own way. There seems little doubt that the Indians thought they would be able to break through at Sialkot where the heaviest fighting took plaee. But they made no break through anywhere. Being able to force only a draw with such overwhelming numerical superiority is not marvelous an achievement".

We are suprised at the short memory which the Indian General Staff and their appologists have shown. The author of India's Grand Strategic Plan, General Chaudhuri, who after he had failed to penetrate through Pakistani defences at Lahore and Chawinda, has said that this was merely "a war of attrition,"[1] and India never desired the conquest of Pakistan or a deep penetration into Pakistani territories. We would like to refer to the communique issued by the Indian Defence Ministry at the time when the massive attack was launched from Samba on to the plains of Sialkot. It had said, "The move will certainly split West Pakistan militarıly; Lateral lines of road and rail communications will be cut........Whatever doubts Pakistan might have had till now about India's capacity to do this, have been dispelled by the new front opened at Sialkot.".

There is ample evidence to prove that the Indian invasion was not a mere war of attrition. The Indian war communiques issued from time to time showed clearly the Objectives of the Indian Army as the towns of Hyderabad, Lahore and Sialkot. Although unintentionally, yet the author of "Three Weeks War" has unmasked the Indian intentions in an ample manner. Speaking of the attack by the Indian Army he says, "Indian Forces advanced into West Pakistan in two new sectors, Jammu and Rajisthan......In the Jammu area, a two-pronged drive was under way and the target was Sialkot, which was only fifteen miles away".[2] It remained fifteen miles away until the end. Speaking of the attack on Lahore and basing his information on the incorrect news supplied by the Indian General Staff, he says, "In the Lahore sector, the Indian Army patrols crossed Ichhogil Canal at several points. The crossing of Ichhogil Canal at different points along the length of the canal in the three different sectors of Lahore front. Wagah, Kalra and Kasur poses a direct and immediate threat to Lahore".[3] In view of these statements it is difficult to agree with the Indian C-in-C that the Indian Army never wished to make territorial gains in Pakistan.

There were no doubts in the minds of Pakistani's. They were certain that they were being attacked in right earnest and further that they would,


1. "General Chaudhuri addressing a news conference......said that India's main objective was attrition—destruction of as much fighting power of the Pakistan Forces as possible and not territory." Hindustan Times dated 25 September 1965.
2. Sakumar Biswas, op. cit., p. 70.
3. Ibid, p. 88.

with the help of Merciful God, be able to ward off this danger. The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan was confident that the Armed Forces of Pakistan will be able to meet the threat from India with courage and determination. He had, from the beginning, been associated with the defence plans and had contributed a great deal towards the training and equipping of the threee services and no one could be better acquainted with the fighting capabilities of the Defence Services of Pakistan. His confidence had permeated down to the lowest level. Armed with this confidence the defenders of Pakistan had taken the field. This was the reason why Pakistan had allowed free access to correspondents to visit the fronts during the war.

The Indians were angry with the foreign neutral observers for taking "their news from the more accessible Pakistani sources",[1] but they should have realised that they themselves were at fault in trying to hide their failures from their public and the world at large. If the conduct of the war which they are proud to term as 'inconclusive", and "too short to be otherwise"[2] was going according to plan, they would have had no reasons to keep it back from the press. The world and the Indian public would be within their right to ask in the words of Mankekar himself "If then, the Indian Army's performance in the Twenty two days War was nothing to be ashamed of, why did our "top brass" tend to shun public relations in general and shy at the foreign press in particular?"[3] Mr. Mankekar can shrug his shoulders and say "Ask me another;"[4] as he has done, but the foreign press he is talking about had to say something different. The correspondent of the Daily Mail had to say on 24 Sep, "With the battlefield now open to UN Observers and correspondents it has been clearly seen that Pakistan had severely thrashed India's armour despite Indian attempts to hide the facts with claims that the Pakistan Army and Air Force has been defeated".

The correspondent of Daily Mail said, a couple of days later, "If you drive along the dusty road through Chawinda, in the tank graveyard they call Sialkot, one fact emerges with brutal clarity; that most of the tank casualties there are Centurians.........I saw the wreckage of the Centurians littering the ground......On the front I visited, the Indian armour had been decisively beaten and very severely handled...The Pakistani losses were negligible by comparison in this Sector. The Indians fought hard to break through, south of Sialkot city and try to swing round to cut one main road linking Lahore with Rawalpindi...... thus virtually cutting West Pakistan in two". The thrust through Chawinda, started with a fan-fair had not been allowed to develop. The

1. Mankekar, op. cit., p. 162.
2. Ibid p. 154.
3. Ibid p. 161.
4. Ibid p. 161.



The Indian Elephant comes to grinding halt at Chawinda.

Indians knew it and so did the world. To have called it as anything but an invasion after it had failed miserably cannot add to the prestige of the Indian General Staff.

The Indian spokesman and also the Indian General Staff in their assessment of the war have consoled themselves by saying, that, "The Indian forces rarely came to grips with Pak Infantry".[1] It is difficult to grasp the meaning of this remark. Does it mean that the Indian Army itself failed to come to grips with Pak Infantry or is it meant to denote that Pak Infantry did not come to grips with the attacking Indian Army. If so, why did the Indian Army fail to make headway all along the numerous fronts. All we can do is to ask the Indian General Staff and their spokesman, "Who was attacking"? Who comes to grip with the defending troops in an attack? If the Indians were to have been on the defensive they would have been fully justified in deluding themselves with the pleasant thought that Pak Infantry does not come to grips with it's enemy. The few occasions that Pakistan Army took to offensive as in Chhamb, Khem Karan, Chawinda, Khokhrapar and Sulaimanki the Indians know well that their forces had to fall back to avoid coming to grips with "Pak Infantry", as Mr. Mankekar had to admit this fact, although in another context, when he said, "One could fully understand and sympathise with the need of "hush bush" in the initial phase of the Pakistani blitzkrieg through the Chhamb Sector, when the Indian Army was on the defensive and falling back. But there was no justification whatsoever for reticence in the later, brighter phases of the fighting".[2] Mr. Mankekar seems to be ill informed. The Indian Army was neither worthy nor lucky enough to have experienced any "brighter phases of the fighting". How could then the Indian "top brass" afford to allow the Indian and foreign press near the fighting zone. If, however, their misguided optimistic calculations of entering Lahore and cutting the road at Wazirabad had somehow materalised, they would certainly have flown the press forward.

The Indian General Staff are the best judges of the lessons learnt by them in this war and we believe that their assessment was not far from the truth when they sent round a circular letter to the lower formations decrying;

1. "The lack of offensive spirit at lower levels of the Indian Army".[3]
2. The faulty field intelligence due to poor patrolling by Indian Infantry Units.
3. Indifferent planning at brigade and battalion levels...... .."

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1. Ibid p. 156.
2. Ibid p. 161.
3. General Chaudhuri, the Indian COS, appears to have ascribed this lack of offensive spirit to lowering of the morale due to the reverses met by the Indian Army. He puts it in rather veiled words by saying, "The August September war with Pakistan seemed to show that if there are initial successes morale will rise high. Had there been initial failures what would have been the result?" Chaudhuri op cit. p. 42.

We would refrain from attributing motives to the Indian General Staff for these remarks, which may or may not be in the nature of "Passing the buck", but it would be correct to draw the conclusion that, either the Indian Plans were too unrealistic to be implemented by the Indian Army or else the lower formations and field commanders were ill trained to undertake such a gigantic task. It would be unfair on our part to accuse the Indian soldiers of cowardice. They fought well and bravely; at times even recklessly. There can be no other conclusion from the number of casualties inflicted on the Indian Army but it would also be correct to conclude that the Pakistani soldier, sailor and airman fought better and more bravely. It was he who dominated the battlefield from the first to the last.

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